Israel-Hamas War Day 192: What's going on in the Middle East?

Hezbollah stands at a crossroads after Iran’s attack on Israel.

Tehran launched drones and missiles from multiple directions; Hezbollah is a key Iranian-backed terrorist group. However, its role in the attack illustrates how it is trying to balance its role in Lebanon with its alliance with Iran.

Hamas launched its attack on Israel on October 7. One day later, Hezbollah joined in from the North. Over the past six months, it has posed as a support beam for Gaza and Palestinians. On Saturday, that talking point shifted because Hezbollah clearly supported Iran’s attack on Israel, which signals to Lebanon that Hezbollah is increasingly dragging Beirut into a potential escalation it might not want to be a part of.

On Friday, a day before the Iranian attack, Hezbollah escalated its attacks on the North. Now, Iran attacked using drones and missiles and mobilized the Houthis in Yemen to join. Hezbollah’s attack on Friday included dozens of launches and culminated over the next two days with attacks against the Golan: Over 150 rockets targeting military bases.

This is a serious escalation, the kind, in the past, Hezbollah only did when it claimed to respond to Israeli airstrikes deep inside Lebanon. It means that the Hezbollah threat to Israel coincided with the Iranian attack, and was part of Hezbollah showing support to its patron, extending far beyond Hezbollah’s claims to be backing Palestinians or “defending “ Lebanon. What it did was more openly join Iran as an acting proxy.

Grad rockets used by Hezbollah (credit: Alma Research Institute)

That night, Hezbollah no longer used force to support Palestinians, but rather was part of the Iranian response to Israel. It now becomes increasingly apparent that Hezbollah is acting on Iranian guidance.

Iran backed Hezbollah for years, dating back to the 1980s; key IRGC members supported it. Now, things have changed because Hezbollah is being used as an Iranian tool, meaning that Hezbollah will have a harder time pretending that it is merely “resisting” in Lebanon.

Hezbollah carried out more than 3,100 attacks on Israel since October 7. Now, it is expanding its usefulness to Iran as a proxy, but this very act could potentially harm its image in Lebanon which can put pressure on the group to change course.

It's time for Hezbollah to make a decision

As Hezbollah’s true colors as a proxy are revealed, it is worth highlighting how Hezbollah has been holding Lebanon hostage to the Iranian escalation in the region. Israel’s goal in the North is to establish enough of a secure border to allow the return of the 50,000 or so displaced citizens; this cannot be done if Hezbollah is on the border and its threats are so clear. For that to happen, Hezbollah would have to be pushed back to a depth of more than 10 miles into Lebanon, or as far back as the Litani river. This would put Israel out of range of Hezbollah's anti-tank missiles and its large short-range Burkan missiles and would make it harder for Hezbollah to conduct an October 7 type of attack.

As some in Lebanon become frustrated with Hezbollah’s actions, there may be an opportunity to achieve this goal. Hezbollah is facing pressures that it hadn’t before, and now has revealed its hand as working for Iran, which makes it harder for it to spread its propaganda about backing Gaza.

Many questions remain about what comes next in Lebanon. Israel and Lebanon signed a maritime deal in 2022 that was supposed to benefit both countries and ostensibly reduce tensions. Before the deal, Hezbollah threatened Israel and then escalated tensions in early 2023. This shows that it cannot be trusted.

It is unclear how Hezbollah will be deterred from its attacks on Israel. Time will tell if the Iranian-backed group will change course.

A fateful and climactic internal debate took place on Saturday night – and still is taking place – in the war cabinet and within the IDF about how and when to respond to Iran’s attack.

This could be seen as of similar importance – perhaps even more – than the debates surrounding the future of the Gaza war.

At the end of the day, Iran is Israel’s ultimate adversary, not just for the next five days or five months, but potentially for decades.

And despite Hamas’s one-time success on October 7, Iran, with its Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC), web of proxies, over 80 million people, huge land mass, and nuclear weapons program, is far more formidable.

There is no such thing as permanent and perfect deterrence.

Israeli missiles in action. April 14, 2024. (credit: IAI)

But, if Israel does not restore that balance, there is no reason why Tehran shouldn’t attack directly again, to more devastating results.

The question which Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, Defense Minister Yoav Gallant, war minister Benny Gantz, and IDF Chief-of-Staff Maj.-Gen. Herzl Halevi’s struggle is with how to best restore that deterrence, without instigating a regional war.

This is not so different from key moments on October 11 when Gallant, Halevi, and IDF Northern Commander Maj.-Gen. Uri Gordin pushed for a surprise attack on Hezbollah – only at very symbolic levels.

