Brig. Gen. Amir Avivi, chairman of the Israel Defense and Security Forum, speaks to The Media Line about the ongoing war in Gaza, Hamas’s controlling the next narrative, and the US’s calls to halt the Rafah operation.
“And really now it’s in Hamas’s hands. If Hamas agrees to a 40-day cease-fire, and with this cease-fire to basically return the 33 hostages we agreed upon, then we’ll see a cease-fire for 40 days.” Avivi rightfully expected a renewal of the ground invasion in Rafah if Hamas didn’t agree to Israeli terms suitable for the hostage release.
Asked about the Biden Administration's thoughts on halting the operation in Rafah, Avivi told The Media Line, “What the administration is saying is basically it’s calling Israel to lose the war. Israel cannot lose the war. Israel cannot go back to a reality where Hamas can build itself back to tens of thousands of militants on our borders, threatening all the towns along the border and threatening all of Israel with rockets.”
He reiterated that Israel must achieve the real goals of the war and that it is not just about Gaza, referring to its ability to stand strong against Lebanon, Hezbollah, Iran, and militias in Syria and Iraq.
The war, which followed the October 7 massacre of 1,200 Israelis and foreign nationals and the abduction of more than 250 hostages, has been a slow and tactical operation that has left tens of thousands of Gazans killed, including 15,000 whom Israel says are Hamas terrorists.
Avivi was deputy commander of the IDF's Gaza Division in 2010-2011; he understands the terrain, mindset, and obstacles.
As many question what has gone awry, he tells The Media Line it takes time. “This is due to how much the army shrunk the ground forces during the years. This has to do with the munitions and the pace that we are getting them,” Avivi says. “This had to do with the international pressure. But, overall, everywhere the IDF operated, Hamas was destroyed.”
He speaks of two key stages: one to destroy the battalions, brigades, command, and control, and the second to clean up the area.
“This can take years,” he says, reiterating that no one should expect an immediate end of the war because Hamas has time to fortify Rafah, and they are ready for this war.
“Israel can win the war, can reach its goals by going to Rafah. The leadership of Hamas is in Rafah. All the hostages are there. All the remaining military capabilities—Hamas has really fortified Rafah.”
Could the strategy have been different? Could the IDF have entered Rafah at the beginning of the war?
Brig. Gen. Avivi didn’t feel this was feasible at the first stage of the war when they were attacking the northern part of Gaza. “The big question for me is, should they have had the IDF gone into Rafah when the IDF attacked Khan Yunis?” Avivi thought it probably would have been “wiser to launch the attack on Khan Yunis and Rafah first and then get control of the border with Egypt.”
Avivi said that by cutting off Hamas’ capability to build itself, it also cut the chances of Hamas leaders and hostages being taken to the Sinai Peninsula.
He went further to say that the way things are done “gives a lot of power to Hamas and it’s a big mistake. Israel needs to attack more and talk less. But this is the reality.”
Avivi strongly criticized the IDF’s preparation and response to the October 7 events. He lamented the IDF's failure in its core duties of intelligence and defense, attributing these shortcomings to longstanding preconceptions among military leadership. He remarked, "They had a chance to really think differently, and they’re stuck with their own preconceptions. And the society is paying a heavy, heavy price for that. And it obviously means that we really need a change of leadership in the army."
The Media Line asked if there were backup plans that were ready. Avivi replied, “So the army in the Southern Command had in the past a plan to take over all of Gaza. But again, these plans always need to be planned again once a new situation emerges. This situation is very different from what the IDF imagined.”
“Most of the plans looked at Lebanon as the main challenge and Gaza more as defensive plans. To adjust plans is not so complicated. I don’t think this was the main problem,” he said. “The main problem was not being proactive in the understanding that war with Gaza is imminent.”
“We in IDSF said it two years ago, that war is coming, that it’s imminent, that we need to take over the Gaza Strip, that we need a Six-Day War scenario, not a Yom Kippur War scenario. And unfortunately, Israel chose a Yom Kippur War scenario and now we have to deal with this.”
