Ilan Kfir, a renowned Israeli military writer, has published a captivating and detailed account of the events leading up to October 7. His Hebrew book, titled Gaza Division Conquered, describes in minute detail the colossal disaster in which the Gaza border barrier collapsed and thousands of terrorists overran the Gaza Division and invaded the surrounding kibbutzim. Thousands of Israelis hid in shelters crying for help, which was very late in coming. Hundreds were butchered, and an unfathomable 253 men, women, and children were kidnapped by Hamas. Israeli society had not experienced an invasion and mass captivity since the Yom Kippur War. The Israeli leadership did not heed the warning signs in 1973 or in 2023.
In Israel, the word “concept” will always have a negative connotation. It led to the biggest intelligence failure on October 6, 1973. And 50 years later, on October 7, 2023, it led to an even bigger fiasco. Yahya Sinwar, Hamas’s leader, perfected the devious tactics he had developed during his 22 years in Israeli prison. Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and his government were convinced that he was deterred from military confrontation. The strategy Netanyahu chose was to rehabilitate Gaza with the help of suitcases filled with cash from Qatar. It was based on the assumption that strengthening Hamas would weaken the Palestinian Authority and its aspirations for a Palestinian state. The hundreds of millions of dollars from Qatar enabled Hamas to accumulate a huge arsenal of weapons.
Kfir lists a series of grave mistakes made by Netanyahu (“Mr. Security,” as he called himself). In 1997, against his defense minister’s advice, he ordered the (failed) assassination attempt in Jordan of Khaled Mashaal, which forced him to release Hamas founder Sheikh Ahmed Yassin. In October 2011, again against the advice of top intelligence officers, Netanyahu released 1,026 prisoners, many with “blood on their hands,” including Sinwar, in exchange for one Israeli soldier, Gilad Schalit, captured by Hamas five and a half years earlier. Kfir attributes the exorbitant price Netanyahu paid to the civil demonstrations against the high cost of living, which endangered his government. Many of the released prisoners went on to commit more terror attacks in which numerous Israelis were killed.
Ilan Kfir: Sinwar was happy that Netanyahu replaced Bennett
According to Kfir, Sinwar was happy to see Netanyahu back in power after Naftali Bennett’s short and aggressive tenure as prime minister in 2021. Sinwar identified Netanyahu’s weakness and even wrote him a letter asking him to “take a risk,” which he did – a big one. While talking publicly about rehabilitating Gaza, Sinwar was busy building a monstrous war machine and hundred of kilometers of underground tunnels. When [Shin Bet officials] Yoram Cohen and Nadav Argaman presented plans to eliminate Sinwar while he was still above ground, Netanyahu vetoed them.
For years, Israel responded to missile attacks from Gaza with brief military incursions, at the end of each declaring that Hamas had been deterred. Fast forward to September 2023. Hamas used diversion tactics at the border fence in order to hide bombs which the IDF female observers in the Gaza Division had warned about for months. The military and civil leadership put their trust in the technological barrier rather than human intelligence in Gaza. The name that Hamas gave to the attack on October 7 – Al-Aqsa Flood – was an apt description. Two thousand Nukhba terrorists crossed the border, followed by a murderous, looting mob from Gaza. The Hamas terrorists had accumulated detailed intelligence about the kibbutzim at the border. According to Kfir, their original plan was to carry out suicide attacks in Tel Aviv and even reach the Knesset in Jerusalem.
Kfir’s depiction of the conquest of the Gaza Division makes for very painful reading. He depicts from a personal standpoint the invasion of the kibbutzim and the murder and capture of so many innocent civilians who cried in vain for help. He goes on to detail the heroic stories of the insufficiently armed few from Kibbutz Be’eri, Nahal Oz, Ofakim, and Sderot against the flood of terrorists with ample ammunition. He tells the stories of civilians and organizations that stepped up to fill the vacuum where no army or government assistance was in sight, such as retired generals Israel Ziv, Yair Golan, and Noam Tibon, who drove their cars to save as many people as they could. For many hours, the army was nowhere to be seen.
Kfir goes on to list the military accomplishments and heroic fighting in Gaza of regular soldiers and reserve officers. However, the biggest danger now, he says, is that those tactical and hard-won victories of the IDF could evaporate due to the current leadership’s refusal to present a strategy for “the day after.”
All the top military leaders are now plagued with guilt over October 7, and many accepted responsibility even before a formal investigation was launched. To date, Kfir says, Israel’s longest-serving prime minister has not assumed any responsibility for the fiasco of October 7. Kfir also criticizes Netanyahu’s lack of gratitude to US President Joe Biden, Israel’s staunchest supporter, and his confrontational attitude toward the US. The 81-year-old author is convinced that for his own political survival motives, Netanyahu is prolonging the war and the return of the captives. He puts the blame for October 7 first and foremost on Netanyahu’s shoulders, contending that the prime minister is holding the country hostage.
Gaza Division Conquered is a must-read book because it casts light not only on tragic leadership failures but also serves as a warning for what awaits us in the much larger conflict looming in the North.■