Gantz, Gadi Eisenkot, some senior IDF officers, and eventually Netanyahu, the government, and the military decided on a “Gaza First” policy, making the reaction to Hezbollah more passive.

It seems that, so far, the decision whether to attack Iran holds some similar dynamics, though Gallant may have shifted from a more aggressive Hezbollah approach to waiting and trying to milk the moment with Iran for additional military or diplomatic commitments from allies that would prefer Israel stand down.

There is also some confusion regarding Gantz and Eisenkot’s position, with some reports claiming they wanted to counterattack immediately.

The Jerusalem Post understands that its approach was extremely limited, which is why it was not viewed by other decision-makers as a strong enough counterattack that would restore deterrence.

As well, the IDF, at its top levels, has been more reserved about a rushed counterattack, even as it wishes for deterrence.

Meaning, that there is no single person in power in the war cabinet or the military publicly pushing for an immediate response, as of the time of printing.

This was reflected in the stunningly-fast decision by the IDF Home Front Command to restore normal educational and public gathering conditions, just 24 hours after announcing those emergency measures.

Those pushing for intense response are outside war cabinet

Those who are publicly pushing for an immediate and harsh response are outside of the war cabinet – Itamar Ben-Gvir and Bezalel Smotrich.

Even Gideon Sa’ar, who has outflanked much of the government on the Right in terms of aggressive approaches, would prefer to wait on Iran.

No one in the opposition has been vocal about attacking Iran sooner or more harshly, with opposition head Yair Lapid criticizing the government, but being silent on the public dialogue of what to do about Iran.

No one in the opposition has been loud about attacking Iran sooner or more harshly, with Lapid making some loud political statements against the government, but disappearing from the public debate of ideas of what to do about Iran.

There was also some speculation that Israel is playing a double game, and a meeting between Netanyahu and Lapid could mean an attack on Iran sooner, despite all of the counter-signals.

But unless Israel is pulling off one of the best deception acts in war history to surprise Iran, its attack will likely be deferred until at least after Passover, possibly even until a much later date, and very much depending on Rafah.

There were hints from several top Israeli and US officials that Jerusalem might get more latitude against Hamas in Rafah, as part of holding off against Tehran.

Will Israel still be able to attack Iran as its coalition shakes, with possible elections later this year, and the US presidential election around the corner?

What would a potential Israeli attack look like?

Regardless, whether now or later, if the government and military do decide to attack, how will they do it? Will they go big as Gallant and Halevi suggested against Hezbollah on October 11? This could involve dozens and dozens of Israeli aircraft targeting the ayatollahs’ nuclear program, which would also require disabling Iran’s extensive advanced antiaircraft network. It could even branch out far more to attack its military power centers.

It would require significant risk to the pilots and incur a significant danger of a substantial counterattack by Iran and Hezbollah – though at this point we have seen quite a lot of those attacks already.

Top Israeli officials confirmed to the Post that Iran does not have more powerful weapons than it attacked with on Saturday night, such that the main additional risk would be whether Hezbollah might go all in, and it might not – after being punished by Israel for six months.

A lesser attack might involve targeted strikes on IRGC bases with ballistic missiles and drones, especially those from where the most recent attack was launched. However, this too would involve high risk, both at the attack phase and at a later stage of retaliation.

Israel would need to hope that Tehran realized this past weekend it had watered down its response by not going after nuclear sites.

A variation could be a limited strike using only drones and ballistic missiles just like Iran did.

Alternatively, Israel could use Mossad to covertly hit some of the nuclear or weapons facilities to kill select officials, choosing not to “out” itself in a public direct attack the way that Iran did.

Alternatively, Israel could use Mossad to covertly hit some of the nuclear or weapons facilities to kill select officials, choosing not to “out” itself in a public direct attack the way that Iran did.

Gallant will probably push for a more aggressive approach at some point, while Halevi is a bit of a wild card. He is not as ideologically committed to aggression in general but has taken more aggressive views following the shock and trauma of October 7.

Whatever these officials end up deciding will set the new paradigms for Israeli-Iranian military relations, after Tehran demolished the old ones. 

Israel’s wars changed fundamentally in January 1991.

Why January 1991? Israel was not at war with any of its Arab neighbors at that time.

No, it wasn’t, but the US – under President George H.W. Bush – was. As a result of the US invasion of Iraq, Iraqi leader Saddam Hussein decided to launch Scud missiles toward Israel, primarily at Tel Aviv and Haifa.

From that moment on, Israel’s confrontations with enemies beyond its borders changed forever. It was no longer Israeli tanks against Egyptian tanks in the Sinai or Syrian tanks on the Golan Heights; rather, it was their rockets and missiles against Israel’s population centers, their missiles against Israel’s kindergartens.

