The IDF is investigating the incident at the football field in Majdal Shams, where 12 children and teenagers were killed and dozens were injured. A bomb shelter is located near the field, and most casualties occurred as people ran to the shelter, but the warning time was too short for them to reach safety.
The question is: Was the warning time adequate? If it was insufficient, why did Home Front Command Chief Major General Rafi Milo not impose assembly restrictions in Majdal Shams? Notably, the Golan Heights settlements were neither evacuated nor subjected to any gathering restrictions by the IDF.
Yesterday, the IDF presented intelligence identifying Ali Muhammad Yahya, a Hezbollah commander who ordered the strike. The question arises as to why Northern Command intelligence did not issue an early warning to Northern Golan residents to take shelter before the attack. If intelligence existed, why was it not translated into defensive actions?
This morning, the Force claimed that the short distance from the village of Shebaa on the slopes of Mount Dov to Majdal Shams, coupled with the topography, makes interception and Iron Dome lock-on difficult. "Interception is complex due to the rocket's flight and the topography," the air force said.
The air force won’t say it openly, but Iran and Beirut are constantly trying to study and challenge Israel's air defense system. This includes launching hundreds of UAVs and firing at the northern Golan while exploiting the Hermon's topography.
The detrimental failures of the Northern Command intelligence
Another issue is the preparedness in the North. Golan residents reported slow rescue response times until Magen David Adom (MDA) amassed enough personnel. At the start of the war, Northern Command mobilized its medical units, partly tasked with responding to such scenarios.
Due to economic decisions, manpower preservation, and concerns about force fatigue, Northern Command decided to reduce its medical units, relying instead on routine security and MDA forces. Yesterday, it became clear that this decision is problematic.
Now to the combat reality: The Iranian-made Falaq-1 missile is not highly sophisticated but deadly enough. Northern Command has entered a state of routine combat. Although the damage inflicted on Hezbollah is considerable, the IDF has not posed a challenge significant enough to make Nasrallah reconsider his strategy.
The IDF has not succeeded, or is unwilling, to destroy all weapon depots, eliminate Falaq-1 and other missile stockpiles, strike launch sites, headquarters, and command posts. Israel is managing a "response economy," a daily war game where each side reacts to the other: they do this, we respond accordingly; they escalate, we escalate further.
Israel is ignoring its situation like a patient in denial of a medical diagnosis. In the past ten months, Israel has lost territory. For the first time in 76 years, tens of thousands of Israelis have become refugees. The leadership of the war has been handed to the terrorist organization Hezbollah, not the IDF.
On October 7, Israel lost its deterrent power in the Middle East. Some say it has become the "punching bag" of the region. Yesterday, Hezbollah demonstrated this in practice. In the morning, they launched a UAV at Israel's strategic Karish rig, an action that went unchallenged. By evening, they had fired fifty or more missiles at Israel. One of these missiles caused the child massacre in Majdal Shams.
Half a day has passed since the disaster. Israel's response remains minor, within the bounds of the combat equation. The IDF and Northern Command have yet to fully grasp the reality. Commanders issue threatening statements, but it is doubtful they have political backing.
On Highway 6, there are no tank and artillery convoys. The phones of Northern Command reserve soldiers remain silent. Those expecting a response that will change the rules of war in the North will have to wait. It is doubtful that it will happen.