On security threats from Gaza, Avivi emphasized the impossibility of tolerating a substantial hostile armed force near Israeli borders, advocating for a continuous military presence in Gaza to dismantle and prevent the resurgence of such groups. “The lesson learned is you cannot have a terror army on the other side of the border. This is not a reality Israel can have.”
Asked to confirm reports that approximately 40 hostages are still alive in Gaza, he suggested that the actual number of survivors might be higher, stating, "I think that at least half of the hostages are alive, but definitely every day that passes puts them in danger. And when we talk about releasing certain hostages now and then waiting, what about the others?” He emphasized the urgency of a comprehensive military response to rescue all hostages as swiftly as possible.
Avivi addressed rumors regarding mass graves allegedly linked to the IDF. He refuted these allegations by shifting focus to Hamas' tactics, stating, “It’s actually Hamas that wants to use these citizens as a human shield that is trying to block the citizens from going out of war zones. Hamas wants as many citizens as possible to die.” It is Hamas, he said, not the IDF, that is putting civilian lives at risk.
Commenting on the oversight of warnings from female surveillance operators at the Nahal Oz military base, who had observed suspicious activities on the Israel-Gaza border prior to October 7, Avivi criticized the military leadership's response to these alerts: "I think that this is what happens when you try to process information through ideological narratives. And then the outcome is completely different. Instead of looking at the reality as it is, and listening to the facts as they are, the way the leaders of the army process this information is basically pretty much disregarding it." He described a significant disconnect between the reported observations and the leadership’s interpretation and response to those reports.
Avivi recounted his visit to the scene of the October 7 attack and his conversation with a leading commander who assured him that the threats around the Gaza border fence were under control, claiming that Hamas was deterred. Avivi said the misplaced confidence was similar to that experienced before the Yom Kippur War, noting that the facts were ignored due to entrenched beliefs. He described how TV commentators often offer diverse interpretations of the same events and propose vastly different solutions to the same incident security challenges.
He also addressed the geopolitical landscape, calling for decisive US leadership against regional threats, particularly from Iranian-backed forces, to prevent global destabilization. He passionately argued for relentless pursuit of Hamas leaders, drawing a parallel to historical efforts against Nazis, underscoring a commitment to ensuring that those responsible for attacks against Israelis face justice.
“Even if it takes five years, 10 years, every single leader of Hamas must be destroyed,” he said. “Wherever they are, no matter in what country, no matter what happens, nobody can butcher our people the way they did and stay alive afterwards. They need to pay exactly as the Nazis paid. Israel hunted Nazis for years, and the Israeli society expects Israel to hunt these leaders until every single one of them is dead.”
Discussing the challenges faced in managing aid during the ongoing conflict, Avivi addressed the dynamics of providing support to Palestinian areas while ensuring it does not empower Hamas. He explained the situation, stating that “we are feeding our enemies. But we understand that this is a basic condition of the US to continue and support Israel,” and adding, “It cannot be that at the end of the day, this aid arrives to Hamas, that Hamas then really spreads the aid and controls the society.”
Regarding Israel's strategies for postwar Gaza, Avivi emphasized the importance of maintaining military and civilian control in the region to prevent Hamas from regaining power. He articulated the necessity of a sustained Israeli presence, stating, “Israel will have at least for a while to control militarily, even on the civilian side, Gaza until a new leadership is built. And it’s not going to happen in a day.”
Avivi highlighted the historical and current complexities of Israeli-US relations and the broader implications of regional conflicts. Reflecting on past challenges, he recalled a critical moment in Israel’s War of Independence, when the United States demanded that Israel withdraw from the Negev and the Galilee. “And Ben-Gurion stood firm and said, this is not going to happen. We’re not going to withdraw.”
In a recent article, The Media Line exposed the capabilities of the Iranian-backed Houthis, not only to fire missiles that can reach Israel and cause major disruption to the shipping industry but also to destroy the internet lines beneath Bab el Mandeb Strait and the Red Sea, potentially impacting 2 billion people. Asked what should be done to mitigate this threat to global stability, Avivi urged the US to lead decisively: “We expect the US to show leadership as a global leader, to build a coalition, to stand strong, to be willing to use military power against the Houthis, against the militias in Iraq, but first and foremost against Iran, the generator of all this terror. And when the US doesn’t show leadership, then you see destabilization globally. And this is exactly what’s happening.”
