Most Palestinians support West Bank groups but don’t back Hamas, researcher says

Despite the ongoing “dehumanization and lack of trust” between Palestinians and Israeli Jews, both groups are weighing the choice between regional war and peace, Dr. Khalil Shikaki said.

 Dr. Khalil Shikaki. (photo credit: Courtesy)
Dr. Khalil Shikaki.
(photo credit: Courtesy)

Gliding through the maze of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is challenging even in normal times. To gain insights into the Palestinian perspective during the Israel-Hamas war, one man stands out for his ability to provide answers. Do the Palestinian people support Hamas after October 7? Did they before? Is an Israeli-Palestinian peace agreement still within reach?

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Dr. Khalil Shikaki, pollster and founder of the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research, shared his views in an in-depth interview with The Media Line’s Felice Friedson and Giorgia Valente. 

Friedson asked if Dr. Shikaki had any hopes for a resolution to the conflict and whether he had new polling data to share. Acknowledging the “very, very grim situation,” Shikaki expressed cautious optimism. He observed that despite the ongoing “dehumanization and lack of trust” between Palestinians and Israeli Jews, both groups are weighing the choice between regional war and peace. He stressed that, when given the option, “a majority of Israeli Jews and a majority of Palestinians” favor a comprehensive peace agreement over war. Shikaki mentioned that his team was working on a joint Israeli-Palestinian survey, to be released in the coming few weeks, that would explore this dynamic further, with the hope that leadership, possibly from the US, could help bring about such peace.

When asked about Palestinian support for Hamas 10 months into the conflict, Shikaki explained that while a certain percentage of Palestinians support Hamas, it has never been a majority. He stated that “it has always been a minority” in both Gaza and the West Bank, with roughly 40% of Gazans consistently supporting Hamas over the past decade due to shared values. In the West Bank, support was much lower, around 20%, but has surged to 40% since October 7, not because more people share Hamas’s values but because they now support Hamas’s policies. This shift is driven by the perception that Hamas’s attack on October 7 has brought international attention to the Palestinian cause and increased the urgency of finding a resolution.

Friedson also inquired about any Palestinian empathy for the October 7 attack. Shikaki indicated that there was little to no empathy on the Palestinian side. He explained that most Palestinians are focused on what they see on TV, particularly Al Jazeera, where they witness “women and children being killed every day,” which distances them from empathizing with the Israeli victims. He also noted that the Israeli and Palestinian perceptions of the events of October 7 differ significantly. While Israelis see the atrocities committed, “the overwhelming majority of Palestinians” do not believe that such atrocities took place. However, many Palestinians do acknowledge that taking hostages, particularly women, children, and the elderly, was “unacceptable” and a violation of international law. But the ongoing violence by Israel overshadows any hesitation they might feel about Hamas’s actions on that day.

  A Palestinian fighter from the armed wing of Hamas takes part in a military parade to mark the anniversary of the 2014 war with Israel, near the border in the central Gaza Strip, July 19, 2023. (credit: IBRAHEEM ABU MUSTAFA/REUTERS)
A Palestinian fighter from the armed wing of Hamas takes part in a military parade to mark the anniversary of the 2014 war with Israel, near the border in the central Gaza Strip, July 19, 2023. (credit: IBRAHEEM ABU MUSTAFA/REUTERS)

The issue of food and humanitarian aid in Gaza was another prominent topic. Dr. Shikaki was asked whether Gazans blame Hamas for withholding it and keeping it for their own forces, especially given reports to this effect from sources like the United Nations. Shikaki explained that there is “tremendous criticism” in Gaza regarding the distribution of aid, but most Palestinians do not blame Hamas for the failures. Instead, they attribute the situation to Israeli policies and actions, which have created conditions where gangs and armed groups act out of desperation. He added that the targeting of Hamas police by Israel has undermined law enforcement in Gaza, leading to the current “anarchy” in aid distribution. According to Shikaki, Palestinians do not believe Hamas is deliberately stealing or withholding aid but rather that Israel’s actions have weakened Hamas’s control over Gaza.

