The IDF publicized its first probe into Israel’s October 7 failure to prevent Hamas’s invasion, focusing in on the invasion of Beeri in the South, which parallels central Gaza, and which was overwhelmingly destroyed.
During the invasion, 101 Beeri residents were killed, 30 hostages were taken, of which 11 are still being held by Hamas in Gaza, 150 houses were destroyed, and several complete security breakdowns took place.
From the start of Hamas’s breaking through the Beeri security gate at 6:55 a.m. until 2:30 p.m., between 80-220 Hamas terrorists at anyone time (a total of 340 Hamas forces participated) massively outnumbered Israeli defenders, who had only between 13-26 fighters at any given moment.
The Hamas invaders were broken down into: 100-120 trained Hamas Nukhba terrorists, 50-70 Hamas regular fighters, 100-150 even less trained Islamic Jihad fighters and common criminals.
Most of the around 1,000 Beeri residents were in grave danger, but hoping to wait out the invasion in their home’s safe rooms until around 6:00 p.m., when the first large evacuations started.
IDF Maj, Gen. (res.) Mickey Edelstein, who is outside the mandatory service officers chain of command, directed the probe.
A Hamas Nuseirat commander in central Gaza started maneuvering his forces to be ready for the invasion around 5:30 a.m.
Under cover of thousands of rockets being fired and using drones and hang gliders to destroy Israeli sensors and lookout towers, around 6:30 a.m., Hamas started penetrating the border into Israel in many areas.
Between 6:55 a.m. and 2:30 p.m., a huge number of things went wrong for the IDF beyond the lack of IDF or Shin Bet warnings and the lack of forces preventing the Hamas invaders from arriving at Beeri in the first place.
Around 7:30 a.m., Hamas was already attacking and overwhelming the IDF’s forward headquarters for Gaza at Reim which would have been the main party to coordinate reinforcements.
Gaza Division Commander Brig. Gen. Avi Rosenfeld eventually fled and there was no one left nearby to coordinate a broad reinforcements operation or defense.
Rosenfeld recently resigned from the IDF.
Around 20 Hamas forces had penetrated the village from two different vectors in a short time.
First hostages taken to Gaza
By 8:00 a.m., Hamas was moving the first two hostages to Gaza, with another seven being moved by 9:00 a.m., and another 12 by 10:00 a.m.
Around 9:45 a.m., the first reinforcements, the Shaldag special forces unit, engaged Hamas forces in Beeri to try to save the residents.
However, by that time, Hamas had 80 fighters in the area and overwhelmed the small Shaldag forces, many of which retreated.
Previously, Shaldag Commander, Lt. Col. “B” noted to the Jerusalem Post that around five of his forces were killed and around 15 wounded, including his top deputy.
The probe called the Shaldag forces' retreat a grave error, while complimenting the Shaldag forces for their fighting during the rest of October 7-8 as well as in general throughout the Gaza war.
In Beeri, B said that after five hours of fighting, they had killed 20 Hamas terrorists.
B also said that his forces arrived at Beeri closer to 8:30 a.m., versus the probe which concluded that they only really engaged Hamas around 9:45 a.m.
In mid-November, Shaldag was critical in successfully taking over Shifa Hospital in Gaza City from Hamas without killing a single patient or medical staff member.
Around 10:45 a.m., the Sayeret Matkal special forces was on its way to help in Beeri, but was ambushed at the 232 junction, which other Hamas forces had taken over.
This delayed Sayeret Matkal from entering Beeri until around 1:30 p.m.
By 12:00 noon, Hamas had taken 11 more hostages to Gaza, the last group it would succeed in kidnapping.
A number of other forces at various times in the afternoon and evening were nearby and failed to enter Beeri earlier either because they were waiting for additional commanders to show up or because they viewed their role as evacuating Beeri residents only once Hamas was defeated.
The IDF probe harshly criticized these forces for passivity and emphasized the need for a spirit of risking one’s life to confront enemy forces to protect civilians.
