The act is the result of Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu's actions, and the blame falls on Israeli Finance Minister Bezalel Smotrich.
This assessment relates to Israel’s quick descent into the quagmire of annexing the West Bank—both through its settlement expansion, long considered illegal under international law and preparations for the day after the US presidential elections. Netanyahu hopes a Trump victory would pave the way for the unrealistic to become real: annexing the West Bank.
Israel’s troika, Netanyahu, Smotrich, and National Security Minister Itamar Ben Gvir, have wreaked havoc with their unrestrained plans to turn the West Bank into a new flashpoint of confrontation, if not directly, then by their measures and policies.
There’s no denying that the situation in the West Bank is volatile. Anyone could ignite the spark. Whether the next attacker is Palestinian or Israeli is beside the point; the focus should be on preventing the explosion, not fueling a climate where it seems inevitable.
On December 8, 1987, few could have predicted that a car accident would trigger the First Intifada. This uprising opened the door for secret backchannel negotiations between the Palestinian Liberation Organization and Israel, ultimately leading to the signing of the Oslo I Accord (officially the Declaration of Principles) in 1993.
The Second Intifada erupted in September 2000 after Ariel Sharon, then Israel’s opposition leader, visited (or stormed, depending on one’s perspective) the Al Aqsa Mosque in Jerusalem’s Old City. This uprising was harsher for both Palestinians and Israelis, yet it helped pave the way for the Arab Peace Initiative, presented at the Beirut Arab Summit in 2002. The initiative proposed a fair exchange: Israel would support the creation of a Palestinian state along the 1967 borders and agree to a just resolution of the Palestinian refugee issue.
Leadership sparks West Bank tensions
In return, Israel would receive full political recognition and normalized ties with the Arab world. The next eruption could surpass the brutality of both intifadas, fueled by Palestinians’ legitimate fear that annexation will shatter their hopes for freedom and an independent state. This would be a zero-sum rebellion, where many Palestinians may feel they have nothing left to lose.
The Gaza war has continued primarily due to the zero-sum mentality of both Netanyahu and Hamas leader Yahya Sinwar, where each seeks total victory and winner takes all. But will there be any winners in this horrible war? I don’t think so.
The developments on the ground support this apocalyptic scenario. The Palestinian Authority’s (PA) financial crisis has worsened conditions in the West Bank, impacting public sector wages and local markets. Public servants’ purchasing power has fallen by more than 50% due to the PA’s financial struggles. Trade freedom, both internationally and with Israel, has also been curtailed, exacerbated by Israel’s ongoing war in Gaza.
The PA’s heavy responsibilities and shrinking financial resources worsen the situation. The PA faces one of its toughest challenges in security. Israeli security and media reports suggest that smuggling routes from Lebanon, through Syria and Jordan, into the West Bank are thriving.
These smuggled weapons serve a dual purpose: On quieter days, they are used to attack Palestinian security personnel, public buildings, and government sites. During clashes, when Israeli troops raid cities or refugee camps, they are used against Israeli forces. Palestinian militias armed with smuggled weapons are not bored at all.
Understanding why armed Palestinians alternate between targeting their security forces and Israeli troops is complicated. A retired Palestinian security officer, once a lieutenant colonel, explained that some fighters use clashes with Israelis as a “patriotic cover,” though their real agenda is to destabilize the PA. Different motivations drive others—they fight Israel but sometimes express frustration with the PA by shooting at buildings and intentionally avoiding security personnel. The first group consists of members of Hamas and factions aligned with Iran and Hezbollah. The second group includes Fatah supporters who disagree with specific actions of the PA.
The recent shooting at the Allenby Bridge highlights the depth of the crisis between all parties involved. Even the name of the crossing reflects these tensions. Israel calls it Allenby Bridge. Jordan calls it King Hussein Crossing. The Palestinians refer to it as Karameh Crossing, after the Jordanian village where, on March 21, 1968, Palestinian Fatah guerrillas stationed in a nearby training camp clashed for a whole day with Israeli troops who crossed the Jordan River to “crush the head of Palestinian Fatah terrorists,” according to the late Israeli Defense Minister Moshe Dayan.
Palestinian security officers prefer to deal with smuggling operations quietly, relying on solid intelligence, discreet information flow, and a low-profile approach. The retired Palestinian lieutenant colonel told The Media Line that even in closed meetings, officers maintain discretion, adhering to the rule: "You only know what you need to know to stay focused.”
Another retired officer described the situation in the West Bank as highly sensitive.
“Palestinians expect their security forces to stand against any Israeli military incursion into cities, villages, or refugee camps in PA areas," he told The Media Line. He explained that the Gaza war so angers many Palestinians that they demand an open PA declaration of war on Israel, but they also understand that the PA’s security forces “only have defensive light weapons and cannot match Israel’s devastating firepower.”
A former Israeli colleague of mine, a journalist who worked on a documentary about Palestinian suicide bombers during the Second Intifada, was allowed by the Shin Bet to interview Palestinians arrested before their explosive belts could detonate. When he asked them why they did it, most responded with the same answer: ”Loss of hope.”
Nearly every day, senior Shin Bet officials and Israeli army generals warn that the statements and actions of government ministers like Smotrich or Ben Gvir are creating significant security risks for Israel. They surely understand that the key to preventing further escalation lies in ending the incitement and irresponsible behavior directed at Palestinians.
The writing is on the wall. Israel saw the signs of what was coming but did nothing to prevent the October 7 attack. As a Palestinian, I say that what happened that Saturday must never happen again. The fuse of incitement must be extinguished, the plan to annex the West Bank must be permanently scrapped, and a negotiated path to peace must begin—regardless of what Israel’s troika wants.
Elias Zananiri is a veteran journalist from East Jerusalem who has held several senior positions in the PLO as a political adviser and media consultant over the past two decades.