Hamas is demanding the Philadelphi Corridor for a reason - analysis

It stands to reason that the control of the border was a key ingredient in Hamas’ strength and this is why it wants it back. 

The Philadelphi Corridor (photo credit: YOSSI ZAMIR/FLASH90)
The Philadelphi Corridor
(photo credit: YOSSI ZAMIR/FLASH90)

Many reports have focused on the Israeli internal debate about the Philadelphi corridor, and whether holding on to it is essential to prevent Hamas from rebuilding its power in Gaza. However, Israel’s decisions are not coming in a vacuum. Hamas also is demanding to control the border with Egypt.

Hamas controlled that border since 2007 and it used it to build up an unprecedented rocket arsenal. It used this arsenal to carry out the largest massacre of Jews since the Holocaust. It stands to reason that the control of the border was a key ingredient in Hamas’s strength, and this is why it wants it back.

An article at Iran’s IRNA state media is clear on this: “Khalil al-Hayya, a senior Hamas official, says no agreement is possible for a ceasefire in Gaza without the Israeli regime’s withdrawal from Philadelphi, Netzarim, and Rafah corridors.” When Hamas says something, it is not just rhetoric.

Hamas clearly understands that the IDF’s control of these areas is preventing Hamas from controlling all of Gaza. Hamas currently controls the central camps area of Gaza; Bureij, Maghazi, Deir al-Balah, and Nuseirat, as well as areas in northern Gaza and Khan Younis. However, Hamas’s control has been partially checked by the IDF control of the corridors in southern Gaza and Netzarim in the center.

It’s worth recalling that IDF control of Netzarim and Philadelphi is not something that just happened in this war. The IDF took control of these areas in previous wars and operations. When Israel controlled Gaza from 1967 to 2005, control of these areas was key to securing Gaza. In those days, particularly in the 1980s and 1990s, Israel established communities in those areas to secure them. Israel also had communities in Sinai near the Philadelphi border. Yamit was a key to this area and a key to securing the border; it was evacuated in 1982.

 Israeli soldiers operate in the Gaza Strip amid the ongoing conflict between Israel and Hamas, January 21, 2024 (credit: IDF SPOKESPERSON'S UNIT)
Israeli soldiers operate in the Gaza Strip amid the ongoing conflict between Israel and Hamas, January 21, 2024 (credit: IDF SPOKESPERSON'S UNIT)

It’s worth noting that the IDF had to operate in the Philadelphi corridor during the Second Intifada to uproot terrorist infrastructure. Hamas, founded in the late 1980s, has always understood the need to control the border area. Hamas knows Gaza; its key leadership almost all come from Gaza. Therefore, Hamas understands that control of the border with Egypt and central Gaza is a key to its return to power.

How does Hamas smuggle items into Gaza? Some of it may come from underground tunnels, but it is likely that a lot of Hamas’s terror infrastructure comes from controlling the overland route via Rafah. It brings in dual-use items that it repurposes for terror needs. Likely, that underground smuggling is not the real story these days. Control of the overland route is more important. That is one reason Hamas wants to return to control Rafah.

Internal politics

Hamas knows that an internal debate exists in Israel about holding on to the Philadelphi corridor. It exploits this and uses language that is designed to sow internal discord. For instance, it accuses Israel’s leadership of seeing the corridor as “more important than Israeli captives.” The fact is that it is Hamas that sees this area as more important. It is Hamas that took hostages. It is Hamas that used the border area to become stronger and launch a genocidal attack on Israel. It is Hamas that murdered the hostages.

In Israel, the debate is whether having military units on the corridor route is essential. Some think Israel can return to the area. Others think that monitoring can be done remotely. History shows that generally, this is not the case. After 2005, there was also supposed to be a mechanism to monitor the border. The EU was supposed to have a role. Hamas was able to seize control in 2007 and clamp down on any monitoring. Once Israel left Gaza in 2005, it didn’t want to come back. This is how things have worked in the past, and it’s likely this would be how things happen in the future.

Hamas is arguing that Israel’s demands to control the corridor are new. The fact is that Hamas worked hard to prevent an Israeli operation in Rafah. Back in February and March, it used contacts, likely via Doha, to spread stories about how it needed Israel to pause fighting over Ramadan. Then in March and April, it sought to prevent an operation in Rafah by claiming civilians could not evacuate Rafah.


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The US pushed for a maritime humanitarian corridor. Once Hamas had stalled long enough it attacked IDF soldiers in Kerem Shalom. The IDF began the operation in Rafah in early May, having left Khan Younis in April.

This enabled Hamas to shift its forces from Rafah to Khan Younis. Hamas basically already played for time to prevent a Rafah operation. It gained some six months in this respect. Then Hamas demanded that any talks in Doha or Cairo meant that it could keep the corridor. It made sure to cement this in talks that took place up through July. Then Hamas claimed to have accepted this proposal, and claimed Israel was now putting Philadelphi into the mix. However, it is Hamas that has always exploited this area and it is clear from the start that Hamas has wanted to hold onto southern Gaza.

Hamas is now spreading propaganda via media in Iran and Doha that is designed to make it seem that it is Israel that is being stubborn on the issue of the border with Egypt. But the reality is that this is Hamas policy. Hamas insists on control of an area in Gaza that its forces lost control of. The Rafah brigade of Hamas has been defeated. It now wants Israel to return this area for free to Hamas without the State receiving anything.

It then wants Israel to pay for this ground twice if Israel has to return to stop smuggling. This shows the arrogance and privilege of Hamas and its interlocutors who reside in Doha. The Hamas officials in Doha are being told to insist on control of Philadelphi. The IRNA report makes this clear in a roundabout way. It says, “Netanyahu is also facing mounting criticism from Israeli officials and the public over his refusal to accept a truce deal.

He has recently set a new condition for a deal, saying that Israel should maintain its control of Philadelphi corridor, which is a 14-kilometer area along the Gaza-Egypt border.” The reality is that this is Hamas policy to insist on the corridor.

Meanwhile, Iran’s Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi spoke with his Bulgarian counterpart, Ivan Kondov. In the call, he said, “Iran supports any deal, which is accepted by the Palestinians and Hamas for establishing a ceasefire in Gaza and paving the way for sending humanitarian aid to [the territory],” IRNA reported. This is important because it shows how the Iranian diplomatic offensive is unfolding.

Iran is pushing into Europe and Central Asia with diplomatic initiatives and it is keeping Gaza at the forefront. It’s important to note that while Israel has internal discussions, Hamas and the Iranians are maneuvering in the region.