This week marks the six-year anniversary of the creation of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) between and the P5+1 nations, which has informally become known as the “Iran nuclear deal.” Proponents of the deal assert that the agreement is the best method for preventing Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons. Unfortunately, proponents of the deal are sadly mistaken. The JCPOA contains many flaws that not only fail to prevent Iran from acquiring a nuclear weapon, but actually grant Iran an internationally recognized path to nuclear weapons, in addition to emboldening the country’s military and regional ambitions.
Among the major flaws in the JCPOA are the sunset clauses. Under these clauses, key restrictions on Iran’s nuclear program expire. For instance, in October 2023, the proscription on manufacturing advanced centrifuges is scheduled to be lifted, which will allow Iran to build centrifuges that enrich uranium at a faster pace than the ones currently in operation. Beginning in 2026, Iran will be allowed to begin operating these advanced centrifuges.
Likewise, Iran will no longer be limited to 5,060 IR-1 centrifuges that it currently uses for enriching uranium, and will be able to operate as many of these centrifuges as it wishes. Having more centrifuges and ones that are more advanced will only shorten Iran’s breakout time to acquiring nuclear weapons. Furthermore, all of the limitations on performing research and development on centrifuges are terminated. By 2030, restrictions such as reprocessing spent fuel, which can be used for nuclear weapons, are retracted. Of great consequence, by January 2031, the constraints expire on the amount of uranium Iran can enrich.
Along with this, the JCPOA’s 300-kilogram limitation on Iran’s enriched uranium stockpile will end, enabling the country to enrich uranium at a level greater than the currently permitted 3.67% purity of uranium-235. This is significant because once these restrictions on enrichment levels and production expire, Iran can, without any restraints, enrich limitless amounts of uranium to levels required for a nuclear weapon. Additionally, the restrictions placed on heavy water reactors will be terminated, which would allow Iran to build new heavy-water reactors that could yield enough plutonium to power numerous nuclear weapons.
Another problem with the JCPOA is that the inspection process is very weak. Contrary to proponents of the deal, the JCPOA does not subject Iran to “anytime/anywhere” inspections. Under the agreement, Iran has 14 days to determine whether to comply with a request from the IAEA to inspect a facility where suspected prohibited nuclear activity transpired. If Iran objects, the issue would be deferred to an eight-member commission made up of the P5+1 and a European Union representative.
IRAN IS also a member of the commission. A majority of the members on the commission have to decide whether access should be permitted. If the commission decides against Iran, the Islamic Republic would be given three days to provide an inspection. The deal’s various allowances for extended debate and delay provide Iran with up to 24 days to conceal, remove or destroy evidence of any illicit nuclear activity.
Although 24 days might not be enough time for the Iranians to erase a large-scale facility, David Albright, a former weapons inspector in Iraq, said, “If it is on a small scale, they may be able to clear it out in 24 days.” The smaller-scale activities that Mr. Albright referred to include experiments that involve triggering a nuclear weapon or constructing a small plant to produce centrifuges. Alarmingly, Iran’s military sites are off limits under the JCPOA, enabling Iran to conduct critical activities in order to produce a nuclear weapon.
An additional flaw in the JCPOA is that ballistic missiles aren’t explicitly covered. Instead, ballistic missiles are addressed in UN Security Council Resolution 2231. The language of this resolution is much weaker than the six previous UNSC resolutions on Iran’s ballistic missiles, as it only “calls upon” Iran to not engage in any activity regarding ballistic missiles that are designed to be capable of delivering nuclear weapons. Previous resolutions mandated Iran “shall not undertake any activity related to ballistic missiles capable of delivering nuclear weapons.”
While Iran claims its missiles aren’t designed to deliver a nuclear weapon, eight of its 13 ballistic missile systems are able to deliver 500-kg. (1,100-lb.) payloads at a distance of 300 km. (186 miles) or more, which meets the international standard set by the Missile Technology Control Regime regarding the nuclear capability of missiles. Since the signing of the JCPOA, Iran has violated UNSC 2231 by testing more than 30 nuclear-capable missiles. Given that Iran doesn’t have a modern air force, the country would likely use its ballistic missiles to fire nuclear weapons at other countries.
A correspondingly troubling aspect of the JCPOA is that it provides sanctions relief for Iran but doesn’t tackle the country’s sponsorship of terrorism. Prior to former president Trump’s withdrawal from the JCPOA, Iran received billions of dollars in frozen assets from sanctions relief. The influx of cash into Iran only increased its aggressive actions, given that it could then provide more funds to its terrorist proxies. From 2016-2018, while sanctions were lifted, Iran was able to increase its military budget by more than 30%.
The JCPOA fails to achieve its ultimate goal of preventing Iran from acquiring a nuclear weapon. This failure could have immeasurable consequences for both the region and the international community as a whole.
The writer is a lawyer at Rudolph Clarke and a graduate of the Widener University School of Law.