The 1956 Suez Crisis: Israel's geopolitical turning point

Following the crisis, Israel faced international isolation, with many nations criticizing its role in the conflict.

 An Israeli infantry trooper reads an Arabic magazine found in a captured Egyptian army position during a break in fighting, November 1, 1956 in the southern Arab town of Rafah in the Gaza Strip. (photo credit: GPO via Getty Images)
An Israeli infantry trooper reads an Arabic magazine found in a captured Egyptian army position during a break in fighting, November 1, 1956 in the southern Arab town of Rafah in the Gaza Strip.
(photo credit: GPO via Getty Images)

For most of its history, Israel’s wars have been reactive - responding to the actions of its Arab neighbors to ensure its own survival. Only on rare occasions does Israel make the first move, grabbing the initiative to prevent a more destructive conflict down the line. One such moment was the Suez Crisis of 1956.

The crisis was a pivotal moment in post-World War II geopolitics, marking a turning point for colonial powers, Middle Eastern nationalism, and Cold War tensions. Triggered by Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser’s nationalization of the Suez Canal, the crisis drew in global powers such as Britain, France, Israel, the United States, and the Soviet Union.

What started as a military intervention by Britain, France, and Israel to reclaim control of the strategic waterway and curtail Nasser’s influence quickly escalated into an international incident. The crisis underscored the declining influence of European colonial powers and solidified the emerging dominance of the US and the Soviet Union in global affairs. Furthermore, it reshaped the political landscape of the Middle East, planting the seeds for future conflicts.

By the 1950s, Egyptian nationalism had taken center stage under the leadership of Gamal Abdel Nasser, whose vision of pan-Arab unity aimed to challenge Western dominance in the region. The Suez Canal, a crucial maritime route connecting the Mediterranean to the Red Sea, was a symbol of Egypt’s colonial past, controlled by Britain since its construction in the late 19th century. For Britain and France, the canal was vital for global trade, particularly for the flow of oil from the Middle East. France also had additional motivations, particularly its concerns over Nasser’s support for Algerian independence movements.

Tensions escalated when the US withdrew funding for Egypt’s Aswan High Dam in 1956, prompting Nasser to nationalize the Suez Canal in July of that year.

 SINAI DESERT, EGYPT - OCTOBER 30, 1956: Israeli army officer Ariel Sharon (L) with his troops before the attack on the Mitla Pass during Operation Kadesh October 30, 1956, in the Sinai Desert in Egypt. (credit: Defense Ministry via Getty Images)
SINAI DESERT, EGYPT - OCTOBER 30, 1956: Israeli army officer Ariel Sharon (L) with his troops before the attack on the Mitla Pass during Operation Kadesh October 30, 1956, in the Sinai Desert in Egypt. (credit: Defense Ministry via Getty Images)

“We shall not let imperialists or exploiters dominate us,” Nasser stated in Alexandria on July 26, 1956. “We shall not let history repeat itself once more. We have gone forward to build a strong Egypt. We go forward towards political and economic independence. We go forward towards a national economy for the sake of the whole people. But, whenever we look behind, we do so to destroy the traces of the past, the traces of slavery, exploitation and domination. Today, citizens, rights have been restored to their owners. Our rights in the Suez Canal have been restored to us after 100 years.”

This move was seen as a direct challenge to Western powers and set the stage for a military confrontation, as both Britain and France feared losing control of the canal and their influence in the Middle East.

There was also the issue of Nasser’s support for attacks against Israel. Throughout the early 1950s, Israel faced regular incursions from Egyptian-backed Palestinian fedayeen (militants) who launched cross-border raids, causing civilian casualties and increasing insecurity. Israel viewed Egypt, under Nasser, as a growing threat, particularly as Nasser sought to build alliances with other Arab nations. By 1956, Nasser’s hostile stance, coupled with his support for Palestinian militants, put Israel on edge.

Another major political issue for Israel was Egypt’s blockade of the Straits of Tiran, which cut off Israeli access to the Red Sea and hampered trade, especially the vital route to the Indian Ocean. Securing the Straits was a key strategic goal for Israel, as it saw the blockade as a direct economic threat. The crisis presented an opportunity for Israel to break Egypt’s stranglehold on its southern maritime access.

