Two strategic mistakes were made by the Israeli government, especially by its leader, after October 7. The first and most significant mistake was beginning a ground operation without attempting to return all the hostages home first. Some 240 people, including babies, children, girls and boys, women, men, and the elderly, were kidnapped on that terrible day.
Before the military operation began, most of the hostages were still alive. It was a national, ethical, and moral duty to try as a supreme and exclusive task to return them home, whatever the cost. This was the state's duty after abandoning its citizens in their homes.
It is the direct fault and responsibility of the government, which should have led the decision makers to an immediate decision to return the hostages home while they were alive, recognize the fact that we lost the battle, and realize that the first victory would be the return of the kidnapped.
Government leaders should have put aside their egos and should have held off on the albeit justified task of striking a decisive military blow at the murderous organizations until the return of the hostages.
The decision-makers decided otherwise.
The need for revenge, for a complete military victory, and the overthrow of Hamas as a central goal prevailed over national, moral justice. It was an unfortunate and painful decision for the hostages, their family members, the fighters on the front, and the evacuees from the North and South.
Better late than never.
Instead of deepening the conflict with the US and many other friendly countries, instead of taking control of Rafah, the cabinet must decide to return the hostages home, whatever the cost, immediately.
The strategic error of the military maneuver
The second and critical strategic error is in the military maneuvers. The government should have fought the war on two fronts in the Gaza Strip simultaneously. In other words, a parallel entry in the North of the Gaza Strip and the South.
The IDF should have entered northern Gaza and southern Rafah at the beginning of the maneuver, when Israel had the world’s support, to destroy the terror brigades and battalions in both cities at the same time and, from there, move towards Khan Yunis and the central camps.
Such a brilliant military move would have been accepted by the whole world. It would have prevented the sanctions imposed on Israel by the US, the wrath of the ever-expanding world, the antisemitism, the anti-Israeli votes in the UN, etc.
Shock, embarrassment, and loss of temper accompanied the decision-makers in the first days after the failure. Many mistakes were made, but these two mistakes led us to helplessness and weakness, indecision, and loss of hope regarding achieving the goals of the war, as defined by the decision-makers about eight months ago.
It should be noted that to persist and continuously broadcast the chilling and shaky, sleep-depriving, cry-for-help video, which was broadcast about Hamas’s infiltration of the Nahal Oz observation post, the brutal takeover of them, and the taking of them as prisoners by Hamas while carrying out their important mission, calmly and professionally, illustrates once again the depth of the failure and the cruelty of the enemy.
This is perhaps the government's last chance to fulfill its national, moral, and ethical duty and return all the abductees home at any cost. Prime Minister, this is your responsibility and duty. In my opinion, and the opinion of many, we are in a dangerous deterioration that must be stopped immediately.
The steering wheel and the brakes are in the hands of the prime minister, who, along with others such as the defense minister, the chief of staff, the chief of the Shin Bet, the commander of the Southern Command, and many others, should have vacated their places and let others manage the campaign after their agonizing failure.
He who has failed such an agonizing failure cannot manage the military and civilian rehabilitation, and even more so those who have not accepted responsibility until this moment.