On February 12, Israeli security forces staged a dramatic rescue of two hostages from Hamas in Rafah – one of only two successful rescues of living hostages during the war. But the operation did not just happen out of thin air.
Drone Unit 166 reservist commander Lt. Col. “O” (his identity remains classified) revealed to the Magazine that drones were performing surveillance of the Rafah hostages for three to four weeks before the rescue operation.
According to O, his unit’s drone surveillance could be divided into at least two periods: an earlier period when he and IDF intelligence were still trying to determine and verify that there were hostages at the location in question; and a later period when they studied the exact positions of both the hostages and their Hamas guards in order to facilitate planning the rescue operation.
This included determining approach vectors for a greater chance of achieving surprise, as well as disqualifying approach vectors that would be more likely to allow the Hamas guards to kill the hostages, the rescuers, or both.
O was among the drone operators who followed IDF special forces into Rafah when it was still completely under Hamas’s control. He said that the climax was when the 166 Squadron went in, along with the ground special forces, to perform the rescue.
He said that “it was a surprise how fast Israeli forces accomplished the mission and called over the communications platform ‘The hostages are in our hands’ – it only took a few minutes.”
During Israeli security forces “exit from the area, the drone unit engaged and stopped the [Hamas] threats from getting to the area of the rescue operation. We [destroyed] those Hamas forces and provided the Israeli forces the quiet and clear path to get the hostages out of Rafah,” said O.
“They slammed on the gas to get out of there, with the area lit up with Hamas counter-strikes. All of the terrorists in the area tried to come after them at once.”
O noted that many times the drones had saved IDF ground troops from entering a trap.
He said they warned ground forces to select a different approach to avoid a trap which the drones could see had been set. Sometimes, they even postponed an attack until much heavier aerial or artillery firepower was used against enemy positions.
In fact, O said that the IDF had started an earlier version of the Rafah rescue operation, and then aborted it until a later date.
Aborting the operation was based on real-time data from the drones suggesting that “the imminent conditions and setting were not ripe for the operation, and that waiting some additional days for more favorable conditions would be a better bet.”
O WAS initially an Air Force navigator/second seater (the pilot being the first seater) who activated weapons and electronic warfare and surveillance for F-16 aircraft (called “Barak” by Israelis).
Eventually, he was the commander of a squadron.
Later, he learned the drone systems and transferred to working in the drone arena 2006-2009, after the Second Lebanon War.
In 2013, he was released from the regular officer career track and started reserve duty, where he served in Unit 105 flying F-16s, and Unit 166 flying drones.
By 2021, he shifted entirely to flying drones, commanding Unit 166. In April of this year, he split his time between a variety of drones in Unit 166, as well as the new drone Unit 147, which now focuses exclusively on the Kochav drone (smaller than the Eitan, similar in size to the Shoval, and larger than the Zik).
He noted that Air Force reservists generally must pilot their craft a minimum of once a week to remain 100% “in shape.”
IDF drone history
Recounting some of the evolution of the use of drones by the IDF, he said they expanded their use significantly to involve two divisions in 2008-2009.
Once drones became usable for war, the IDF realized that they afforded it a virtually unlimited number of tools.
He said that one connection between Operation Cast Lead and the current war was that already in that war, the IDF had learned that certain levels of cold, since it was winter, could render drones inoperative and needed to be planned for.It seemed likely, based on O’s description of how helpful the drones were to the brigades in Gaza in 2008-2009, that current IDF Chief of Staff Lt.-Gen. Herzi Halevi probably gained at the time a tactical understanding of how best to employ drones.
Some of this experience may have translated into a general strategy that Halevi and the high command would later issue for O and other drone unit commanders when the current Israel-Hamas war started.At the beginning of the war, O piloted the drones in both the South and the North. But when the invasion started in Gaza, the focus shifted even more to the South.
For several months, 90% of the flight hours were in the South, providing offensive and intelligence surveillance support to IDF ground troops.
A major role of O and his drones has been to reduce rocket fire. This can be accomplished by locating the rockets before they are even fired or shortly after a terror cell fires the rockets. O said that drones are the most effective tools for this because they can hover in an area all the time.
