“Bibi at War” read the clever Time Magazine cover published Thursday.
It was, on one level, a statement of the obvious. Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has indeed been a wartime leader for 10 months.
It is also subtly evocative of the larger and more negative framing of Israel’s existential battle against Iran and its proxy groups as “Bibi’s war.”
The slogan, often used by the prime minister’s opponent, reduces Israel’s complex larger geo-military to the most basic point of simplicity.
It’s a slogan that makes it seem as if war is about Netanyahu’s personality and not the larger existential threats facing the Jewish state that existed prior to his time in office from 2009-2021 and his return in 2022.
Hamas launched rockets at Israel when former prime minister Ariel Sharon was in office. The Second Lebanon War, which focused on curbing the threat from Hezbollah, was conducted by former prime minister Ehud Olmert.
The Iran threat
Iran posed a threat to Israel under both Sharon and Olmert. Hamas organized and trained for the October 7 attack while former prime ministers Naftali Bennett and Yair Lapid headed the government.
If Netanyahu were to silence Israel’s guns, Iran and its proxy groups would still pose a threat, and the war could very easily rage on.
Netanyahu, the man, and his policies and his strategies, however, obviously have an impact – and none more than the question of when to press on militarily and when to hold off.
It was Olmert who set Israel on the pathway of deterrence when it came to responding to Hamas, which seized power in Gaza in a bloody coup in 2007 under his watch.
But Netanyahu certainly continued to subscribe to that script until October 7. So, it comes as no surprise that since then, he has focused on vanquishing Hamas, not curbing it.
He has learned in the aftermath of the October 7 Hamas-led invasion that there is a price a nation can pay for a deterrence policy that does not eliminate the enemy.
The policy of vanquishment is made more complicated by the imperative Israel has to secure the release of the remaining 115 hostages in Gaza, 111 of whom were seized on October 7 and four others who had been held there previously since 2014 and 2015.
Netanyahu was able in November to free 105 of the hostages in a limited ceasefire deal, which Hamas then broke. It was a step that led to the immediate resumption of the war.
It has been clear to the prime minister’s opponents that Netanyahu since then has not been willing to make a deal at any price, which for them would be an agreement to end the war that left Hamas in Gaza and included a large release of Palestinian terrorists and security prisoners in Israeli jails.
It’s a price Netanyahu’s opponents on this issue would pay to see the hostages home now.
Finance Minister Bezalel Smotrich has been blunt that this is not a price the government will pay.
Netanyahu has insisted he can do both – vanquish Hamas and release the hostages. Time, however, has never been on his side.
History has shown that the safest and best way to free hostages is through a deal that is done as early as possible after their capture. If not, the hostages could be killed by their captors, or events could cause their disappearance.
The story of airman Ron Arad, who was kidnapped in Lebanon after aborting his damaged fighter jet during an IAF mission over that country, hangs heavy over the narrative of the Gaza captives.
Arad’s whereabouts were known for two years, while Israel mulled a deal it was never able to complete because he disappeared and has been missing ever since.
Concern is particularly high for these Gaza captives, some of whom are elderly and ill, given that they are held in difficult conditions that also endanger their health and psychological well-being.
The public debate on a hostage deal has sharpened since May 31, when US President Joe Biden unveiled a three-phase deal that was authored by Israel.
Theoretically, that should have put all the pressure on Hamas to make a deal, particularly since the proposal was an amended version of a Hamas counterproposal to a prior Israeli offer.
As Israel waited for Hamas, however, Netanyahu issued clarifications to the agreement against the advice of security officials.
His redlines included insisting that Israel retain control of the critical buffer zone between Gaza and Egypt, known as the Philadelphi Corridor, as well as the Netzarim Corridor within the enclave itself.
Netanyahu has also pushed to ensure that there be a maximal number of live hostages released in the first phase of the deal, which is slated to last for six weeks.
One frustrated Israeli official spoke about the importance of securing these terms by asking this question: If one could double the number of live captives freed in the first stage by waiting a few more weeks, wouldn’t that be worth it?
Publicly, Netanyahu has insisted that any of his terms and any additional clarifications fall within the framework of the Biden proposal, even as the US has been blunt that some of them are addenda to the framework.
Israel officials have insisted that Hamas does not want to make a deal, and that the only way to impact it is through military pressure. They have said making Netanyahu the fall guy for the potential of the deal’s collapse only emboldens Hamas to harden its stance.
That was the paradigm, however, prior to last week, when two assassinations set the region on the edge of a possible Israel-Iran war.
The assassinations of Hezbollah commander Fuad Shukr and Hamas leader Ismail Haniyeh did not scuttle the deal, but it’s feared that the breakout of a larger war as a result would.
Israel has claimed responsibility for Shukr and not Haniyeh, but it is widely believed to have been behind the Hamas leader’s killing.
The US maintains that a hostage deal would calm regional tension and could put a halt to potential reprisal attacks from Hezbollah and Iran.
What might have been a smart strategy about playing for the best optimal deal possible might pale in comparison to the importance of preventing reprisal attacks.
There are those who theorize that the question now is not what are the best terms for the deal, or which terms fall within the framework, but what needs to be done to finalize the deal immediately.
True, there are two players in the question. But for those focused on Netanyahu’s part in the process, there is a new push for him to forgo amendments and clarifications irrespective of whether they fall within the framework.They worry that while he focuses on the best terms, events could make it impossible to close the deal.
Netanyahu might have sound reasons for sticking to principled points, but there are also strong reasons to avoid regional escalation and safeguard the deal. The timing is everything.
Netanyahu might be right in his principled points but wrong in strategy. The failure to show flexibility could risk sinking the deal and create a situation in which the window to free the hostage might not open for a while.