A mix of top Israeli and US officials have poured cold water on reports claiming that a multinational Arab force is feasible to manage internal security in Gaza – and potentially the West Bank.
Some officials also appeared to dismiss reports that Israel and the US were close to agreeing on a very tamped-down invasion of Rafah, which Washington would support, instead of criticizing.
These dual reports, taken together as one full picture, could have potentially solved a variety of Israel’s remaining largest problems in a grand series of bargains.
Israel wants to dismantle the remaining six Hamas battalions out of the original 24, four of which are in Rafah. But the problem was that everyone else – most importantly the US – not only opposed such an invasion for humanitarian reasons, but some countries preemptively froze arms purchases, to convey to Jerusalem the seriousness of their opposition.
Does Israel need to forget about Rafah?
Does this mean Israel needs to forgo Rafah, leaving one-quarter of Hamas’s military intact?
A mix of top Israeli and US officials have poured cold water on reports claiming that a multinational Arab force is feasible to manage internal security in Gaza – and potentially the West Bank.
Some officials also appeared to dismiss reports that Israel and the US were close to agreeing on a very tamped-down invasion of Rafah, which Washington would support, instead of criticizing.
These dual reports, taken together as one full picture, could have potentially solved a variety of Israel’s remaining largest problems in a grand series of bargains.
Israel wants to dismantle the remaining six Hamas battalions out of the original 24, four of which are in Rafah. But the problem was that everyone else – most importantly the US – not only opposed such an invasion for humanitarian reasons, but some countries preemptively froze arms purchases, to convey to Jerusalem the seriousness of their opposition.
Does this mean Israel needs to forgo Rafah, leaving one-quarter of Hamas’s military intact?
An even larger long-term strategic problem is: Who will take over internal security to keep Hamas down in Gaza once the IDF withdraws?
No one in the war cabinet, in the top echelons of the IDF, or from any political parties besides the Religious Zionist Party and Otzma Yehudit – which combined only have 13 seats – is willing to get stuck in a permanent occupation.
But, who can Israel reliably hand Gaza off to?
One of Jerusalem’s preferred options from the start has been a multinational Arab force from allied states like Egypt, the UAE, and Jordan, and perhaps Morocco and Saudi Arabia.
One problem has been that these countries have made it clear from day one that they are not interested in stepping into the Gaza quagmire, unless the Palestinian Authority is also involved and unless there is a process in place to eventually move toward a two-state solution.
Although war cabinet ministers Benny Gantz and Gadi Eisenkot have been ready to accept these terms from the start, and Defense Minister Yoav Gallant has more recently swallowed the idea of the PA being involved in controlling humanitarian aid in Gaza, Gallant still opposes the two-state solution, while Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu opposes any involvement by the PA.
Although there were hopes by Gallant and the IDF to build up a local Gazan force, connected to neither Hamas nor the PA, all have concluded these attempts failed following Hamas’s assassination of the top potential prospects for cooperation.
This realization had shifted Gallant and the IDF into Gantz’s and Eisenkot’s camp on the idea of the PA controlling Gaza aid instead of Hamas, pitting them against Netanyahu.
But Netanyahu, who still holds the vast majority of the levers of power, has not budged, making it seem increasingly likely that Israel would get stuck occupying Gaza for a very extended period, despite its clear lack of interest in doing so. The apparent alternative would be to eventually withdraw in six to 12 months, regardless of whether someone is there to take the reins.
And yet, leaks from over the weekend suggested there might be a new way. Reports claimed that the US and Arab countries might be willing to have the Arab countries handle aid and hold back Hamas internally, while only giving the PA a role much later.
What this would do is thread the needle to gain Netanyahu’s support, because he could say that he was not giving the PA security power in Gaza in the near term.
Why would the Arab states do this?
Not only would they ask for a path to a two-state solution, which Netanyahu might be able to agree to if it was very distant, but would also get to place their peacekeepers in the West Bank, according to the reports.
This would allow Netanyahu to have less PA involvement while letting the Arab states claim they achieved something new by getting peacekeepers into the territory, something Israel always opposed due to the limitations it places.
But, in the new circumstances where Arab states would be only doing internal security, and Israel would do both external security and retain the right to carry out targeted raids in Gaza, applying the same paradigm to the West Bank would no longer be seen as yielding sovereignty or security imperatives.
The Rafah solution would have seen the US support Israel surrounding and isolating Rafah indefinitely to contain Hamas, while Jerusalem and Washington would maintain a joint operations room and authorize small-scale targeted operations against Hamas leaders and rocket-launching cells.
However, The Jerusalem Post has learned from at least three Israeli sources, as well as US diplomatic sources, that there has not been any real movement on the Arab forces idea.
Multiple top Israeli officials who would need significant involvement had not even heard of the idea, suggesting that it never made all of the basic necessary rounds let alone a serious, concrete solution.
Likewise, though there are certainly some officials in the US, like Joint Chiefs Chairman General C.Q. Brown, who are pushing hard for the new Rafah idea, it is nowhere near being accepted by top Israeli defense officials.
Rather, they have indicated that they view this US “counteroffer” as part of the negotiating process by the US to reduce the scope of Israel’s invasion into Rafah as much as possible, to compel the IDF to use less force, which might even accidentally kill civilians, and to prepare more seriously for safely absorbing civilians in other locations.
The IDF for its part, the Post understands, would not necessarily reject the US offer out of hand, but it would demand that at the end of the US’s idea of the process, all four Hamas battalions must be taken apart.
If this was not doable through the US process, then the IDF would still eventually demand a larger invasion that would succeed in taking the four Hamas battalions apart.