Recent attention has turned to Jordan, following the murders of three Israelis at the Allenby Bridge Crossing. These killings have reignited fears in Israel about a potential deterioration in security, fueled by Iran’s efforts to recruit armed Jordanians for terror attacks against Israel and to destabilize the Hashemite regime.
However, the Allenby Bridge Crossing attack diverted attention from another significant event in the kingdom – the House of Representatives elections held every four years. The timing of these elections was particularly inconvenient for King Abdullah, given the ongoing war in Gaza, the worsening economic crisis, and the terror attack just two days earlier. They were held in the context of a process of liberalization that the king has been leading in recent years, with three main goals.
First, the process primarily aimed at strengthening the political parties and integrating more of them into the political system. Of the 130 outgoing members of the House of Representatives, 118 were independents, while only 12 represented just four parties.
What lay behind this step were fears of an increase in the strength of the Islamic Action Front (the political wing of the Muslim Brotherhood in Jordan). Thus, in the new electoral system, every citizen votes for two candidates: a representative from a national list and a representative from a regional list.
Two-thirds of the 138 seats in the House of Representatives are allocated to representatives from regional lists (97), with the remaining seats (41) awarded to those from national lists. This system was designed to dilute the power of the Islamist party. However, the intended outcome did not materialize.
While the new House includes 12 parties – three times more than before – the Islamic Action Front has tripled its number of representatives to 31 and now comprises around 23% of the House.
The second goal was to increase the representation of women and younger people, reflecting the ambitions of sectors traditionally underrepresented in Jordanian politics. King Abdullah has, in fact, been working to advance the status of women and youth for several years. On this front, significant progress was made compared to the past: 27 of the 138 members (nearly a fifth) in the new House of Representatives are women, up from 15 out of 130 (11.5%) in the previous House.
The third goal of the reforms was to increase public trust in politics. A survey conducted in May 2023 by the Center for Strategic Studies in Amman found that the majority of Jordanians do not trust political parties and believe they have failed. Only 2% follow party activities, and just 1% know the names of party leaders or would consider joining a party. Therefore, this third goal has not yet been achieved, as only a third of the electorate turned out to vote – just slightly more than in previous elections.
Overall, to the king’s credit, the elections were fair and transparent, as confirmed by EU supervisory commissions at the polling stations – no small feat in a region dominated by autocratic regimes that avoid unnecessary political risks.
The gains made by the Islamic Action Front were hardly surprising, however, as the past two years have seen a significant rise in support for political Islam across the Middle East. Many Jordanians favor greater inclusion of Islamic parties in national politics.
According to a May 2023 survey by the Arab Barometer, around 50% of Jordanians reported reading religious texts and praying daily as well as expressing a desire for Islamist parties to play a more prominent role in the country’s politics.
Muslim Brotherhood aligned with the Palestinian cause
Additionally, there has been substantial support for the Hamas movement despite it being legally banned. Around 57% of the Jordanian public demonstrate their sympathy for Hamas, even before the outbreak of the current war. When the Gaza war began, the Muslim Brotherhood in Jordan aligned itself with the Palestinians and expressed solidarity with Hamas. The Brotherhood organized pro-Hamas demonstrations outside the Israeli embassy in Amman and other locations, raised funds, and coordinated donations of food, clothing, and equipment for Palestinians in Gaza.
It maintained contact with Hamas leaders and supported both the continuation of the fighting and the recruitment of Jordanian volunteers for terror attacks against Israel. In this context, the timing of the war worked to the advantage of the Islamic Action Front, which was able to incorporate the Palestinian resistance into its election campaign messaging.
Support for the Muslim Brotherhood in Jordan, demonstrated by the elections, extends beyond the cities. It is deeper and more widespread, reaching towns in the periphery and even Bedouin tribes. Residents of weaker peripheral regions, often lacking proper infrastructure, have traditionally supported Islamic movements and, at times, expressed sympathy for Islamic terrorist organizations. One such region is Ma’an in southern Jordan, the hometown of Maher Diab Hussein Al-Jazi, the terrorist responsible for the murder of three Israelis at the Allenby Bridge Crossing.
In recent years, Bedouin Jordanian citizens have become more prominent within the Islamic Action Front, including as members of the House of Representatives.
In contrast, Palestinians in Jordan have shown greater loyalty to the Hashemite regime and refrained from engaging in subversive activities or mass protests against the government during and after the “Arab Spring.” Their strong participation in Jordan’s economy is one of the key factors behind this loyalty.
To what extent, then, should Israel be concerned about the election results?
Historically, it is important to note that this is not the first time the Muslim Brotherhood has garnered significant support in Jordan. The party reached the peak of its influence in the 1989 elections when it secured 22 seats in the House of Representatives, which at the time had only 80 members – meaning that the Brotherhood controlled about a quarter of the available seats.
Just as King Hussein skillfully managed Jordan’s foreign policy with a balanced approach, signing the peace treaty with Israel in 1994, despite the Brotherhood’s opposition, King Abdullah will also have to navigate between national strategic interests and local political pressures. The House of Representatives is likely to become more vocal and critical of Israel and the West.
Combative declarations, antisemitic slogans, and calls to revoke the peace treaty or expel the Israeli ambassador are expected to resurface.
The king is well aware that the threats he faces come not only from Iran but also from the growing strength of political Islam within his kingdom. In response to these challenges, King Abdullah will continue to rely on the West, Egypt, the Gulf states and Israel – an alliance crucial to the survival of the Hashemite regime.
Prof. Ronen Yitzhak is the head of the Middle Eastern Studies Division at Western Galilee College; Prof. Elie Podeh teaches in the Department of Islamic and Middle Eastern Studies at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem and is a board member of Mitvim – The Israeli Institute for Regional Foreign Policies.