The “non-decision-making process” occupies a significant chapter in the theory and practice of politics. There is no shortage of excuses to justify refraining from dealing with explosive issues, including “if it ain’t broke, don’t fix it.” Indeed, in any serious policy paper the “do nothing” alternative will almost always be on the table. But exercising this option is still a decision that requires a careful examination of the trends in play that may change the current situation over time. To cling to the assumption that the status quo will hold until we are prepared to make a postponed decision is a dangerous illusion.
The future of the West Bank is a clear example of this. The dynamics in the territories will not take a time out. Since the signing of the Oslo Accords in 1993, the number of settlers across the Green Line has tripled. In each of the so-called status quo years, around 3,000 additional Jewish settlers moved into the territory designated for a Palestinian state (the area beyond the settlement blocs adjacent to the 1967 line). Today there are about 130,000 settlers there, and as a result we are approaching the point of no return – when it will no longer be possible to divide the land between the two peoples. The conclusion is simple: Failure to make a decision now serves the proponents of annexation.
It is widely believed that US President Joe Biden will not push for a speedy permanent agreement; he does not believe the parties are ripe for it. However, will he – unlike his predecessors – adamantly insist that Israel stop sabotaging the future prospects of implementing the two-state formula? Will he resolutely convey to Prime Minister-designate Bennett at their first meeting a message similar to the following?
“MR. BENNETT, you have opted to postpone Israel’s decision on the future of the West Bank. I can accept that. But in the meantime, I cannot accept the continuation of settlement activity in the areas beyond the populated blocs adjacent to the ‘67 lines. This is the minimum required for me to fend off pressure from my own party’s progressive wing. After all, Israel pledged not to establish facts on the ground that would impede a permanent agreement. Over the decades, I have proven my staunch commitment to Israel’s security, and I will continue to be a true friend to you as president.
“Still, my presidency is fundamentally different from Trump’s. I really want to see a world in which international cooperation steps up to face global challenges, in which a stronger emphasis is placed on human rights and democratization. I am convinced that you do not want to slip into the reality of a bi-national state in which Israel forfeits its Jewish and democratic character and the Palestinians are denied their rights. The wave of violence between Jews and Arabs that recently broke out in Jerusalem and spread to other mixed Israeli cities should serve as a warning signal for all of us.”
Although a date for Bennett’s White House meeting has not yet been set, one thing is rather clear: As long as Biden turns a blind eye, each year, another 3,000 settlers will be added to a highly calculated project designed to prevent the establishment of a Palestinian state. The new Israeli government will not interfere with this expansion because it is ruled by the “non-decision-making process” now formally anchored in the mutual veto power granted to Bennett and Lapid.
At the beginning of the negotiation between the two, Bennett fantasized about – to no avail – having an “extra vote” that would enable him to dominate every significant decision. But in practice, especially with regard to the Palestinian quandary, this precious vote belongs to someone stationed a long way from Jerusalem. It is in the hands of the president of the United States. Will he use the extra vote in his hands?
The writer is a senior fellow at The Jewish People Policy Institute (JPPI), a former director-general of Israel’s Foreign Ministry and the author of Shimon Peres: An Insider’s Account of the Man and the Struggle for a New Middle East.