The full transcript of Brig. Gen. Avivi’s interview with The Media Line follows:
TML: Brig. Gen. Amir Avivi is co-founder and chairman of the Israel Defense and Security Forum. Thank you so much for joining me at the Media Line.
Brig. Gen. Amir Avivi: My pleasure.
TML: Seven plus months into the multifront war that Israel’s fighting, and it seems like Israel is in a quagmire. What’s going to happen at the moment? Everyone’s wondering that all eyes are on a hostage deal and a cease-fire.
Brig. Gen. Amir Avivi: Well, I think we’re in a very, very defining moment. On one hand, Israel is a moment from destroying Hamas. I mean, the moment Israel will go into Rafah, we’ll see a reality where Hamas is going to be destroyed as a governmental and military entity.
But as we are planning to go into Rafah and the army is fully ready for this mission, we still have discussions about the hostages. And really now it’s in Hamas’ hands. If Hamas agrees to a 40-day cease-fire, and with this cease-fire to basically return the 33 hostages we agreed upon, then we’ll see a cease-fire for 40 days, and then, Israel is saying, we’ll renew the ground incursion.
If Hamas won’t agree, I am expecting the Israeli government, the cabinet, to take a decision to start a full ground incursion into Rafah and bring back our hostages militarily and destroy Hamas as a governmental entity and destroy Hamas as a military entity by destroying the remaining brigade of Hamas in Rafah.
TML: Do you feel that the Americans are going to halt that operation? It’s been said and stated out loud as clearly as possible.
Brig. Gen. Amir Avivi: Well, what the administration is saying is basically it’s calling Israel to lose the war. Israel cannot lose the war. Israel cannot go back to a reality where Hamas can build itself back to tens of thousands of militants on our borders, threatening all the towns along the border and threatening all of Israel with rockets.
This is not a reality Israel can go back to. There are clear goals of war and Israel has to reach these goals of war. This is not just about Gaza.
This is about the ability of Israel to stand strong against all its enemies, against Lebanon, Hezbollah, Iran, militias in Syria, in Iraq. This is much bigger than Gaza. And calling Israel to lose the war is threatening Israel existentially against all its enemies.
This is not an option.
TML: To the world and many Israelis, the goals of the war have not been met. Prime Minister Netanyahu countless times reiterated that the goal of the war is to obliterate Hamas, not reduce its power, and certainly not return to places the IDF has already cleansed in a controlling manner. What went so wrong?
Brig. Gen. Amir Avivi: The only thing that I can say is not working well is the time it takes. And this is due to how much the army shrunk the ground forces during the years. This has to do with the munitions and the pace that we are getting them. This has to do with international pressure. But overall, everywhere the IDF operated, Hamas was destroyed.
We have to understand that in a ground incursion, there are two steps. One is destroying the battalions, the brigades, the command and control. And then many of the terrorists are killed or apprehended and others dispersed. The second stage is really cleaning up the whole area.
And this can take years. It’s not something we should expect to happen fast. Israel can win the war, can reach its goals by going to Rafah.
The leadership of Hamas is in Rafah. All the hostages are there. All the remaining military capabilities—Hamas has really fortified Rafah. They are ready for this war. It’s going to be tough. But Israel, once we go in, will definitely destroy Hamas and the win will be decisive.
Wars sometimes are long. We need to be a bit patient about reaching these goals.
TML: Amir, could the strategy have been different? Could the IDF have entered from Rafah the first few weeks?
Brig. Gen. Amir Avivi: Well, I’m not sure that the IDF could have done that at the first stage when we attacked the northern part of Gaza. The big question for me is, should they have had the IDF gone into Rafah when the IDF attacked Khan Yunis? Once the IDF brought the remaining divisions from the north to the south and launched an attack on the central camps and on Khan Yunis, probably it would have been wiser to launch the attack on Khan Yunis and Rafah first and then get control of the border with Egypt.