In a follow-up, Friedson pressed on whether fear might prevent people from speaking out about Hamas taking aid. Shikaki acknowledged that while incidents of Hamas members taking aid do happen, they are not widespread. He explained that the “grip of Hamas over Gaza has softened considerably” due to the current anarchy, and people are less afraid to express their views now than before. However, he emphasized that the majority of Palestinians do not blame Hamas for the chaotic aid distribution. Instead, they attribute the situation to the environment created by Israel, where armed groups, gangs, and even merchants exploit the lack of control in Gaza to seize aid, often for personal gain.

Valente shifted the discussion to Palestinian support for terrorism versus peace, particularly in the West Bank. Shikaki shared that his surveys show that “the overwhelming majority” of Palestinians in the West Bank support the formation of armed groups. For most Palestinians, these groups symbolize a rejection of the current situation—ongoing occupation, the collapse of the two-state solution, and the failure of diplomatic efforts by the Palestinian Authority. This support for armed resistance has grown, especially since the formation of the current Israeli government, with a majority of West Bank Palestinians now favoring armed struggle.

Friedson followed up by asking whether the rise of armed groups in the West Bank could persist beyond October 7, given the apparent lack of control. Shikaki acknowledged that the West Bank was “boiling” with frustration and support for armed struggle, driven by worsening economic conditions, increased Israeli restrictions, and anger at the Palestinian Authority. However, he does not foresee an imminent explosion of violence, such as a Third Intifada, without significant changes—like a leadership shift in the Palestinian Authority or a weakening of its security forces. For now, the situation remains tense but not on the verge of a large-scale uprising.

In addition to these topics, the interview delves into several other significant issues, such as the identity of the data collectors; Shikaki’s personal reflections on his brother who co-founded Islamic Jihad and who was assassinated in Malta in 1995, and the growing popularity of Marwan Barghouti, who is widely seen as the leading candidate to succeed President Mahmoud Abbas when he steps down.


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Dr. Shikaki, 10 months into an ongoing war between Israel and Hamas, are the Palestinian people still supporting Hamas?

"A certain percentage of Palestinians support Hamas, but it’s not the majority. It has never been the majority. There was never a time since the creation of Hamas that a majority of Palestinians supported Hamas.

"It has always been a minority. A minority in Gaza and a minority in the West Bank. The question is the size of this minority, how small or how big a minority it is.

"The support after October 7 in Gaza has essentially remained stable. It has not changed and it reflected the support from those who share Hamas’s values. This is about 40% of Gazans and that’s the percentage that has essentially remained intact during the last decade or so.

"There might have been a sudden increase here and there during wars, but overall that percentage has never exceeded, has never crossed the 50% threshold. In the West Bank, the support is much smaller because those who share Hamas’s values are much smaller in size. We’re talking about 20% or so of West Bankers who support Hamas because they share Hamas’ values.

"But since October 7, that percentage has increased considerably. It is about 40% or so today. So that essentially means Hamas has doubled the size of the support it used to have before the war.

"Not because more people are now sharing Hamas’s values, but because there are more people now who share Hamas’s policies. Most importantly, the perception that Hamas was right to carry out the attack on October 7 because of the Palestinians living in Gaza under the siege and blockade by Israel over the Gaza Strip, and because they think that attack has generated a great deal of change at the international level, making the Palestinian-Israeli issue central and the search for a solution to the conflict more urgent. This is an achievement of October 7 that has therefore led to that increase in the support for Hamas and the West Bank."

When you look at what happened on October 7 and 1,200 people murdered and so many hundreds of hostages taken, is there any empathy on the Palestinian side that you’re seeing?

"No, we don’t see empathy on the Palestinian side. Most Palestinians look at what they see today on their TV. If they turn on Al Jazeera, what they see are women and children being killed every day by the dozens.

"That keeps them away from any kind of empathy with the Israelis who suffered on October 7. In addition to that, Israeli perception of what happened on October 7 is fundamentally different from the way that the Palestinians perceive what happened. It’s a matter of knowing or not knowing what happened on that day.

