The IDF’s strike on Iran’s S-300 antiaircraft missile system on April 19 as retaliation for Tehran’s launching over 300 aerial threats against Israel days on April 13-14 significantly deterred the Islamic Republic and Hezbollah throughout August, top sources have told The Jerusalem Post.
How the deterrence worked was different for each party, the sources said.
To date, Iran has not retaliated in any dramatic military way directly against Israel for the assassination of Hamas chief Ismail Haniyeh on July 31 while he was in Tehran, which it attributed to Jerusalem.
Sources are confident that Iran Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei felt that the strike on the S-300 was a significant loss and that he and his armed forces were further disturbed by being unsure of how the Jewish state had pulled it off.
The significance of the strike of the S-300 was not only that it took Tehran a decade to get Russia to sell the system, or that it was a huge jump in anti-aircraft capabilities, but also that the system was located in close proximity both to Iran’s Natanz nuclear facility and a key military airport.
According to sources, Khamenei understood loud and clear that Israel could have easily destroyed those other mega-important strategic sites.
Thwart major attacks by Iran
All of this was also augmented when Israel and its coalition of allies shot down 99% of the aerial threats launched by Iran in April, and the return of that coalition in early August.
After weeks of saber rattling by the Islamic Republic, in which it promised to kill large numbers of Israelis with a new massive strike to retaliate for the killing of Haniyeh, Israel has entered September with all signs being that Khamenei may have decided to back off substantially (and either way he has decided not to retaliate within 30 days.)
Sources explain a more complex picture with Hezbollah, which wanted to retaliate for the killing of its military chief, Fuad Shukr, on July 30.
In the end, Hezbollah did intend to attack, despite Israel’s show of power on both offense and defense against the Islamic Republic in April.
However, sources say Hezbollah chose a more limited option to retaliate against Israel in the end.
Rather than launching a full war on Israel with 6,000-8,000 rockets per day, including firing its most advanced longer-range precision missiles at civilians in Tel Aviv, central Israel, and Haifa, it chose to launch only several hundred rockets, and only at 11 IDF bases, including the headquarters of the IDF and the Mossad.
Sources said that this change in plan by Hezbollah – due to fears of what Israel had done to Iran in April – not only avoided a general war but also gave Jerusalem a huge additional advantage tactically.
Had Hezbollah used all of its rockets and precision missiles and gone after major Israeli population centers, the IDF would have had to preemptively strike not only southern Lebanon, but also Beirut, Baalbek, and the Bekaa Valley.Although over 100 IDF aircraft destroyed thousands of Hezbollah rockets on August 25 to preempt the Lebanese terror group’s plans, 90% of their strikes were in southern Lebanon.
This meant that the IDF did not have to focus more of its air power on farther away and more difficult targets and was able to strike closer and easier targets.
In turn, that meant that the IDF could spend more energy protecting northern Israeli villages from short-range rockets, whereas in a larger war, the air force probably would have focused more defense on Tel Aviv and central Israel, leaving northern villages much more vulnerable.
The combined might of Israel’s offense and defense in April versus Iran, along with its preemptive strike on Hezbollah on August 25, according to sources, have likely ended or significantly pushed off the Jewish state’s enemies’ intentions of turning August into a nightmare for Jerusalem.