Here are two names that will go down in ignominy in Israel: Nahum Manbar and Gonen Segev.
Why? Because they worked for the Iranians against their own people.
In the 1990s, Manbar – a kibbutznik with a checkered past – set up shop in Europe and started selling arms to Iran, including the ingredients, equipment, and expertise to make chemical weapons.
In 1998, he was sentenced to 16 years for collaboration and providing information to an enemy. He served 14.5 years of his sentence.
Segev, a former minister in Yitzhak Rabin’s cabinet turned drug smuggler (he was arrested for trying to smuggle thousands of ecstasy tablets into Israel from Amsterdam), was recruited abroad by Iranian intelligence in 2012.
In 2019, Segev – whose vote was critical in the passage of the 1995 Oslo II accords in the Knesset – pleaded guilty to charges of espionage and supplying the enemy with information and was sentenced to an 11-year prison term, which he is currently serving.
Both these cases made huge headlines in Israel: Israeli Jews working for the enemy. The Wikipedia entry on Manbar includes this telling sentence: “Manbar’s activities, some of which were conducted in Britain, drew the attention of MI6, which could not believe that an Israeli could be working so closely with Iran and concluded that Manbar was a Mossad agent trying to penetrate Iran’s defense establishment.”
In other words, Britain’s vaunted intelligence service believed it so far-fetched that an Israeli would be working so closely with the Iranians that they thought it must be a ruse; that Manbar must be a double-agent.
These cases were once startling exceptions that dominated the headlines, painting espionage as an aberration. No more.
The last year has seen the Israel Security Agency (Shin Bet) arrest dozens of Israelis working for – and getting paid by – Iran or Hezbollah with the express purpose of spying on or sowing discord in Israel.
Spying for the enemy
The instances of spying for the enemy that come to light are now so frequent that Sunday’s announcement that the Shin Bet arrested two east Jerusalem Arabs for passing information to Hezbollah barely cracked the chock-full news cycle.
True, the two arrested were not Jews – but Arabs – but this, too, would have garnered much more attention in years past. Now, cases of Israelis – Jews or Arabs – indicted for espionage or assisting the enemy during war are so common that they barely elicit outrage.
Why? What has changed? Why are there currently so many more cases of Israelis spying for the enemy?
The Shin Bet has uncovered about a dozen separate espionage cases involving dozens of Israelis over the last year. The large number of these cases indicates Iran is increasing its intelligence efforts and shifting its methods and targets.
Consider the following: On December 17, it was revealed that Erdler Amoyal, a 23-year-old Jewish Jerusalemite, was arrested on suspicion of espionage on Iran’s behalf and allegedly proposed setting fire to a police station and causing a power outage on Jerusalem’s light rail.
On December 9, the Shin Bet announces that Artyom Zolotarev, a 33-year-old from Nof HaGalil, was arrested after being recruited by Iran to carry out a number of disruptive actions inside Israel aimed at fostering internal divisions, including spraying anti-government graffiti and burning vehicles.
In October alone, some 20 people were arrested for everything from surveillance of military installations to attempted assassinations, and they included a Bnei Brak resident, recent immigrants from Azerbaijan, and east Jerusalem Arabs.
Israelis working for Iran
Several reasons have been given for this upsurge in Israelis working for Iran.
The first has to do with Iran significantly ramping up its espionage and disruptive efforts inside Israel.
This stems from operational considerations – remember, Iran attacked Israel directly on two occasions this year, and photographs of military installations reportedly assisted them in aiming for their targets – and also an increased motivation to penetrate Israel following the July assassination of Hamas leader Ismail Haniyeh in a secure location in Tehran.
The escalation of the conflict and readiness of Iran to hit Israel directly has led to an increase in Iran’s efforts to gather intelligence.
Second, the Islamic Republic has spread a wide net, targeting individuals across the Israeli spectrum. While the popular perception might be that Israeli Arabs are the most likely to spy for Iran due to an ideological affinity with the regime’s goals, this is not the case.
Rather, they are targeting haredim, new immigrants, people with a criminal background, and ordinary citizens, often going after those with financial difficulties motivated by the prospect of making some quick money. Iran has been offering significant amounts of money for tasks such as painting graffiti or taking pictures.
The targeting of new immigrants – a number of those arrested have been from the former Soviet Union – also may have an unfortunate ripple effect beyond a threat to Israeli security: fostering suspicion and stigmatizing specific demographics among the public.
Furthermore, Iran has been able to cast a wider net largely thanks to social media, which they leverage to recruit people. The digital approach to recruitment allows Iran to reach segments of the population that they would not have been able to access before the advent of platforms like Telegram.
As Iran spreads a wider net, more actively trying to recruit spies and reaching out to broader demographics, the likelihood of detection by the Shin Bet also increases. The more you engage in this type of activity, the greater is the risk of being found out.
Indeed, Iran’s increased activity has triggered an escalation in Israeli counterintelligence efforts.
The Shin Bet has invested heavily in technology and surveillance tools to detect espionage networks, leading to a higher rate of arrests and dismantling of operations but also straining the organization’s resources. And as Iran’s efforts multiply, the challenges of detection will become more complex.
The upsurge in these cases is a product of the clash between Iran’s intensifying ambitions and Israel’s determination to protect itself. The cases of Manbar and Segev were once shocking outliers; today, they are part of a larger pattern.