A Walla investigative report published on Tuesday revealed that the IDF’s Gaza Division, led by Brig.-Gen. Avi Rosenfeld had no prior warning of the October 7 Hamas attack, and despite criticism, investigations show Rosenfeld's decisions helped prevent greater disasters.
Nevertheless, questions remain about the IDF’s preparedness for such a large-scale assault.
IDF Brig.-Gen. Avi Rosenfeld commanded the Gaza Division and was in the war room in Kibbutz Re'im at 6:29 a.m. on October 7 when Hamas Nuhkba terrorists penetrated Israel's fences and stormed the bordering communities.
Rosenfeld was one of the prominent field commanders of the IDF until the start of the war. He took command of the Gaza Division in August 2022. In the early morning of October 7, he received intelligence about activity in Gaza - but nothing from the Shin Bet or Military Intelligence Directorate provided any warnings of an imminent incident.
The investigation also revealed that Rosenfeld decided to send the commander of the northern division, an intelligence officer, and the divisional engineering officer out to test systems at the Gaza border.
Rosenfeld faced significant criticism for remaining at headquarters while a war raged outside. However, in hindsight, investigations reveal that his decision to stay, though difficult, was logical. From there, he assessed the situation, issued orders, and maintained HQ communication despite the numerous attacks. The investigations indicate that staying in command HQ allowed him to make three crucial decisions more effectively.
Rosenfeld's three courses of action that morning
The first key decision was to acknowledge that all the localities were under attack and that a force of soldiers needed to be assigned to each one, including Kfar Aza, Nahal Oz, and others. It took a significant amount of time for many of the forces to arrive, but once they did, all available forces were deployed to the communities.
His second decision was to activate a "belt of fire" on the Gaza border. The division stopped even more significant amounts of terrorists who intended to reach the communities.
In the initial hours of the attack, there were concerns that hundreds of thousands might attempt to cross the border in real time.
As a result, Rosenfeld directly contacted the IAF Chief of Staff, Brig.-Gen. Omer Tishler, to ensure a swift response. One of the first operations, conducted around 7:15 a.m., targeted the Erez Crossing to prevent additional waves of terrorists, who, according to intelligence, planned to continue along Highway 4 toward Tel Aviv.
The third decision was to regain control of the highways leading to the communities after it became clear that terrorists had set up ambushes along these routes, hindering the IDF's ability to deploy forces to the communities and outposts.
Had there been intelligence about even a minor attack, Rosenfeld likely would have called for a significant deployment of forces. A similar situation occurred a few years ago when Palestinian Islamic Jihad sent a sniper squad to carry out an attack near the border while Rosenfeld was serving as a northern brigade commander.
The investigations also show that two weeks before October 7, Rosenfeld fired the two brigade commanders in the division while on vacation in Eilat for an apparently minor incident - a suspected order violation at the Gaza border.
Rosenfeld failed as the central command of his division in defending the communities. However, Walla revealed that even if the IDF had known hours in advance that thousands of Hamas terrorists planned to infiltrate Israel, it could have only weakened the attack, not completely prevented it.
He received reports from observers and had to steel himself to lead what remained of his unit, as well as the forces that would arrive late, to rescue and fight against an enemy that grew stronger with each passing hour.
According to the Walla report, the IDF and Gaza Division's failure is stark and unprecedented. However, investigations reveal that several key decisions made by Rosenfeld in the initial moments of the war helped to avert even greater disasters.
The investigations of the war have not yet answered the main question: How did the IDF not prepare the Gaza Division and the Southern Command for a surprise attack - a scenario in which tens of thousands of terrorists approach the fence and threaten to penetrate Israeli territory?
This scenario has already happened in practice, the Walla report claimed, as in the years preceding the war as part of the Great March of Return led by the Hamas government.
No one thought that one day, instead of stones and kites, terrorists would run to the fence with anti-tank missiles, explosive charges, and guns. And if that wasn't enough, every Israeli citizen in the border area knew that the monthly explosion noises emanating from the training grounds of the military arm of Hamas were preparations for war.
Could the war have been prevented at the last minute?
Rosenfeld transferred command and the Gaza Division flag to Brig.-Gen. Barak Hiram just one day after the school year began in the Western Negev communities. The start of the school year was uneventful, following months of extensive preparation by the division.
Rosenfeld handed over to Hiram a division that renovated the entire fence, built a buffer zone, and managed to chase down commanders and terrorists who raided the Israeli border on October 7 - among them a Nukhba terror unit in the Tuffah neighborhood in Gaza.
They also succeeded for 11 months in thwarting hundreds of intrusions into the territory of Israel.
Rosenfeld and other senior commanders will likely grapple with the question of whether they did enough in the years leading up to the conflict to develop an effective defense against Palestinian terrorism, Walla reported. They will also question whether they acted decisively upon receiving the initial intelligence.