What if it was called disengagement and not annexation? – opinion
What would happen if Netanyahu had introduced his plan as a unilateral disengagement rather than applying sovereignty/annexation?
By ORI WERTMANPalestinian demonstrators pray as an IDF soldier stands guard during a protest against Israel’s planned annexation, near Hebron, on July 17.(photo credit: MUSSA QAWASMA/REUTERS)
The Israeli imminent annexation of parts of the West Bank is of great interest to the international community. According to Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s plan, based on US President Donald Trump’s proposal to resolve the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, the Jewish state intends to apply its sovereignty over the Jordan Valley and the settlement blocs, which constitute about 30% of the West Bank. So far, Netanyahu’s plan has been widely criticized by many countries in the world, which express fierce opposition to the Israeli annexation move. In Israel too, there are voices against the Israeli imminent unilateral move, especially among left-wing politicians and former security officials, who say it would endanger the two-state solution and could ignite another round of violence in the Middle East. In addition, the opponents contend an Israeli annexation of the Jordan Valley may undermine the peace agreement with Jordan due to the fierce public opposition of the Hashemite kingdom to any Israeli act that violates Palestinians rights.While the discourse regarding the imminent Israeli move in the West Bank continues to arouse interest among the international media, there is one point that has not yet received any attention: what would happen if Netanyahu had introduced his plan as a unilateral disengagement rather than applying sovereignty/annexation?In fact, the Israeli “annexation” could have been easily labeled as a “unilateral disengagement” from some of the West Bank’s territory. At present, the Palestinian Authority led by President Mahmoud Abbas controls Areas A and B, which constitute 40% of the West Bank. 2.3 million Palestinians live in these territories, which is about 95% of all Palestinians living in the West Bank. The remaining 60%, known as Area C – which comprise all of the Israeli settlements and the Jordan Valley with a population of 600,000 Jewish settlers and 120,000 Palestinians – is controlled by Israel. In practice, whether it is called “annexation” or “disengagement,” the outcome will be that Israel will decrease its control over the West Bank, from 60% of the territory to about 30%, while the area under Palestinian control will be increased from 40% to 70% of the entire West Bank.In essence, there are three main dimensions that are relevant to this conundrum. First, while the term “annexation” provokes intense opposition among the international community – mainly due to the context of Russia’s annexation of Crimea in 2014, a move that has been widely condemned and even led to sanctions against Moscow – the term “disengagement” would have perceived by the international community as a positive act by Israel. Thus, like the Disengagement from the Gaza Strip in the summer of 2005, a move which has been praised and supported worldwide, it seems that the disengagement from 30% of the West Bank would add much credit to the Jewish state at the international level. In this context, the world media would describe the Israeli withdrawal as a courageous step in advancing the two-state solution and taking another step toward ending its occupation over the Palestinians.Second, from a Palestinian political point of view, a unilateral disengagement would not provoke domestic resentment. On the contrary, like the Israeli Disengagement from the Gaza Strip in 2005, the Palestinians would view an Israeli disengagement from 30% of the West Bank as a Palestinian triumph over the Israeli occupation by not giving the Zionists anything in return. In Jordan, whose leadership is adamant (at least publicly) for an Israeli annexation in the Jordan Valley, as many within the Hashemite kingdom calling for the cancellation of the peace treaty with Israel, an Israeli unilateral disengagement would have been welcomed in Amman as a positive step toward the end of Israeli occupation and the establishing of a Palestinian state.Third, from an Israeli political point of view, the situation is even more complicated. Netanyahu, who originally introduced his plan as an “annexation,” later began to use the phrase “applying sovereignty,” probably due to the realization that using the word “annexation” is not positively perceived by the international community. In this context, the prime minister cannot introduce his plan as a “disengagement”, given his past argument that the radical Islam would take over on any territory that Israel had unilaterally disengaged. Nonetheless, if Netanyahu had presented his plan as a “disengagement” after all, he would have definitely obtained support from the center-left bloc and the Israeli media. However, the right-wing camp would most likely criticize the prime minister, asserting that by giving up parts of the Jewish state homeland, Netanyahu bestows award to the Palestinian terrorism. In this situation, Netanyahu’s reign would be undermined from the Right, a position that he cannot afford himself politically.In conclusion, whether it is called “annexation” or “disengagement,” the outcome is physically identical, as Israel would still hold 30% of the West Bank. Politically, there is no doubt that labeling the plan as a disengagement could have enhanced Israel’s reputation internationally. Yet, although it was preferable for both sides to negotiate directly in order to reach peace, an Israeli unilateral move does not detract from the two-state solution. On the contrary, the Israeli move creates de facto, if not de jure, the establishment of a Palestinian state in 70% of the West Bank.The writer is a PhD candidate and research assistant at the International Centre for Policing and Security at the University of South Wales, UK.
