Why Biden must tread lightly with Turkey

While a hardline approach to some of Turkey’s actions could be in America’s interests, it is also vital that the next administration treads lightly when dealing with Ankara.

US President Donald Trump and Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan meet during the annual NATO Heads of State and Government Summit in Watford, Britain, last year. (photo credit: PETER NICHOLLS/REUTERS)
US President Donald Trump and Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan meet during the annual NATO Heads of State and Government Summit in Watford, Britain, last year.
(photo credit: PETER NICHOLLS/REUTERS)
In January, US President-elect Joe Biden will enter the White House. The new administration will have several urgent challenges to tackle. On the domestic end, the spread of the COVID-19 pandemic and economic recovery are certainly the most pertinent issues.
But foreign concerns also await the new president. Biden will face a rapidly changing Middle East, a tense relationship with China and numerous low-level conflicts connected to US interests. One of the most consequential foreign policy objectives will be America’s engagement with Turkey and its leader, the dominating President Recep Tayyip Erdogan.
How the Biden administration manages to balance the delicate considerations vis-à-vis Ankara will determine the future relationship with this important ally.
Biden has been in national politics for a long time. It is no secret that in recent years, the longtime senator from Delaware has developed a low opinion of Erdogan. For starters, it seems that Biden at least suspects the Turkish president of being a staunch Islamist and secret terror supporter. Back in 2014, during his second term as US vice president, Biden was forced to issue a public apology after suggesting Erdogan had something to do with the rise of ISIS. Earlier this year, Biden gave an interview with The New York Times in which he voiced his concerns over Erdogan’s “autocratic” leadership. Biden went as far as to state Erdogan’s behavior made him weary over the American nuclear weapons based in Turkish territory.
Beyond Biden’s issues with Erdogan’s style and regional policies, his administration will inherit a raft of major disagreements with Turkey. In 2019, Ankara purchased the advanced Russian S-400 missile defense system. By acquiring the system, Turkey, a NATO member, signaled it was seeking closer ties with Moscow and was willing to defy American wishes on even highly sensitive defense-related issues. The geopolitics of the current Middle East also puts Turkey at odds with the US. Turkey has been waging a persistent campaign to its south over the past several years to clamp down on Kurdish forces in northern Syria. The Kurds, who have been a key American ally in the fight against ISIS and their jihadist allies, are seen by Erdogan as a threat to Turkish sovereignty. The Turkish president has sworn to destroy the “terrorist corridor” Kurdish militias have established on his southern border.
Adding to this diplomatic tumult, Turkey has pitied itself against several regional nations spanning from Israel, to Egypt and to Italy in a high stakes energy-rights dispute. This has led to yet another aggressive military venture by Erdogan in Libya. As if these regional conflicts weren’t enough, the US government has been investigating the Istanbul-based Halkbank, one of the largest financial institutions in Turkey, on suspicions of sanctions violations related to Iran. In 2017, deputy head of the bank Mehmet Hakan Atilla was arrested in Miami on federal charges, and several Halkbank executives and other Turks are still at risk of prosecution.
The incoming president has clearly voiced his opposition to Turkey on many of these ongoing conflicts. In regards to Turkey’s efforts in Syria, for instance, (perhaps the most sensitive of all the issues) Biden has stated he would never abandon Kurds, a stance which has drawn the ire of the Turkish government. Biden’s cabinet picks have also indicated his intention to oppose Turkey. For instance, Biden’s pick for secretary of state, Antony Blinken, has been a long advocate of American intervention in Syria – which would mean more support for the Kurdish cause and a limit to Erdogan’s maneuverability. Similarly, the Halkbank prosecution would likely gain traction under Biden. Many have pointed to delays in the case as being caused by US President Donald Trump’s administration’s bias toward Erdogan.
While a hardline approach to some of Turkey’s actions could be in America’s interests, it is also vital that the next administration treads lightly when dealing with Ankara.
Despite Turkey’s actions that have run contrary to its interests, the US must ensure that its ally is not further alienated from the West. An over-application of pressure on Ankara could trigger flashpoints in Turkish-American relations and drive Erdogan into further solidifying ties with US adversaries the likes of Iran, Russia and China.
Maintaining good terms with Turkey will have important implications for America’s strategic aims. Economically, Turkey straddles three continents and plays an important role as a bridge in many areas of business and commerce. On defense, Turkey presents a strong ally with a modern military and its own independent and booming defense industry. Turkey could also play a role in furthering diplomatic progress in the Gulf and in the Arab world, helping to resolve the rivalry in the Gulf.

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The ball is firmly in America’s court. It is doubtful whether Turkey has the institutional capacity to build bridges with the US at this point in time. Any strengthening of ties will be at the initiative of Washington. The next administration can and must take advantage of regional shifts, which include both the new Middle East alliances as well as Turkey’s own floundering economy, as an opportunity to offer cooperation and develop better relations with the Turkish government. Doing so will help ensure an important partner in advancing America’s interests over the next four years.
The writer is a researcher specializing in US foreign policy and global politics.