Major developments
By 1:00 p.m., two major developments occurred.
The IDF high command had started to get a handle on the situation only around 11:00 a.m., but by 1:00 p.m., it had assigned a number of commanders zones on the Gaza border to retake.
Brig. Gen. Barak Hiram was assigned to direct retaking Beeri and surrounding areas.
Also, by 1:00 p.m., the IDF had retaken the 232 junction which Hamas had been using all morning to ambush and block Israeli attempts to reinforce Gaza border towns.
Around 1:30 p.m., Hiram had directed the gathering of significant forces to reinforce Israelis in Beeri and turn the tide.
Sayeret Matkal finally joined the fight at that point, along with portions of Shaldag, fighting in different sections of Beeri, though still not properly coordinated. Also in the afternoon, a paratroopers unit was involved.
A small number of Shin Bet officials and a larger number of YAMAM police fighters eventually engaged Hamas in Beeri, though a number of police officers were also ambushed before they could arrive and some fled after others were ambushed.
By 2:30 p.m., with 230 fighters against 219 for Hamas, the IDF finally had its first military advantage, and started to rout and isolate the remaining Hamas forces.
Around 4:15 p.m., the IDF forces had ballooned to 350 and later in the evening, they would reach a climax point of 730.
It was not until the next day on Sunday that Beeri was considered fully clear of invaders and the area around Beeri was not considered fully clear until October 11-12.
On October 11, the Jerusalem Post visited Beeri while there was still fresh blood and horrific signs of destruction and carnage throughout the village.
The IDF probe noted the contributions of two tanks to ousting Hamas from Beeri, though they only arrived in the late afternoon.
The role of the IAF
Although the probe does not mention the air force, previous leaks have slammed air force fighter jets for not participating in the defense of the Gaza border.
In contrast, IDF helicopters did make some contributions, though it was hard for them to fully optimize their power since they only arrived after Hamas was already mixed in with Israeli civilians whose villages they were invading.
By around 8:30 a.m., helicopter units were providing support gunfire and missile fire to residents at Beeri.
From Beeri, around five helicopters in the early hours were hopping from scene to scene, including: Nahal Oz, back to Beeri. Hulit, Nir Oz, Kerem Shalom, and a variety of areas right on the border fence.
Countless Hamas terrorists, both in vehicles and on foot, were picked off by these helicopters as they swooped through the region.
However, in the first few minutes that they arrived, some helicopters had no idea what was going on and thought that they were helping with a minor incident where a border protest had gotten out of hand.
Even after providing initial support at Beeri, they did not all realize the scale of the invasion or the threat. In fact, when they left Beeri the first time, they thought they had successfully scared away a small group of invaders, who they had just fired warning shots at to scatter them.
Only when they arrived at Nahal Oz and saw large numbers of Hamas invaders streaming across the border, did they "remove the gloves" and permit free open fire rules within the squadron on anyone who seemed to be associated with Hamas.
Even after that point, it was not easy for many hours, as Hamas terrorists' were not a common sight on the Israeli side of the border and helicopter pilots' were not always sure who was Israeli and who was Hamas.
The probe praised the Beeri resident civilian defense teams who held Hamas back for such a long time until the IDF did finally arrive, saying countless other residents were saved by their bravery and sacrifice.
In addition, the probe slammed IDF personnel at various times who did not offer helmets, water, and other aid to civilians when doing so would not have hampered their mission.
IDF Chief of Staff Lt. Gen. Herzi Halevi said, “although this is only the first and a unique probe which does not represent the full picture regarding what happened that day, it does clearly demonstrate the enormity of the failure and the multiple dimensions to the disaster which befell the residents of the South who defended their families with their bodies for long hours when the IDF was not there to protect them.”
Further he stated that the probe provides “the global answer that the immense number of simultaneous attacks on the villages and military positions as well as on cutting off the critical transportation junctions, made it harder for us to accomplish our mission” of defending or at least reinforcing the South