And by that, cut completely Hamas’ capability to build itself and also the chances of maybe Hamas leaders and hostages being taken to the Sinai Peninsula, which is something that might happen. So yes, definitely the IDF could have done things differently. But now, you know, what’s important is to finish the job and to finish the job is going into Rafah.
TML: Do you feel that Hamas is holding the cards? Every time there’s a move, it’s always waiting for Hamas.
Brig. Gen. Amir Avivi: I think that the way things are done, it gives a lot of power to Hamas and it’s a big mistake. Israel needs to attack more and talk less. But this is the reality.
Now we’re waiting for Hamas to see if they are releasing the hostages or not. And if not, then we have to operate.
TML: In retrospect and having commanded troops yourself in Gaza, when October 7 happened, shouldn’t the army have had backup plans ready then for any case scenario?
Brig. Gen. Amir Avivi: So the army in the Southern Command had in the past a plan to take over all of Gaza. But again, these plans always need to be planned again once a new situation emerges. This situation is very different from what the IDF imagined.
Most of the plans looked at Lebanon as the main challenge and Gaza more as defensive plans. To adjust plans is not so complicated. I don’t think this was the main problem.
The main problem was not being proactive in the understanding that war with Gaza is imminent. We in IDSF said it two years ago, that war is coming, that it’s imminent, that we need to take over the Gaza Strip, that we need a Six-Day War scenario, not a Yom Kippur War scenario. And unfortunately, Israel chose a Yom Kippur War scenario and now we have to deal with this.
TML: Why should those borders have been so porous?
Brig. Gen. Amir Avivi: Well, I think that when you build, when you enable building a huge, huge terror army meters from our border, once this army is deployed, it’s very hard to stop it. So really the lesson learned is you cannot have a terror army on the other side of the border. This is not a reality Israel can have.
So in this case, when we’re talking about the day after Hamas, Israel will have to keep freedom of operation everywhere in Gaza and make sure that there is no reality where a terror army can be built again in front of our towns.
TML: The word on the street is that there are around 40 hostages from both civilian and army groups that remain alive in Gaza. Can you confirm this?
Brig. Gen. Amir Avivi: No, I think there are more. I think that at least half of the hostages are alive, but definitely every day that passes puts them in danger. And when we talk about releasing certain hostages now and then waiting, what about the others?
This is why it’s so important to mobilize the army and really reach all the hostages as soon as possible.
TML: There was a brief blockbuster headline which ran about mass graves that the IDF allegedly were responsible for. It sort of came and went. What can you share?
Brig. Gen. Amir Avivi: I think that the IDF is really, really doing from the very first day everything it can to prevent collateral damage. Each time the IDF operated in an area, the citizens were called to move out of that area. The IDF opened humanitarian corridors.
It’s actually Hamas that wants to use these citizens as a human shield that is trying to block the citizens from going out of war zones. Hamas wants as many citizens as possible to die. But even if you look overall at the numbers, and let’s stick to the numbers Hamas says and the IDF.
Hamas is talking about 34,000 people killed; the IDF is talking about at least 15,000 terrorists we know we killed. So in a ratio of one to one almost.
This is unprecedented. There is no army in the world that can reach such a ratio. Usually when you talk about densely urban areas and fighting a terror army that doesn’t even have a uniform and embeds itself in hospitals, in houses, in kindergartens, the ratio would be one to eight, one to nine, one to five, certainly not one to one.
So in this sense, I think that the IDF is doing a very, very professional and good job really minimizing collateral damage.
TML: Brig. Gen. Avivi, senior officers of the Israel Defense Forces resigned over the failure or the lack of preparation for October 7. Replacements have already been assigned. Now we discussed at the beginning of the war, and I’m sure a lot of research has gone into this.
What can you share of the fact that the army was ill prepared?
Brig. Gen. Amir Avivi: Definitely the army’s mission is to defend the borders, is to have the right intelligence, and even if intelligence lacks, to be able to stop any attack. And in this sense, the army failed completely. And they didn’t defend the citizens in the south.