He said the drones can fly for 17 hours or more, depending on the type of drone, as well as the mix of the quantity of munitions they are carrying, speed, and learning the operating zone better.For example, O noted there are specific locations that IDF intelligence has identified as being zones from which terrorists have fired rockets before.
“If they re-fire from the same area and sometimes even the first time, the fleet of drones will catch up with and eliminate them,” he said.
He also discussed the positive elements of drones and regular aircraft working together. But usually drones can get to a specific problem zone more quickly than aircraft because there are more of them and because they are deployed even pre-attack in a hovering position closer to the enemy.
“Now there are no land forces encountering the enemy who do not receive direct air support. This air support umbrella gives ground forces, and the IDF more generally, freedom of action in the field,” he stated.
Drones in the North and West Bank
After months of providing support in the South, at a later third stage around February, when the IDF had operational control of Gaza City and Khan Yunis, O returned to the North with drones in larger numbers.
Presumably, this was to help target Hezbollah commanders once the IDF decided to draw blood from Hezbollah via its commanders.
In addition, the IDF was able to once again spare more drones for operations in the West Bank, though there had always been some there.
Regarding assassinations, drones more often carry them out when above ground, and aircraft more frequently carry them out when below ground. Far more targeted Hamas commanders have been killed above ground than below, indicating that drones are the primary weapon used in Gaza for such strikes.
But this is a dynamic situation. Any time in the spring that operations heated up in Gaza, many of the drones returned there from other fronts, even as fighter aircraft, according to public IDF messages and sources, remain the go-to solution in the North.
Regarding broader strategy for the North, O said that the fact that the conflict with Hezbollah has been “more moderate” is deceptive. He acknowledged that “it will be very complicated and hard to bring security back to the North.”
“If someone goes to live in Shtula near the border, they need to know that they will not get kidnapped,” he said.
If no diplomatic deal is struck with Hezbollah, and the government gets most of Hezbollah’s Radwan fighters to flee southern Lebanon, nevertheless a significant problem remains, according to O. “We can’t know who is coming back to southern Lebanon once the war stops – Radwan operatives [in civilian clothing] or actual civilians. We need to find a solution.”
Still, expressing confidence, he stated, “We have more tools to change the nature of the fight with Hezbollah.”
Predicting that war in the North, at some point, however distant, is inevitable, he said, “When we make the decision to go to war, reality will change quickly.”
Drones and hostages
In areas in which IDF intelligence assesses that Hamas may be holding hostages, the IDF makes sure to maintain drone surveillance.
The hostage issue kept a certain minimal volume of drones focused in the South throughout the spring, even when portions of the drones that had been used in the South were shifted to other fronts.This means that the cumulative volume of drones has not changed during the war. Rather, it has just been a continuous question of where they are focused at different stages of the conflict.
The May Rafah invasion
For the Rafah operation, which began around May 6, drones were expected to be used to distinguish any Palestinian terrorists among the civilian population, while helping to ensure that the IDF would not come close to harming the general civilian population.
Drones were planned to be used in Rafah, as in other stages of the Gaza invasion, for advanced and clandestine surveillance of enemy-controlled areas that ground troops were about to enter, as well as to open fire on and help reduce enemy resistance in those areas just before IDF ground forces would arrive.
Drone capabilities and methods
Generally, O said, “Drones achieve only precision strikes, whereas larger human-manned aircraft carry out both precise and much larger and less precise attacks.”
O said that he and his drone operators follow people to see if they are innocent or dangerous and that additional guidance is given by targeting teams near the southern border. “But brigade commanders in the field tend to be the final word on whether to strike and whether a questionable individual should be defined as a civilian or a combatant-terrorist.”
He said that the number of times that drones have killed innocent people is almost zero. The implication was that human-manned aircraft, tanks, or artillery, while usually also accurate when bombing heavily, make more errors than drones.
O said that drones also assisted in combating Hamas’s tunnel warfare. Surveillance could occur both from above and from within, with the use of smaller, specialized drones and robots.Many times, tunnels could be also be discovered by following Hamas fighters as they fled back to tunnels to hide after carrying out an attack.