"For most Israelis, the atrocities were committed, but the overwhelming majority of the Palestinians does not believe that atrocities against women and children took place on that day. Most Palestinians do believe that Hamas acted sometimes in a manner that was contradictory to international law. For example, taking women and children and elderly hostages in Gaza.

"The majority of Palestinians believe that this is unacceptable, that this is a violation of international law. But when they look at what Israel is doing, that seems to basically overcome any hesitation that they might have in viewing what happened on October 7 as a correct decision by Hamas."

Many of the West and many of Israelis have opined that Hamas withholds all kinds of food and humanitarian aid. How do a lot of the people living there feel? Are they afraid to say that this is true?

Do they feel that others are exaggerating it, even though you’ve had even UN offices say that this is the case? What is the pulse on the ground in this particular area?

"As far as we can tell, there is tremendous criticism in Gaza against the manner in which aid is being distributed. But the extent to which this is blamed on Hamas is debatable. We do not see a majority of Palestinians in Gaza blaming Hamas for the failed process of delivery and distribution of aid.

"Most Palestinians believe it is the Israeli measures and policies that it implements on the ground that create such conditions for gangs and armed groups to act on their own, sometimes justifiably because they are hungry. They feel that unless they take matters into their own hands, they will continue to be hungry. Many people believe that the conditions that were created, that led to current anarchy in Gaza, and that Israel, by targeting Hamas police in Gaza, has essentially prevented any kind of law enforcement or imposition of law and order.

"That led to the miserable situation with regard to aid distribution, and that it is not Hamas deliberately stealing food or aid, or that Hamas is acting in a manner that denies people access to such aid, but that it is rather a matter of a situation in which Hamas’ ability to control Gaza is weakened by the day by the acts that Israel is currently implementing there."

Now, you’re tailing polls. You have people who are data collectors that you employ to go into Gaza, go into the West Bank, to understand what’s happening as well in Israel. Who are these people?

How do you weed them out? I’m sure it’s very difficult at this time.

"We have been collecting data in Gaza and in the West Bank and in east Jerusalem for the last 31 years. Many of the people that we have have been trained at least four times a year. All of our teams are trained four times a year, and many of them have stayed with us all these years.

"We think that we have the best data collection team that we can have, and that they are very well trained. Based on that experience, based on the tests that we do, based on the quality control that we exercise, the team is the best that there can be."

Dr. Shikaki, we had a journalist that has done work for us in Gaza over the years, and he did speak to people who were saying that Hamas was taking the goods. We had video of this happening, so is it possible that this does still happen? That even if your people are getting a general consensus that there are people that are afraid to speak out, whether it’s a minority or not, it is happening?

"We expect that people are more willing to talk now than before because of the anarchy prevailing. Hamas’s ability to control or punish people today is much more limited than it was at any time before. So the grip of Hamas over Gaza has softened considerably, and we would expect that people are much less afraid to express their views today.

"The fact that there are, of course, incidents in which Hamas people do take aid is, of course, probably not in dispute because we also hear that, and when we ask people, some people do say that. But this is not a majority. It’s not even a significant minority.

"The majority of Palestinians do not point out that this is a Hamas action, but rather that this is the result of the environment that Israel has created, leading to this anarchy in which the ability of those who distribute the food and aid is extremely constrained. They can do very little against armed men, gangs, sometimes from big families who need the food, and sometimes merchants who want to sell the food that is the aid at higher prices in the market, and for them having the ability to organize themselves into armed groups and take control of the goods is an indication that there is really no one in control in Gaza today. And day by day, this is the prevailing perception in Gaza, that Hamas’ control is weakening, and along with that comes the kind of environment in which the aid distribution is suffering considerably."

Dr. Shikaki, by way of background, you were born in a refugee camp in Rafah. You attended the American University of Beirut and completed a doctorate at Columbia University. You also co-founded the Crown Center at Brandeis.