And I think that, you know, part of the building of IDSF, when we founded it four years ago, was exactly our feeling that there is a lot of preconception, that things are not done the right way, that there’s not a good understanding of the threats and the intentions, or we’re not doing the right things. And we really tried to convey the right ideas. And I think that part of the problem is that the leadership of the army didn’t listen to all the serious ideas we gave them.
They had a chance to really think differently, and they’re stuck with their own preconceptions. And the society is paying a heavy, heavy price for that. And it obviously means that we really need a change of leadership in the army.
I would assume that there also will be a huge change in the political leadership in the upcoming elections, maybe in a year or two, or whenever this will be. And people are very frustrated by the reality we see. And there is an overall sense that Israel needs new leadership and new direction, whether it’s in the army or in the political sphere.
TML: The women on the Nahal Oz base were the front-line eyes to what was happening on the border between Israel and Gaza. They warned their superiors, both intelligence and high-ranking officers, in the months leading to October 7, that there were trials happening, practice raids, mock hostage-taking, bombs planted by the border, and unusual behavior. They were the surveillance operators, Israel’s first responders.
No one believed them. Why?
Brig. Gen. Amir Avivi: I think that this is what happens when you try to process information through ideological narratives. And then the outcome is completely different. Instead of looking at the reality as it is, and listening to the facts as they are, the way the leaders of the army process this information is basically pretty much disregarding it.
They said, OK, yes, they’re training, they’re doing this, they’re doing that. But they don’t really mean it. They’re not going to do anything about that now. This is something that maybe will be a problem in the future.
I can tell you that I visited the region of Gaza three days before the attack. And I had the chance to meet one of the leading commanders. And I asked him, what’s going on? What’s going on with the riots in the border, around the fence, and so on? And he said, no, listen, they’re deterred. They’re not going to do anything, and so on. They really believed that, no matter what were the facts.
The same happened in the Yom Kippur War. All the facts were there. Everything was seen. All the intelligence was.
The problem is, how do you process what you see? I mean, you see it, by the way, every day. You see something happening. Then you see people commenting about it, let’s say on TV. And each one takes the same facts and basically understands something completely different from these facts.
So you have a terror attack, for example. One guy will say, OK, there is a terror attack. We need to withdraw. We need a two-state solution. Another one will look at it and say, no, there was a terror attack. We need to apply sovereignty. We need to build more towns. We need to strengthen the army.
So facts are not enough. Question is, how do you process them afterwards? How do you assess the situation?
TML: At the moment, the real picture appears that [Hamas chief in the Gaza Strip Yahya] Sinwar may walk out a free man. What happens if that is the case?
Brig. Gen. Amir Avivi: I think that the Israeli government, the cabinet, must stick to the strategy of destroying Hamas. Even if it takes five years, 10 years, every single leader of Hamas must be destroyed. Wherever they are, no matter in what country, no matter what happens, nobody can butcher our people the way they did and stay alive afterwards.
They need to pay exactly as the Nazis paid. Israel hunted Nazis for years, and the Israeli society expects Israel to hunt these leaders until every single one of them is dead.
TML: Humanitarian goods are now flowing into Gaza at a better rate. Can you share the role Israel is playing in terms of the security and operations of the temporary ports that are being constructed in Gaza, as well as the accompanying US military pier that’s being built?
Brig. Gen. Amir Avivi: Well, I can tell you that according to international law, when you fight a war, doing a siege is part of the war. Instead of that, we are feeding our enemies. But we understand that this is a basic condition of the US to continue and support Israel. So humanitarian aid is flowing into Gaza. I think that it’s time that Israel takes responsibility of this humanitarian aid. It cannot be that at the end of the day, this aid arrives to Hamas, that Hamas then really spreads the aid and controls the society.
The way to really destroy Hamas as a governmental entity is by Israel, at least for a while, taking responsibility and really dealing also with the humanitarian side.
TML: Will Israel have a role the day after the war? And what do you think that role might look like?
