There is still no official confirmation or statement concerning the success of the targeted strike of Mohammad Dief. The main evidence that Israel relies on includes aerial photographs of the strike site and the fact that the commander of the Khan Yunis Brigade, who was present, was killed in the attack.
However, it is possible to explain the implications of his elimination.
Firstly, their conscious thoughts - Sinwar's number two was removed. There is no hope for Hamas's senior officials, Sinwar himself lives on borrowed time. Additionally, the man who survived five assassination attempts was ultimately killed. Israel is not despairing or deterred, and luck can play a limited number of times.
Those who suggest “exile” as an option - an Israeli message through covert channels stating that in the absence of a deal (and perhaps even with one), senior Hamas figures in Gaza live on borrowed time, and Israel is willing to allow the remaining ones to quietly leave the Gaza Strip to countries that agree to accept them.
Hamas's military wing has likely lost its longtime leader, the Hamas commander-in-chief who held sway for years - its status, military strength, and ability to enforce its will are now in question the day after.
In addition, this is the "end of a wonderful partnership" - Hamas was managed by Sinwar and Deif, meaning the decisive body where important consultations were held between them. Like in any partnership, when one side disappears from the scene, the remaining partner needs time to recover, learning to navigate completely independently, without consulting on important decisions, doubling the weight of responsibility.
It can be assumed that amid Egyptian, Qatari, and international pressure, standing together was easier for the two, and now standing alone will be much more challenging for Sinwar.
IDF strategic gains
Apart from the temporary tactical ceasefire declaration and the brief duration of negotiation talks, it can be assessed that the recent achievements of the IDF and now the elimination of Deif may accelerate a deal out of concern, albeit unfounded, on the other side.
The IDF is leveraging the dialogue to deepen its gains against Hamas and successfully translate them into strategic achievements. For now and in the coming days, it is estimated that there won't be significant changes in what is known on the ground.
However, over time, Hamas may realize that time is turning against the terror organization, and its stance of steadfastness, on which it prides itself, seems to have failed, including with its number two himself unable to "stand firm."
Hamas - which already there is a debate concerning its ability to sustain and endure the conflict with the closure of the Philadelphia Axis - may conclude that time is no longer on its side, and it must strive to end the fighting, thereby compromising on its demands.
Furthermore, it has been demonstrated once again that Hamas and its leaders exploit the goodwill provisions of international law, using them both to evade the IDF ("steadfastness") and to exert control over the civilian population. In other words, they seek to maintain their military arm and administrative capability simultaneously.
This time, when discussing the specifics of an agreement whose importance extends to the day after, there is particular significance in the tailored presentation of the issue by the IDF and the State of Israel in a coordinated campaign.
This campaign will showcase a variety of cases from recent weeks, aiming to legitimize continued IDF operations while solidifying central anchors for the future and principles guiding ongoing negotiations.
The IDF's operations – which were often portrayed by Hamas and Israeli media as nearing conclusion - are at their most dangerous and critical states as they approach the conclusion of the intensive combat phase (Phase A.) This model may also apply to the subsequent phase (Phase B,) where broad ground maneuvers may be replaced by precise, deep, and highly impactful operations that may greatly impact Hamas.
Despite Hamas' exploitation of humanitarian and civilian areas for concealment and operations, it does not deter Israel from focused and determined counterterrorism activities. Therefore, it does not serve as additional protection for Hamas leaders.
Certainly, this will highlight Hamas' capability to function as an organized system and strike deep into the command chain and the connection between the military wing and Sinwar, who remains alone at the helm.
It also underscores the coordination between the military and civilian systems in Gaza. Over time, this could inflame the phenomenon of disintegration among remaining units and organizational frameworks, impacting Hamas's future military prospects planned for the day after.
The targeted assassinations may also affect the new guerrilla warfare pattern that Hamas has been adopting in recent months against the overwhelming force of the IDF - without a functioning organization and a compass indicating what lies ahead and which direction to take, even a skilled guerrilla fighter will struggle to sustain over time.
While there were times when Hamas terrorists and leaders seemed able to operate freely in areas where the IDF had already withdrawn, especially near humanitarian shelters, it is now clear that this is not the case. They must now go underground, which severely impacts their ability to survive an intensive IDF operation.
These are initial insights and implications even before it is officially known whether the targeted strike of Hamas' number two, Mohammad Deif, was successful. They suggest potential impacts regardless, including the need to attempt to neutralize him again in the future.