You co-published a textbook with an Israeli, Arabs and Israelis, Conflict and Peacemaking in the Middle East from the Israeli-Palestinian and Israeli-Palestinian, Arab-Palestinian perspectives. How different would that book look today?

"That book was essentially an attempt to understand the dynamics of Israeli-Palestinian conflicts and the Arab-Israeli conflict at large. We have a third author with us who is an Egyptian who covered the Arab side of the story of that conflict. Our job in the book was to trace the developments to determine why this conflict is so resilient, why it has been very difficult to resolve it over the years, and why we did occasionally manage to come very close to reaching a peace agreement, why this has been more successful with state-to-state relations such as Egypt or Jordan and Israel, or the Abrahamic Accords, but remained extremely difficult to do the same with the bilateral Israeli-Palestinian relations. So the book outlined those factors that have contributed to the resilience of the conflict, while at the same time pointing out those opportunities that have in the past presented themselves for the parties to try and reach accommodation at both dimensions, Arab-Israeli and Palestinian-Israeli."

"So the conflict today basically continues this story of resilience for more than 120 years of conflict, although one can say that a lot of progress was made over the last 30 years, most importantly in removing the existential nature of the conflict from the prevailing perception of Palestinians and Israelis. This last war is probably one of the most significant developments since the start of the current, what is called the peace process, the Oslo process. Since the start of that process, the current events are probably the single most important in restoring that sense of vulnerability for both sides, Israeli-Jews and Palestinians, that the conflict is becoming more and more existential.

"The fear of Gazans and West Bankers that what Israel is after is a genocide and expulsion and ethnic cleansing, and the feeling of Israeli-Jews that what happened on October 7 indicates that the Palestinians do have genocidal aspirations against them. These developments certainly are new and they take us back to those days of 50 and 60 and 70 years ago when the prevailing perception of the parties was that this conflict was irresolvable and that it is about existence, mere existence, and that the other side wants nothing but to completely destroy one side or the other."

Your brother Fatih was the co-founder of Islamic Jihad and ultimately was assassinated. You took a very different path. How do you reconcile the mindset of the terrorist with your intellectual approach to the conflict?

People are different, people take different views. I’m sure you’re different from your sister or your brother, and so that’s true in life. People are different, they have different experiences.

There have been numerous attacks by terrorist groups in the West Bank. The Israeli and Palestinian security organizations have worked together to fight them, but it seems now that the situation is kind of out of control.

Is there any poll that you’ve done on Palestinians who are promoting terror versus peace?

"The surveys that we’ve conducted show that the overwhelming majority of the Palestinians in the West Bank do support the formation of these armed groups. For most Palestinians, these armed groups represent the rejection of the status quo, the rejection of the status quo in terms of continued occupation and the demise of the two-state solution, and the desire of the Palestinians to take matters into their own hands to try and change this situation. They feel the Israelis feel comfortable with the status quo.

"They have little to gain from ending their occupation, and they feel that they have little to lose if they continue with that occupation today. The Palestinians suffer every day, and so the status quo is unacceptable to them. For most Palestinians, the Palestinian authorities’ efforts through diplomacy, security coordination, and so on with Israel to produce a different Israeli policy, whether it is about settlements or ending the Israeli occupation through negotiations or resumption of negotiations have failed.

"Therefore, the search has eventually led a majority of the Palestinians. This is particularly true since the formation of the current Israeli government. By early 2023, we begin to see a majority of West Bankers supporting an armed resistance and supporting the formation of these armed groups throughout the West Bank."

Do you feel that this particular divide, this is a very, very important point and moment in terms of what’s happening with these terror groups, whether they’re large or small, infiltrating Israel. Do you feel that this moment, this is going to be the leading factor that’s going to really outlive what’s happened on October 7? Because there seems to be very little control right now of the situation.

"There’s no doubt that the West Bank is currently boiling, but there are no indications that we are about to enter a phase where we see the West Bank exploding. This is not the case today. We do see extreme conditions in terms of the rejection of the Palestinian Authority, greater support for armed struggle and for the armed groups, a great deal of frustration among the public anger at the restrictions imposed by the Israeli army since October 7.