Brig. Gen. Amir Avivi: Well, from a military point of view, Israel must be responsible for what’s going on in Rafah. In Gaza, we need to control the Egyptian border. We need full freedom of operation everywhere in the Gaza Strip until we completely dismantle all the terror infrastructure. And even afterwards, to make sure that they cannot build it again.
From a civil point of view, I think that the day after Hamas, the moment Hamas is destroyed, Israel will have at least for a while to control militarily, even on the civilian side, Gaza until a new leadership is built.
And it’s not going to happen in a day. Anybody who thinks that one day after Hamas, immediately there will be a civil leadership in Gaza managing a city, I think it’s completely disconnected from reality. This is not how wars work. The IDF will need to control for a while until they are able to build a new representation and local leadership in the cities.
TML: United States apparently believes that they have to secure a deal between Israel and Hamas. And once achieved, they’re going to look to Hezbollah to try to do the same. Is it really that simple?
Brig. Gen. Amir Avivi: No, there is no deal between Israel and Hamas. Hamas needs to be destroyed completely. Israel cannot do deals with the devil.
Israel needs to destroy them. And we cannot allow the existence of Hamas in Gaza. And only after they are destroyed, we can really focus on the northern border and bring security to the citizens in the north.
TML: Is Israel a free agent to do so?
Brig. Gen. Amir Avivi: I remember in the Independence War, when the Independence War ended, and Israel liberated the Negev and the Galilee, that the US, being a superpower that just won the Second World War, that just three years before attacked Japan with two atomic bombs, demanding from Israel to withdraw from the Negev and the Galilee. And Ben-Gurion stood firm and said, this is not going to happen. We’re not going to withdraw.
And he didn’t withdraw. He did what’s right for Israel. And yes, there was a price to pay.
The US embargoed us for years. They didn’t supply weapons to us. But we saved the Negev and Galilee.
So also now, we need to make sure that Israel does what’s good for Israel. We’re not a tiny country. This is not 600,000 people. We are a major power that is able to really take care of its own interests. And we expect our biggest allies to stand with us and not endanger us. And yes, there can be disagreements.
Israel is not supposed to do everything that the US thinks it’s good for them. For us, it’s existential. For the US, it’s about elections.
And we need to take care of our existential needs. And I think that if we do so, we’ll be more respected, not less.
TML: The Iranian-backed and Yemen-based Houthis are not just firing missiles which have reached Israel, but they control areas in the Bab el Mandeb Strait and the Red Sea, causing major disruption to the shipping industry. They told The Media Line that they’re capable of doing a heck of a lot more. And experts in Yemen told us they have the capability to destroy the internet lines at the bottom of the ocean, which could impact 2 billion people.
What do you think should be the course of action?
Brig. Gen. Amir Avivi: Well, I think what you are describing is a global problem that needs to be dealt with globally. It’s not Israel’s problem. This is a global problem.
And there we expect the US to show leadership as a global leader, to build a coalition, to stand strong, to be willing to use military power against the Houthis, against the militias in Iraq, but first and foremost against Iran, the generator of all this terror. And when the US doesn’t show leadership, then you see destabilization globally. And this is exactly what’s happening.
I couldn’t imagine the Houthis daring to do something or talking like that if the US would have shown strength the way they are supposed to. Now, at the end of the day, they will have to do so. The question is, what will be the price before and how much destabilization we’ll see before the US understands that they need a coalition, and they need to deal with the threats.
TML: Is there any light at the end of this very long tunnel?
Brig. Gen. Amir Avivi: Yes, I’m very optimistic. I think that we got a historical chance to really deal with the most pressing national security issues. And I know this for sure, that the bigger the win will be, the more decisive it will be, the greater the golden age of Israel and the Jewish people will be the day after.
So we really have a lot to look forward to. But in order to reach this golden age, we must stay united, strong, resolute, and focus on one thing and one thing only: victory. This is what we need to be focusing on: victory on all fronts.
TML: Brig. Gen. Amir Avivi, thanks so much for the time with the Media Line. And a week from now, it’s the Remembrance Day of those that fell for Israel, fighting for the state.
Brig. Gen. Amir Avivi: Thank you very much.