O added that his drones provide support to IDF ground forces inspecting tunnels so that Hamas cannot launch surprise attacks on them while their attention is redirected to underground threats.
In addition, he warned that once the IDF ends its larger maneuvers-active invasion of any area, and as time passes, Hamas will probably fire rockets again from less-guarded parts of Gaza. He cited Shifa Hospital as an example of Hamas’s return in force once the IDF withdrew from the area.
O said this before Hamas started firing rockets again from Rafah in late April and May, proving that his predictions were accurate.
There are some limits on drones – certainly regarding the conventional drones that Squadron 166 uses. They need to operate in larger spaces, he said; therefore, they are not as useful in profiling special areas like hospitals, to avoid civilian casualties.
Drones and humanitarian issues
Drones, however, are useful in policing and monitoring the mass evacuation routes that the IDF has needed for Palestinian civilians throughout the Gaza invasion.
In a similar vein, O said, in many instances when drones were used during the invasion, “We see the target, but then third party, innocent civilians enter the frame, so we pull back from attacking.
“There are times when it is super complex to tell the difference between Hamas and civilians, such as when weapons are stored in houses, and drones are following people walking through those houses.
“The way someone walks between the houses is often a tip-off. Do they stay close to certain areas as if they are looking for cover to move in secret? Do they avoid certain areas that it would make sense to walk through if a civilian? Or do they walk in a stable, uncomplicated, normal, and calm way?” he asked rhetorically.
“Not everyone who appears not dangerous, who is walking in the open, is actually innocent. It takes talent and experience to distinguish between civilians and combatants.”
Sometimes, it entails following an individual for a while. For example, “a Palestinian at one point may quickly fire on IDF troops from a concealed area, then drop his weapon and enter more open spaces from a different route, holding a white flag” as if not just moments before he was involved in violence.
The IDF generally demands that even those with white flags halt when approaching IDF forces, in order to be inspected from a safe distance of around 50 meters.
Hamas abuses Israeli restraint
O warned that Hamas has been systematically using such Israeli rules of restraint against the IDF.“Hamas fights behind human shields, but I sleep well at night because I know I did the best I could to avoid” Palestinian civilian casualties.
Also, he cautioned that sometimes Hamas members “dress up as women. But we can often tell they are men by their larger steps and how they carry things.
“We still don’t attack if it looks like a woman,” implying that the IDF may take precautions to arrest the “woman” from a safe distance to make a final determination about “her” identity.
As the war has developed, O said he and his drone unit have learned “how the enemy learns and adjusts; how to find the enemy; how to best isolate the enemy from civilians” when Hamas uses civilians as human shields.
Comparing drones
Drones have a wide array of capabilities. For instance, the larger drones that the IDF and O’s unit fly have varying flight times. According to Elbit, the Kochav (also known as the Hermes 900), the Eitan, or the Shoval have a 36-hour flight time; the Zik (Hermes 450) has a 17-hour flight time.
O said that they could carry larger and more powerful munitions, that they could carry larger and more advanced surveillance packages, and that they were stronger for flying in inclement weather.
Moreover, he noted that there are also a variety of smaller drones used by artillery units and are provided directly to ground troops. Unit 166’s larger drones work in unison and cooperatively alongside those more tactical-use drones.
Judicial overhaul
Looking back on the difficulties with reservists during the government’s attempted judicial overhaul in 2023, O said: “I had many discussions with our pilots, both one-on-one and as a group, to bring back” any of those refusing to serve.
He said his message to them was that they “could protest against the move to change the system of government, but reservists still need to come to work. And this is what happened – anyone who said he would not come, came.”
October 7
On Oct. 7, O and his family had rented a vacation spot to spend Simchat Torah in Shtula near the northern border, near Hezbollah.
“I woke up with the situation. If Hezbollah had invaded, I would be a hostage in the tunnels of Beirut. We would do hikes right next to the border defense and would look right up at the nearby Hezbollah positions,” stated O.
“The solution for the North must guarantee the safety of the northern residents. It does not need to be 100% risk-free, but it should reduce the risk a lot.”
Though it was unclear how “winning” would be defined, O concluded: “Many reservists have been in service since Oct. 7. It seems they will continue until the IDF wins.” ■