Let’s start with how it is different.This is the first conflict since Hamas took over Gaza in 2007, in which the IDF invaded for real.There was a sort of invasion-lite of the outskirts of northern Gaza in 2014, and there was a somewhat more serious incursion of Gaza in 2008-2009.
But in 2014, the IDF barely entered any critical areas, keeping most ground troops on the edge of urban areas, and mostly depended on airstrikes, tank, and artillery fire.Though 2008-2009 was more serious, the actual ground invasion part of the war lasted only about two weeks, far from the amount of time needed to substantially harm Hamas long-term, let alone topple the terrorist group.In 2012 and 2021, the IDF almost entirely relied on air power, and in numerous other exchanges with Gaza since 2007, relied entirely on airpower.In most earlier rounds, the IDF did not call up all the reserves, or but some tens of thousands soldiers, with most doing very little.In contrast, this time the IDF called up 360,000 reservists, large numbers of whom served in invasions deep into the heart of Gaza’s most dangerous cities.This time, the IDF has already taken operational control over Gaza City, Jabalia, Shejaia, and most other areas of northern Gaza around two weeks ago (Daraj – Tuffah remains unconquered, but is expected to be finished soon). Also, this time the IDF is deep into the heart of Khan Younis, Gaza’s second-largest city.Next, if in the past the IDF neutralized some tunnel shafts, this time it is spending extensive time and munitions to completely destroy tunnels which it discovers.If in 2008-2009, fewer than 1,500 Palestinians were killed and in 2014 around 2,100 (about half of whom were fighters), this time the IDF is probably close to having killed 9,000 Hamas terrorists, plus wounding thousands, and arresting reportedly well over 1,000.