Israel could have responded in a myriad of ways to last Saturday’s rocket attack on Majdal Shams that murdered 12 children and youth on a soccer pitch.
It could have sent ground troops into southern Lebanon – just as it sent ground troops into Gaza after October 7 – to forcibly move Hezbollah beyond the Litani River, thereby enabling Israelis displaced from their homes in the North to return home.
It could have launched a massive air campaign against Hezbollah facilities and targets throughout Lebanon.
It could have held the state of Lebanon responsible for rockets being fired from its territory and struck at the country’s infrastructure, hitting power plants, electrical grids, fuel storage depots, water pumping stations, airports, and ports.
But it did none of that.
Instead, Israel sufficed with a pinpoint hit on Fuad Shukr, considered Hezbollah’s most senior military commander and a close adviser to Hezbollah head Hassan Nasrallah.
Shukr was instrumental in Hezbollah’s arms buildup over the years and a man the US government labeled a “global terrorist,” for whom it offered a $5 million reward for information leading to his arrest. He was a central figure in the bombing of the US Marine barracks in 1983, which killed 241 US soldiers.
The Israeli assassination of Shukr put flesh and bones on a comment Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu made to the US Congress 10 days ago – a speech that, considering the pace of events since then, seems already like a lifetime ago: “Our enemies are your enemies, our fight is your fight, our victory will be your victory.”
Yet another assassination
Seven hours after killing Shukr in the Lebanese capital, in faraway Tehran – a city not 235 kilometers from Jerusalem, like Beirut, but 1,500 km. away – Hamas head Ismail Haniyeh was assassinated in an Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps apartment where he was sleeping. Iran and Hamas blame Israel, though Jerusalem has not admitted responsibility.
If, however, Israel did carry out this targeted assassination, was it part of the response to the Majdal Shams attack, a way to hit Hezbollah’s paymaster and sponsor Iran, and along the way deliver a stinging blow to Hamas? Or was this a continuation of Israel’s policy of methodically picking off Hamas’s leaders one by one? Or was it both?
On Thursday, the IDF formally announced that Hamas’s No. 2 in Gaza, Muhammad Deif, was killed in a bombing attack three weeks ago that also killed Hamas’s military head in Khan Yunis, Rafa Salama. The confirmation of Deif’s killing, along with the assassination of Haniyeh, brings to four the senior Hamas leaders successfully taken out since October 7: Haniyeh’s deputy Saleh al-Arouri was killed in Beirut in January, and Deif’s deputy Marwan Issa was killed in Gaza in March.
Regardless of whether the Haniyeh hit was part of Israel’s response to the Majdal Shams murders, it and the killing of Shukr demonstrated to all of Israel’s enemies the Jewish state’s impressive capabilities – both intelligence and operational – as well as its will.
Rebuilding the perception in the region that Israel retains tremendous capabilities and will is critical following the October 7 massacre, where the country’s intelligence failures were glaring for all to see, as were its operational shortcomings in being unable to keep Hamas invaders from entering army bases and civilian communities to kill, maim, rape, and take hostages.
Likewise, its will to fight was questioned by its enemies, who misinterpreted the internal divisions within the country last year over the judicial reform as a sign of national weakness and declining resolve.
Demonstrating both capability and will is also crucial as the war passed its 300-day milestone this week without a knockout blow yet delivered that would force Hamas’s head in Gaza, Yahya Sinwar, to release the hostages, and as internal dissent, protests, and demonstrations may once again be interpreted – or misinterpreted – around the region as a sign that Israel is losing its will to continue this long fight.
Israel's operational reach shines
This week’s precision strokes dispel such notions, demonstrating both Israel’s operational reach and its continued determination to confront threats, regardless of their origin or location.
Netanyahu has spoken directly to the country twice over the last number of months: the first time after the bombing on the compound where Deif was three weeks ago, and the second time on Wednesday evening following the assassination of Shukr and Haniyeh.
The prime minister did not directly address the Haniyeh killing beyond saying the country was prepared for any eventuality, but the message in both speeches was strikingly similar – that the war would continue.
In both addresses, he said that Israel is in an existential struggle against Iran and its proxies, which are trying to tighten a stranglehold of terrorist armies and missiles around Israel’s neck.
Likewise, in both addresses, Netanyahu stressed that he rebuffed calls from home and abroad to end the war before its goals were accomplished. He defined those goals, as he has consistently done since the war began, as returning all the hostages, destroying Hamas’s military and governing capabilities, ensuring that Gaza will not threaten Israel in the future, and enabling the residents of the North and the South to return to their homes in safety.
It is clear from what he said on Wednesday that Netanyahu believes that actions such as this week’s assassinations increase the likelihood that Hamas will be more amenable to a hostage deal. This perspective contrasts sharply with the views of some of the hostages’ relatives and others who feel that such actions only complicate and delay the negotiations.
The prime minister’s strategy seems to hinge on the belief that eliminating senior Hamas figures advances all of Israel’s objectives simultaneously. He argues that these actions not only work toward eradicating Hamas and securing the release of hostages but also send a deterrent message to Iran and its proxies in other arenas.
Following the attack on Deif three weeks ago, Netanyahu outlined this thinking, saying that at the beginning of this war he set a general rule: “Hamas murderers are marked for death – from the first to the last of them. We will bring them to justice. The elimination of senior Hamas figures advances all our goals: the eradication of Hamas, the release of our hostages, and the removal of the future threat from Gaza to Israel.”
Further, he said, “it also advances our objectives in other arenas since it sends a deterrent message to all of Israel’s proxies – and to Iran itself.”
The assassinations of Shukr and Haniyeh indicate something else: Netanyahu believes it will be possible to achieve the war’s aims without sending the region spiraling into an all-out war.
How effective will the strategy be?
THE EFFECTIVENESS of this strategy, however, depends heavily on how Iran and Hezbollah respond to these assassinations. Some argue that Israel should not be sitting around waiting to see how Iran responds – as it did in April following the killing of Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps commander Mohammad Reza Zahedi in Damascus – but, rather, should build on the momentum of its tactical military success and take more offensive action against Hezbollah, especially given the legitimacy provided by the Majdal Shams attack.
There is a growing sentiment that the country’s approach of waiting before responding and engaging in prolonged deliberations and public discussion before doing so is counterproductive.
This pattern of extensive public debate before major operations – be it the Rafah incursion, the response to Iran’s missile and drone barrage in April, or the retaliation for the Majdal Shams attacks – undermines any element of surprise and gives the enemy ample time to prepare.
As the country anxiously waits for the other shoe to drop, as it waits to see how and where Hezbollah, Iran, and possibly Hamas and the Houthis will respond – similar to the anticipation in April – it should consider altering certain patterns of behavior that have defined its actions during this war.
Specifically, it should, first, respond more quickly to incidents like the Majdal Shams attack, doing so without endless public chatter about what to do, which only telegraphs its moves to its enemies (though the assassinations of Haniyeh and Shukr surely came as a surprise this week).
Second, it should preempt retaliatory attacks. If Israel knows Iran and Hezbollah are planning to retaliate for the Haniyeh and Shukr hits, it should consider taking the initiative and striking again before they do, thereby forcing them to think beforehand whether this retaliation is really worth their while.