Israel should not re-occupy the Gaza Strip, and should make sure Palestinians still rule the area, Commanders for Israel’s Security (CIS) and other former top defense officials said in its recommendations for how Israel should handle Gaza post-toppling Hamas.
In contrast, several officials familiar with government deliberations on the issues are far more circumspect about sharing their views, and about whether a serious strategy can be framed, before the outcome of the ground invasion (which continues to be delayed) becomes clearer.
According to the senior former security officials, “The war must end decisively for Israel, in a manner which will restore Israel’s standing and enhance deterrence. Towards this end, diplomatic, economic and other tools of statecraft should be pursued alongside the military campaign.”
“Israel has no intention of occupying the Gaza Strip and will not reassume responsibility for it. The Gaza Strip must be ruled by a Palestinian government with the assistance of international entities and a direct connection to the Palestinian government in the West Bank,” said CIS.
Further, CIS said, “Israel should relinquish control of the territory captured during the operation as quickly as possible and should not repeat the scenario of becoming mired in the Lebanese quagmire. This imperative does not include territory captured for the purpose of widening the buffer zone.”
Questions about this new Palestinian regime in Gaza
CIS’s strategy paper is one of the most detailed to date on the issue by top officials, though it still leaves many open questions: What form will a new Palestinian regime in Gaza take? How much will the Palestinian Authority dominate this regime versus local representatives from Gaza? Given Hamas’s success at eliminating organized internal opposition, how will Gaza have local representatives if none of the class of Hamas, rulers for the last 15 years, will be allowed in the new regime?
Also: Why will this new Palestinian government, with whatever unidentified international assistance, succeed in keeping Hamas down where the PA, UNFIL, and other international peacekeeping groups have failed in the past to keep down determined local violent groups?
Finally, CIS said to avoid the Israeli model of the early 1980s of interfering with who ran Lebanon, but suggested an unidentified larger security zone. This larger security zone idea is another large piece of what kept Israel mired deep in the “Lebanese quagmire” for almost another 20 years.
A top former intelligence official separate from this group gave a wider number of potential choices of what could happen to Gaza post Hamas.
“We need to take apart Hamas, and any future ruler of Gaza cannot bring back the military power. All of Oslo was based on the paradigm of demilitarization. We dropped this requirement for Hamas. We need to hand off Gaza to Egypt, or the Palestinian Authority, Jordan, or the UAE,” said the former top intelligence official.
However, he added, “Maybe no one will want to take it.”
Despite this dilemma, he stated, “that even in the worst case, it would take years for some other bad actor to achieve the militarization levels of Hamas.”
“Hamas had 15 years for its military buildup. And it is not just that we did not disrupt their militarization. [Prime Minister Benjamin] Netanyahu even helped Hamas with funding and materials. The materials were for building, but they were used for making rockets and tunnels. It does not matter who rules Gaza, we cannot let them rebuild their military power.”
This official was possibly being the most blatantly honest of all, recognizing that there may be no perfect solution that can prevent Hamas from at some point regaining control of Gaza.
However, he recognized that even if Hamas returned in the worst case scenario, this would take time, and he was pointing out that that time itself and extra time afterward to rebuild military power, would give a much longer break from large rounds of fighting with Gaza.
Former national security council chief from 2017-2021 Meir Ben Shabbat said using overwhelming force against Hamas to defeat it quickly and comprehensively is the only thing Israel should be thinking about at this stage.
“Israel is exempt from worrying what will happen in Gaza after the war. It must overthrow Hamas and destroy its military capabilities, and let the chips fall where they may,” said Ben Shabbat, who now also heads Misgav: The Institute for National Security and Zionist Strategy.
Ben Shabbat appears to be concerned that the invasion itself continues to be delayed and to look more surgical and less aggressive than Netanyahu and other officials’ public statements would suggest.
Regarding the multiple officials familiar with government debates on the issue, one noted that Israel may not have a dominant role in deciding who to hand Gaza to, even if it militarily defeats the Gaza group.
In other words, once Israel refuses to hold on to Gaza itself, and asks for international help, Jerusalem may be stuck with arrangements sponsored by the UN, the US, or some other mix of powers.
Others implied that the invasion itself was so large, and the guerilla war afterward so unclear and vague, that it was nearly impossible to plan post-war issues until the shape of the war itself eventually becomes clearer.