So what was Israel to do? It did not do back then what it did for the first time in its history after October 7 and emptied large swaths of its territory. Instead, it embarked on an ambitious project to develop a three-tiered missile defense system so that if the enemy would launch missiles or rockets, Israel would be able to swat most of them out of the sky.

Israel’s missile defense system actually started a few years earlier. In 1988, following the purchase by Arab countries of surface-to-surface missiles and the use by Saddam during the Iran-Iraq war of a Scud with a range of 600 km. that could hit Tel Aviv, Israel joined Ronald Reagan’s Strategic Defense Initiative, popularly known as “Star Wars.” A contract was signed with Israel Aircraft Industries to develop an experimental missile that could hit an incoming rocket. Real movement on that project, however, did not begin until 1991, when the need became critically apparent as a result of Saddam’s Scud attacks on Israel.

The Israel Missile Defense Organization conducts live-fire intercept tests of the David's Sling weapon system (credit: DEFENSE MINISTRY)

The three-tiered missile defense system that Israel developed since then is made up of the Arrow, designed to intercept ballistic missiles from Iran that fly above the earth’s atmosphere; David’s Sling, intended to intercept medium- to long-range rockets, cruise missiles, and drones in the hands of Hezbollah in Lebanon; and the Iron Dome, to take out the short-range rockets that Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad fire from Gaza.

April 14, the night of Iran’s drone and missile attack, is a landmark in that it demonstrated that this anti-missile defense umbrella actually works, and this – like those Scuds in 1991 – could have a lasting impact on how wars will be waged here going forward.

The Arab world, in the beginning, believed it could defeat Israel through the use of conventional armies, trademarks of the 1948, 1967, and 1973 wars. When it became clear that Israel could not be defeated through traditional warfare, the country’s enemies shifted to a different tactic: terrorism, with the belief that terrorism would wear down the will and resilience of the nation.

When that, too, failed, the focus turned to rockets, in the belief that raining down hundreds and perhaps thousands of rockets on the country would lead to its demise. As a result, developing a system to prevent exactly that from happening became a top priority, one that relied on cutting-edge technology.

The faith of Israelis in its military’s cutting-edge technology took a battering on October 7, however, when all that vaunted technology – all the hi-tech bells and whistles that were supposed to make the Gaza border impenetrable – failed and were no match for 3,000 well-armed and well-trained terrorists intent on breaking through the border wall.

Not only did the technology fail in preventing a massive terrorist infiltration, but the intelligence community, which relies heavily on technology to gather intelligence, failed to warn of an impending attack. All of a sudden, placing enormous amounts of faith in the ability of state-of-the-art technology to keep the country safe seemed like a terrible mistake.

On October 7, technology and intelligence failed Israel. On April 14, it saved it.

Well, at least the technology did.

Despite intelligence failings, technology continues to ensure Israel's safety

The initial intelligence upon which the IDF reportedly acted on April 1 to kill the Iranian Revolutionary Guards Corps commander Mohammad Reza Zahedi in Damascus was flawed. Israel reportedly – and not without reason, given past experience – did not expect the type of Iranian reaction that followed, and definitely not an attack from Iranian soil. That assessment, as is now painfully evident, was way off base.

Nevertheless, Israel – thanks to the cooperation of the US and regional allies – did have exact intelligence Saturday night of an impending attack. On October 7, the military received signs of an imminent attack but did not act on that information. On April 14, it had the information and mobilized fully to act on it.

Unlike what happened on October 7 when all the hi-tech wizardry failed to block Hamas, this time, all that wizardry did the trick – and the ability to shoot down a missile above the earth’s stratosphere with another is nothing less than wizardry. The impressive show this missile defense system put on was important not only for Israel’s enemies to see, but also for Israelis to see themselves.

It is clear why Hezbollah and Iran needed to witness the effectiveness of missile defense systems. This helps to restore Israel’s deterrence, which suffered a blow on October 7. Despite enduring a terrible setback then, Israel with its intelligence and technology proving penetrable and far less robust than expected, the capability on Sunday morning – with assistance from allies – to intercept 99% of the projectiles fired from Iran must be sobering for its enemies. They view their rocket arsenal as the most effective way to attack the Jewish state.

As important, however is the impact of this technological success on Israelis themselves.

It was striking to see how quickly Israeli citizens returned to themselves within hours of watching missiles and rockets and drones in real-time headed in their direction. Once the all-clear signal was sounded, life went back to normal as the country saw that the system worked and that hundreds of rockets, missiles, and suicide drones fired at the same time could be batted away.

Yes, it’s expensive, and no, the country can’t do it all on its own. But this showed that the umbrella works, and having a working umbrella is hugely reassuring when – as is currently the case – the regional forecast is for storms ahead.

