Israelis, Palestinians are headed for a collision without intervention

It is no secret that the Middle East is not high on President Joe Biden’s list of strategic priorities. But the recent round of violence along the Israel-Gaza border and violent clashes between Israeli extremists and Palestinian residents of east Jerusalem, serve as reminders that our neck of the woods has a nasty habit of forcing itself on the American agenda.

Left to their own devices, Israelis and Palestinians are on a collision course. The detonators are already visible. They include, in addition to the noted clashes in Jerusalem and militant Hamas policy, the humanitarian plight of the Gaza Strip and an associated endless cycle of violence along its border with Israel; the de facto West Bank annexation – once creeping, now galloping; the eroding popularity and governance capacity of the Palestinian Authority (PA); Israeli settler violence perpetrated against Palestinians; tensions surrounding Jerusalem’s holy sites, and more.

Active US involvement is needed to arrest these trends and begin reversing the slide toward the tragedy of one state between the Mediterranean and the Jordan River – a recipe for endless conflict.

As former heads of the Israel Defense Forces’ Central Command and members of Commanders for Israel’s Security (CIS) – a non-partisan network of over 300 retired leaders of Israel’s security agencies – we suggest that Washington not wait for violence to further escalate, but rather preempt it. We therefore welcomed Secretary of State Antony Blinken’s announcement that the US will restore aid to the Palestinians as evidence that preoccupation with other priorities does not preclude engagement when needed.

To be sure, we cannot expect such senior intervention to become the routine, at least not for a while. Consequently, in the interim, the administration might empower mid-level officials overseeing this ‘file’ to lead an approach to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict that is less ambitious than one requiring presidential or secretarial hands-on engagement.

While clarifying its (and our) long term objective of a two-state solution, the administration will do well to accentuate stability as an interim, less demanding yet important and attainable objective. Essential toward preventing escalation while improving the lives of both Palestinians and Israelis, it is as important for preserving – and possibly improving – conditions for an eventual negotiated agreement. It should be accompanied by an articulation of the associated guidelines of expected conduct. Consequently, this approach may involve the following:

First, in presenting its political horizon, the administration should clarify that the eventual two-state outcome balances Palestinian aspirations for a viable, territorially contiguous, state with Israel’s Jewish-democratic character and security requirements. 

In so doing, the White House should make clear that the objective of Palestinian statehood must rest on an eventual unified government for the West Bank and Gaza, one whose control over all armed entities is secured. This presupposes an eventual disarming of Hamas, Palestinian Islamic Jihad and other Gaza splinter groups. The American statement should also specify the non-militarized nature of the future State of Palestine, as well as the need for negotiated robust security arrangements that will enable the gradual phasing out of an Israeli security presence in its territory.

Second, the administration should make clear its positions that Israelis and Palestinians refrain from actions that undermine this long-term objective: annexation – sweeping or gradual – outside a reciprocal context is unacceptable; Palestinian security coordination with Israel must not be tampered with; settler violence must be seriously addressed; the status quo regarding all Jerusalem holy sites must be maintained; and the PA cannot reward those who resort to violence or their families.

Third, the United States should impress upon the two parties the need to undertake – jointly when possible and independently when not – steps that reduce friction between the two peoples, enhance security for all, and remove impediments for Palestinian freedom of movement, governance and economic development.

Fourth, the US should invite relevant third parties to join its efforts, in both designing the strategy and its execution. This may include the Arab Quartet (Egypt, Jordan, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates) possibly augmented by other Arab countries that have normalized relations with Israel, the Munich Group (Germany, France, Egypt and Jordan), the International Quartet (the UN, EU and Russia, where the US is a member) and others.

Finally, as a well-functioning PA is as much in Israel’s interests – including security – as it is in the Palestinians’, Washington should lead efforts to shore up the authority. As we can attest from firsthand experience, the professionalism, discipline and motivation of PA security agencies – trained and equipped under the supervision of the US security coordinator – and their cooperation with our forces, have thwarted numerous terror attempts and saved many Israeli lives.

For the PA to be able to care for its people, and for its security forces to continue coordination with ours, it must enjoy popular support and legitimacy. The PA and its security agencies need to demonstrate that they serve Palestinian national aspirations, not perpetuate the Israeli occupation. This is why a credible political horizon and tangible improvement in Palestinian daily lives are critically important.

We realize that, at the moment, conditions might not be ripe for a conflict-ending, final status agreement. Nonetheless, we recommend that the Biden administration take the steps outlined above in order to keep open a path to an eventual two-state solution and to avoid major waves of violence en route.

As our sense of urgency is pitted against the reality of other US priorities, these undertakings might best be handled via the formation of a small, dedicated US inter-agency team. Free of other obligations, it could coordinate with allies the translation of these principles into an action plan and their respective contributions to its implementation.

Commanders for Israel’s Security is prepared to provide detailed suggestions and public support for efforts to stabilize the Israeli-Palestinian arena while securing – and improving – conditions for our common objective of an eventual, negotiated two-state agreement.