"Economic conditions have worsened considerably. The unemployment rate, particularly among young people, has skyrocketed in the West Bank. For all these conditions, of course, not to speak of what the Israeli government is doing with settlements and home demolition and land confiscation and so on, this creates this process of boiling that we currently see.

"For an explosion to take place, however, that requires a change at the level of the leadership of the Palestinian Authority, that is Abbas, and it requires significant weakening of the Palestinian security services. Both conditions are not happening. It also requires that a very strong organization, in this case it would be Farah or Hamas, would be willing and capable of organizing such an explosion that is the Third Intifada.

"That is not at the moment something that one can see happening in the West Bank yet, and so the boiling process is probably going to generate new dynamics that could eventually lead to that. But conditions on the ground today do not point to such an explosion taking place anytime imminently."

 Dr. Shikaki, you have polled the Palestinian people on who should lead Mahmoud Abbas when he hands over his reins. Many are talking about Marwan Barghouti. The question is, how does he pull out these days?

"Today, Marwan Barghouti is more popular than he has been at any time since we started polling about him. October the 7th has generated much more support for him than any other Palestinian leader, and he is today the most popular leader. He was before October the 7th also the most popular leader.

"If elections are held today, there is absolutely no doubt that Barghouti can win these elections, and that is something that probably will continue to be because of the prevailing perception among the Palestinians that Barghouti is someone that they can trust, not only because they see him as incorruptible, but also because they think he’s a unifier, and because they think he will be able to fight for Palestinian national rights in ways that the current Palestinian leadership is not doing."

Connected to this, is there any leader, do you see aside from Barghouti, that has potential to govern both in the West Bank and in the Gaza Strip?

"Of course, there could be other leaders. Right now, the surveys that we conduct do not point to any particular leader who would be acceptable to the Palestinians, to a majority of Palestinians in the West Bank and in the Gaza Strip, unless there are elections. Obviously, if somebody wins in these elections, even if they are not popular today, they will be seen as legitimate.

"In the Palestinians’ eyes, electoral legitimacy is supreme. It is the most important source of legitimacy, and if there are elections and someone emerges as a winner in these elections, that person will certainly be trusted and be seen as someone who should or could control both the West Bank and the Gaza Strip.

The day after is hopefully coming soon. Do you have any kind of hopes for a resolve? What is on the horizon?

"Well, one has to remain optimistic despite the current very, very grim situation. We do see signs, even at this time, in which both Palestinians and Israeli Jews dehumanize each other. This is probably one of the worst points in the history of the two peoples in terms of this level of dehumanization and lack of trust that we see today.

"Nonetheless, I think when people are confronted with a situation similar to the one that is currently prevailing, we’re now waiting to see what will happen with the cease-fire negotiations versus what will happen with Iran and the retaliation from both Iran and Hezbollah. So the concern about a regional war versus the prospect of making peace is leading both sides, both Israeli Jews and Palestinians, coming to the conclusion that if the choice is theirs, if it is up to them, would they risk a regional war or would they be willing to agree to a regional and bilateral peace based on which a two-state solution is created and an Arab-Israeli normalization takes place. In a choice between these two, a majority of Israeli Jews and a majority of Palestinians favor a peace agreement, both bilateral and regional, much more than they favor a regional war.

"So that basically tells us that certainly when one looks at this situation and think how bad it could get and that there is a choice that could take us away from all of that, and that is by reaching a comprehensive peace agreement, bilateral and regional, that people do not hesitate to favor a peace agreement. That, I think, is a very optimistic environment for one, if someone, it requires obviously leadership that unfortunately we don’t see today, but in the region, but hopefully someone else, perhaps the US government or after the election someone could begin to seriously consider a much greater US role in bringing about this bilateral and regional peace. And that’s the kind of surveys that we are currently hoping to release very soon. This is a joint Israeli-Palestinian survey."