Hamas is facing a hard reality lately. It has been pressured by both Arab and Western governments to agree to a ceasefire in Gaza and deny Israel the pretext for launching the very unwanted ground assault on Rafah. If Hamas fails to reach a ceasefire deal with Israel, that might push the Qataris to take the step about which they have hesitated for long: kicking Hamas leaders out of Qatar.
On Feb. 7, 1999, King Hussein of Jordan died, and the crown passed to his son, King Abdullah II. Less than ten months afterward, King Abdullah II released four senior Hamas leaders from prison and deported several lower-level operatives from Jordan to Doha. Since then, Hamas political leadership has been based in Qatar. Jordan cited security reasons for the move, which was coordinated with Qatar.
As Hamas and Qatar are at odds, Hamas turns to Jordan
A quarter of a century has passed since then, and Hamas has recently insinuated a desire to return its leadership to Jordan. However, the movement chose the wrong time to express that wish and the wrong person to express it.
Announcing Hamas’ request to relocate to Jordan was senior Hamas member Mousa Abu Marzook, whose popularity among the Palestinians and the rest of the Arab world is next to zero after his unfortunate statement renouncing responsibility for the safety of the Palestinian civilians in the Gaza Strip. Asked in a televised interview why Hamas didn’t provide the network of tunnels underneath Gaza City for the civilian population to protect them from Israel’s airstrikes, he said Hamas “was responsible for its fighters and their families. It is UNRWA’s responsibility to protect the civilians in times of war.”
A week earlier, Abu Obaida, Hamas’ military wing spokesperson, urged Jordanians to cross the border into the West Bank in order to defend Al-Aqsa Mosque and express solidarity with the Gaza Strip. Muhannad Al Mubaidin, the Jordanian government spokesperson, criticized the recorded message and said, “Any incitement of the public against the government is nothing but a desperate attempt to fragment our focus on the important issues. I advise Hamas to show tolerance to the criticism it faces every now and then.”
When Abu Marzook made his statement about relocating to Jordan, Ghazi Hamad, another senior Hamas member, said the idea “had not been discussed within the movement’s leadership, nor was it on the agenda.” “However, the resistance movement has the right to have offices all over the Arab world,” he added.
Former Jordanian Information Minister Samih Al-Maaytah said of Abu Marzook’s statement, “No non-Jordanian faction has the right to come and operate out of Jordan. Jordan is not a hotel you can check into or out of whenever you want.”
Jordanian leaders were furious at Hamas because of provocative statements by Hamas leaders such as Khaled Mashal and Abu Obaida, which sent scores of Jordanians to the streets to express solidarity with the Palestinian civilians in the Gaza Strip. The goal of those protests was to disrupt the monarchy’s public order. Destabilizing the regimes in Amman or Cairo is something neither Jordan nor Egypt would allow.
When the demonstrations spread in Amman and reached the Israeli Embassy, tensions increased. Jordanian security forces showed tolerance in the beginning, knowing the public wrath from the war in Gaza needed a safety release valve. But when protests outside the Israeli Embassy grew violent and destructive of public property, security forces arrested demonstrators. Some were taken to court and detained for various periods.
In due time, it became clear to the Jordanian public and security agencies that the demonstrations were being used for multiple ends. They were meant to help the Muslim Brotherhood movement in Jordan increase its popularity leading up to parliamentary elections in Jordan next September. The demonstrations throughout the kingdom, with a focus on Amman, were meant to serve the Muslim Brotherhood movement by turning solidarity with Palestinians in Gaza into a ticket to the parliament, hopefully winning the movement a majority of the seats.
Gaining popularity at the expense of war victims cannot be a ticket to political success. This is true when it comes to the Gaza Strip, where the death toll among Palestinians has risen to 35,000, according to the Hamas-run Health Ministry.
After failing to be welcomed back to Jordan, Hamas tried its luck elsewhere. Hamas political bureau head Ismail Haniyeh asked Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan if Hamas could relocate to Turkey. The Turkish National Intelligence Organization had for years spotted activities by Hamas operatives in the security and military field that would damage Turkey’s ties with several countries if they were made public. Turkey then asked senior Hamas leaders and field operatives to leave the country, which they did, heading to Qatar.
For years, Syria had provided Hamas with everything it needed, including political support, freedom of action on Syrian soil, and training facilities for its fighters. Hamas’ betrayal of Syria’s Bashar al-Assad, turning against the Syrian regime, and siding with the Islamic State (IS) group and other Islamist insurgents, made it hard for any Arab country to trust it. But because Qatar was opposed to the Syrian regime, it went without saying that the presence of Hamas leadership in Doha wouldn’t cause the Qataris any embarrassment. Doha was supporting IS, Al-Nusra Front, and other Islamist insurgents involved in the Syrian conflict. It provided them and other minor factions with cash and weapons to topple Assad’s regime.
After Jordan and Turkey said no, Hamas was left with no new destination. At this point, Iran entered the picture and started to pull strings in Iraq, where it hoped Hamas would move should they leave Qatar voluntarily or otherwise. Qatar stepped in and offered to buy a large plot of land near the airport in Baghdad, where it would build a headquarters for Hamas. The headquarters would include a five-star hotel, a television station, a swimming pool, tennis and golf courts, and a horse racing track.
Qatar wasn’t comfortable at all when relatives of Israeli captives held in Gaza sued the Qatari government before US courts. Nor was it comfortable with Israeli statements blaming it for the failure of the cease-fire talks—including allegations that Qatar refrained from pressuring Hamas into accepting Israel’s demands—especially since the Qataris were convinced it was Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu who, due to political calculations, showed zero interest in sealing such a deal with Hamas. Last but not least, Qatar was infuriated by Israeli allegations of funding Hamas while they knew it was Netanyahu who instructed the Mossad, Israel’s intelligence agency, to establish links with Doha and request that they fund Hamas. Israel’s Channel 12 television station revealed the content of some such letters from Israel to Qatar late last week.
Oman is reported to have agreed to host Hamas but with strict conditions that would bar the movement from carrying out any political or military-related activities.
The Israeli government is to blame for Hamas’ rising military capabilities in Gaza. What happened on Oct. 7 was Hamas’ way of thanking Israel for 12 years of support and backing against the legitimate government of the Palestinian Authority in Ramallah. The Israeli government shouldn’t take it personally. Syria, long before Israel, had been betrayed by Hamas.
Elias Zananiri is a former journalist from East Jerusalem who has filled several senior positions in the PLO over the past two decades.