The current ceasefire discussions, which are based on parameters that framed the talks since January, have several sticking points. Recent reports point to several key issues in the talks that could either derail them again or lead to an agreement. At issue are several key demands of Hamas: it wants Israel to leave the Netzarim Corridor, which separates Gaza City from central Gaza, and the Philadelphi Corridor, which separates Gaza from Egypt.
The Hamas demands – to be able to return armed fighters to northern Gaza through dismantling the IDF’s presence in Netzarim and to return to smuggling along the Egyptian border by ejecting Israel from the corridor – represent the grand plan to return to power in Gaza, part of the terror group’s larger grand strategy of using October 7 to take over the West Bank.
Hamas is already on the march in the West Bank, as evidenced by recent IDF airstrikes in the Tubas region and Jenin against key Hamas operatives; its demands in Gaza are step one in its next stage of operations.
These demands, which have been reported in numerous media in the region, may not only be Hamas’s. Other countries involved in the talks, such as Qatar and Egypt, may also have interests in Gaza and Hamas returning to control these areas. Iran, which supports Hamas, has likely advised it that it needs to find a way to return to control the Netzarim corridor and the border with Egypt.
Hamas negotiation efforts boosted by its major regional supporters
According to reports in The Washington Post, Doha was in contact with Tehran about Iran’s threats to attack Israel over the last two weeks.
Why was Doha talking to Tehran? Presumably, the goal was to delay the purported Iranian assault, enabling the continuation of the ceasefire negotiations. Iran would have wanted something in return. It is likely that Iran, along with other regional players like Turkey, which also supports Hamas, is actively advising Hamas on key points to maintain during the ceasefire talks.
Hamas is focusing on reducing its presence in the Philadelphi Corridor and may be open to the Palestinian Authority playing a role on the Egyptian border. Why does Hamas not mind the PA being there? Hamas has a long-term goal of taking over the PA, so it sees these forces as simply its own forces in waiting. Hamas has already been working with Beijing to create a unity deal for 14 Palestinian factions that would allow it to be in the PA. It is quietly backed by the PFLP, and the Palestinian National Initiative among other groups, and has received increasing backing by armed groups in Tulkarm, Kalkilya, Jenin, Tubas, and other areas in the northern West Bank.
Hamas’s main goal is to get rid of the main areas that Israel still controls in Gaza: Netzarim and Philadelphi. Israel has adopted a strategy in Gaza of clearing areas of Hamas and then leaving. Israel uses the corridors to quickly move forces into areas of Gaza. Israeli forces never remain for more than a few weeks, while Israel controls the two corridors across Gaza to monitor northern and southern Gaza.
Hamas in charge of around eighty percent of Gaza
IN GENERAL, Israel’s campaign in Gaza since October has left Hamas in control of the central camps – Maghazi, Nuseirat, Deir al-Balah, and Bureij – and Israel has left Hamas in charge of around 80% of Gaza in total. However, the IDF uses raids to reduce the Hamas presence in northern and southern Gaza. If there is a ceasefire deal, the raids will stop. Hamas will then regrow its power in northern and southern Gaza by using its current bases in Nuseirat, Bureij, and Deir al-Balah to move forces around. Many of the forces Hamas has in Khan Yunis, for example, moved there after the IDF left in April and after the Rafah operation began in May.
Israel is concerned that Hamas could move armed men from Nuseirat across the Netzarim corridor into northern Gaza. Hamas has already stepped up operations against the IDF in the corridor. The terror group has attempted sniper attacks and also attacks using explosive devices. The goal of the Hamas campaign is low-level harassment of the IDF. Hamas and other groups do the same thing, targeting the IDF in areas near Rafah. We know this because Hamas openly brags about it to pro-Iranian media. Hamas publishes daily details about its threats to IDF forces in Netzarim and southern Gaza. Every day that Hamas crouches in the ruins of parts of Gaza, it potentially grows stronger, and every day that the IDF is forced to sit and wait, it could potentially become a target. However, if the IDF leaves these areas, Hamas will take control and rapidly return in force to northern and southern Gaza. This has already been done by Hamas after IDF ground operations.
The key sticking points in the ceasefire talks are evidence of the Hamas plan to return to Gaza. It wants to move armed men to northern Gaza and reestablish itself in southern Gaza. The corridors prevent this. If the IDF presence is reduced or the IDF leaves, then Hamas will return. It has already returned to much of Gaza and shown that it can rapidly regrow its networks.