Operation Musketeer

In response to Nasser’s nationalization of the Suez Canal, Britain, France, and Israel secretly met in Sevres, France, in late October 1956 to devise a coordinated military operation known as Operation Musketeer. The Sevres Protocol outlined the collusion between these three nations: Israel would initiate the conflict by invading the Sinai Peninsula, giving Britain and France a pretext to intervene as “peacekeepers” and retake control of the canal.


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For Israel, the operation presented an opportunity to retaliate against Egypt for continued border skirmishes, particularly the fedayeen raids, and to reopen the Straits of Tiran, a critical maritime route that had been closed to Israeli ships. The prospect of weakening a hostile neighbor like Egypt was also a driving factor for Israel’s involvement. 

On October 29, 1956, Israel launched its invasion of the Sinai Peninsula, known as Operation Kadesh, swiftly advancing toward the Suez Canal - “not a campaign of conquest but a campaign of deliverance,” Israeli Prime Minister David Ben-Gurion would later state.

The Israeli forces, led by Moshe Dayan, swiftly advanced into Egyptian territory, aiming to draw Egyptian forces into combat and create the pretext for Britain and France to intervene. Israel’s airborne forces were instrumental, dropping paratroopers near key locations such as the Mitla Pass while ground troops and tanks advanced toward the Suez Canal.

Two days later, Britain and France issued an ultimatum to Egypt to cease hostilities or face military action. When Egypt refused, the two European powers began bombing key Egyptian military targets.

The Israeli military performed with precision, rapidly seizing control of large swathes of the Sinai, including critical points like Sharm el-Sheikh, which controlled access to the Straits of Tiran. The success of this operation demonstrated the growing capabilities of the Israel Defense Forces (IDF), which had been bolstered since the 1948 Arab-Israeli War. The crisis also marked the first time Israeli forces would hold the Gaza Strip, and they would later withdraw. 

While the military operation achieved rapid success on the ground, allowing Britain, France, and Israel to gain control of the canal zone, international condemnation of the attack escalated, especially from the United States and the Soviet Union. The speed of the military gains was overshadowed by the political fallout that quickly followed.

The Suez Crisis drew widespread international attention, particularly in the context of the Cold War. The United States, under President Dwight D. Eisenhower, was vehemently opposed to the invasion, viewing it as a destabilizing force that could push Arab nations toward the Soviet Union. Eisenhower applied significant diplomatic and economic pressure on Britain, France, and Israel to withdraw, even threatening economic sanctions.

At the same time, the Soviet Union threatened to intervene on Egypt’s behalf, heightening Cold War tensions.

Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev warned of the potential for nuclear retaliation, though these threats were largely aimed at maintaining Soviet influence in the region. The crisis revealed the precarious balance of power in the Cold War, with the US and USSR both seeking to avoid direct military confrontation while expanding their spheres of influence. The United Nations, led by Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjöld, played a key role in de-escalating the situation, establishing the first-ever UN peacekeeping force (UNEF) to oversee the withdrawal of foreign troops.

Israel’s international reputation took a hit, particularly as it was seen as an aggressor by much of the world. However, domestically, the operation was hailed as a military success. The reopening of the Straits of Tiran was a significant strategic win for Israel, though the political fallout strained its relationships with some Western allies.

The Suez Crisis had profound long-term consequences for the global political landscape. For Nasser, the crisis was a resounding victory that cemented his status as a hero of Arab nationalism. Despite Egypt’s military defeat, Nasser’s defiance of the former colonial powers bolstered his standing both in the Arab world and internationally.

For Britain and France, the crisis marked the beginning of the end of their imperial dominance. Both countries were humiliated on the world stage, and their inability to assert control over the Suez Canal signaled the diminishing influence of European colonial powers in global affairs. The crisis accelerated the process of decolonization across Africa and Asia.

For Israel, the immediate military gains were significant, as the Straits of Tiran were reopened and its southern border was temporarily secured. However, Israel also faced international isolation, with many nations criticizing its role in the conflict. In the broader context of Middle Eastern geopolitics, the Suez Crisis set the stage for future Arab-Israeli conflicts, restructuring Israel’s strategy in the 1967 Six-Day War and its approach to preemptive military strikes, and increased Egypt’s role as a key player in the region.