Israel targeted Hamas commander Mohammad Deif in an airstrike on Saturday in the Mawasi area of southern Gaza, designated a humanitarian zone early in the war.
Whether or not Deif is dead may not be that important. If he is dead, it will have removed a key commander who has had the unique ability to elude targeted strikes in the past. Al-Ain media in the UAE referred to him as a “ghost” with nine lives.
The problem with Deif is that he was able to become so powerful in the first place. Israel has eliminated several Hamas commanders and leaders in the past, including Sheikh Ahmed Yassin, Dr. Abdelaziz Rantisi, Salah Mustafa Muhammad Shehadeh and others during the Second Intifada (2000-2005). Saleh al-Arouri and Marwan Issa were eliminated after October 7. It’s not entirely clear how much of a setback this has been for Hamas. The organization has replaced leaders in the past and it also assumed after October 7 that it would lose most of its leaders in Gaza.
However, Hamas has insulated itself well. This is the wider problem that Deif represents. Because he is never seen in public and has existed as a “ghost” for so long, it’s possible to assume that the real story of Hamas is not to be found in its murderous Gazan leaders or in their battalion and brigade commanders.
Israel already believes it has eliminated 60% of the Hamas fighters who were operational on October 7. Most Hamas battalions have supposedly been defeated, yet the organization persists. Its leadership lives in the Qatari capital of Doha, a key US ally in the region.
The fact that Hamas was able to murder almost 1,200 Jews in a single day, and Hamas leaders live in luxury under the protection of a US ally, tells us a lot more about Hamas than Deif’s death might tell us.
This is because Hamas planned October 7 as part of a wider war on Israel. It is a war backed by Turkey, a NATO member, and also by Qatar, Iran, Russia, China, and many other countries. Hamas has systematically exploited UN facilities in Gaza.
Its members work for international NGOs and partner with them. Hamas has bought their silence to such a degree that they don’t condemn the terrorist group or even mention it in statements. They call it an “armed group.” When Deif was once thought dead, major media in the West called him a “military chief.”
How can Deif be a “military chief” if he never appears in public and doesn’t wear a uniform? Yet Western media gives him the same rank as the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in the US.
When the US targeted Osama Bin Laden or ISIS leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, the Western press didn’t call them “military chiefs.” Only Hamas gets this privilege.
It is a unique privilege and represents another aspect of the Deif problem. Hamas members dress as civilians. When they are killed, the Hamas-run health ministry in Gaza calls them all civilians. Yet they are called “military chiefs” by Western media.
They are called civilians and military chiefs and militants and “armed groups” – all of these things.
At each juncture, Hamas is privileged: to hide in UN schools, to hide in a humanitarian zone, and to pretend to be a “military” force even as it systematically massacres civilians – including its own – and has, by its reckless and criminal rule, seen Gaza destroyed over the last two decades.
The real Deif problem
This is the Deif problem. If Hamas was just Deif, then it could be eliminated by killing off its commanders and destroying it bit by bit. But it is not just Deif. It is Deif the “military chief” and also Deif the civilian, and Deif the “armed group” leader. Hamas leaders abroad are backed not just by Western allies but also by Russia, China and Iran. Hamas is a proxy, not only of Iran, but a kind of proxy of Western progressives who hail Hamas as a “resistance” movement. Therefore, Deif is also the “resistance.”
Israel also has a Deif problem because it allowed most of these Hamas leaders to thrive for so long. Most could have been eliminated decades ago. Many, like Yahya Sinwar, were in fact jailed in Israel for murder and then released in previous deals.
Israel has allowed the threat of Hamas to survive, due to negligence, ignorance, or cynical political decisions to pit the terrorist group against the Palestinian Authority – which it violently ousted from being in charge of Gaza even after the PA was democratically elected – enabling Hamas to become the massively powerful genocidal group that carried out October 7.
Deif enjoyed the space to plan and perpetrate this monstrous attack, safe from pursuit, unlike Bin Laden or Baghdadi. Even if Deif is dead, Hamas leaders in Qatar will still relax without fear of personal consequences.
The International Criminal Court applied for an arrest warrant against Deif, alongside Sinwar and Qatar-based Hamas leader Ismail Haniyeh. It accuses them of bearing “criminal responsibility for war crimes and crimes against humanity committed” on October 7.
If Deif is dead, then someone will need to tell the ICC that one genocidal mastermind can be removed from the docket. Yet, the Deif problem will remain.
In nine months of war in Gaza, Deif should have been eliminated long ago along with the rest of the monstrous genocidal beast that Hamas became on October 7.
The tolerance that the international community has borne for Deif – and which Israel bears too by not removing him years ago – will always haunt us, whether he is alive or dead.