The US is still pursuing a hostage deal, a spokesperson for the State Department said on Monday. 

Spokesperson Matthew Miller said there's an "incredibly significant" proposal that last week went from the US, Egypt, Qatar, and Israel to Hamas. He said Israel moved a "significant way" in submitting that proposal. 

"There's a deal on the table that would achieve much of what Hamas claims it wants to achieve. And they have not taken that deal," Miller said. "Now, they can speak for themselves about why they haven't taken that deal. But the bottom line is they have rejected it."

Hamas' rejection of the deal is preventing a ceasefire

If Hamas did accept the deal, it would allow for an immediate ceasefire in Gaza of at least six weeks that would benefit the Palestinian people they claim to represent, Miller said. It would also allow the US to continue the improvements in the delivery of humanitarian assistance that have been seen over the past week.

IDF humanitarian aid trucks enter through the Northern crossing of Israel in to Gaza on April 12, 2024 (credit: IDF SPOKESMAN’S UNIT)

"Those improvements have been significant and are ongoing, but if you didn't have active ongoing hostilities, the US and other partners could do even more to bring humanitarian assistance in. 

"The bottom line is Hamas needs to take that deal. And they need to explain to the world and to the Palestinian people why they aren't taking it," Miller said. "Because it is Hamas right now that is the barrier and the obstacle to a ceasefire in Gaza."

The Islamic Republic of Iran continues to exploit its small Jewish community for propaganda purposes in its war against Israel.

The Jewish community in Tehran took to its Telegram page on Monday to announce its “Appreciation of the hero armed forces of the land of Iran” for its massive aerial bombardment of Israel on Saturday and Sunday.

Alireza Nader, an Iran expert who closely monitors minority communities in the Islamic Republic, told The Jerusalem Post, “The small Jewish community in Iran is held hostage to the whims of the regime. Any time the regime wants revenge against Israel, it eyes Iranian Jews.”

Beni Sabti, an expert on Iran from the Institute for National Security Studies, told the Post, “The Jewish community is so afraid and is panicking and believes the regime will take revenge against them.”

Sabti, who was born in Tehran and follows the Jewish community’s statements, said the Iranian Jewish community’s reaction is unprecedented in its subordination to the jingoism of the Islamic Republic.

Iranian Jews celebrate Rosh Hashana in 2014 at the Yusef Abad Synagogue in Tehran (credit: OLEKSANDR RUPETA / AFP)

The Telegram statement also noted that armed forces of Iran are “punishing the Zionist enemy” in a reference to Israel’s reported strike that killed Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps general Mohammad Reza Zahedi along with six other Iranian regime officials in Damascus on April 1.

A fateful and climactic internal debate took place on Saturday night – and still is taking place – in the war cabinet and within the IDF about how and when to respond to Iran’s attack.

This could be seen as of similar importance – perhaps even more – than the debates surrounding the future of the Gaza war.

At the end of the day, Iran is Israel’s ultimate adversary, not just for the next five days or five months, but potentially for decades.

And despite Hamas’s one-time success on October 7, Iran, with its Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC), web of proxies, over 80 million people, huge land mass, and nuclear weapons program, is far more formidable.

There is no such thing as permanent and perfect deterrence.

Israeli missiles in action. April 14, 2024. (credit: IAI)

But, if Israel does not restore that balance, there is no reason why Tehran shouldn’t attack directly again, to more devastating results.

Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has asked the IDF for "potential target options" for an Israeli attack on Iran, according to The Washington Post on Monday, citing Israeli sources. 

According to the report, the targets include an Iranian facility in Tehran or a cyberattack. 

The US is committed to Israel's security and is also committed to a ceasefire that will bring the hostages home and prevent the conflict from further spreading, President Joe Biden told reporters Monday afternoon ahead of a meeting in the Oval Office with Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammed Shiaa Al-Sudani, according to White House pool reports. 

Commenting on Iran's unprecedented attack against Israel, Biden said, "together with our partners, we defeated that attack.”

Biden also called the US-Iraqi relationship "critical for the region and the world."

Biden did not take any further questions from reporters at this time. 

A hostile aircraft intrusion warning was activated in Adamit, Eilon, Goren, Gornot HaGalil, Hanita, Ya'ara and Arab al-Aramshe, Monday afternoon.

France will do all it can to avoid further escalation in the conflict between Israel and Iran in the Middle East, President Emmanuel Macron said on Monday, urging Israel to show restraint in any response.

"We are all worried about a possible escalation," Macron told BFM TV and RMC radio.

Iran launched hundreds of drones and missiles at Israel on Saturday night in response to a suspected Israeli attack on Iran's Syria consulate on April 1.