In some poetic realm, it might make sense for the timing of the October 7 IDF probes, and the fight over what they mean for political and defense power brokers, to be connected to a Gaza hostage and ceasefire deal.
Common sense, however, would dictate they be completely unrelated.
And yet, there is no question that the delay in publicizing the IDF probe results has been inextricably tied to the conclusion of a hostage deal.
Why shouldn’t they be related, and what should have happened instead?
A state commission of inquiry, including both the political and defense class, as well as a separate IDF probe more narrowly focused on defense errors, should have been opened around mid-November 2023 when Israel defeated Hamas in northern Gaza.
At that point, Israel had not only hit back at Hamas for the October 7 massacre but had made it physically impossible – certainly for the coming years – for Hamas to reinvade the Jewish state.
A different starting point for the commissions and probes would have been in early February, after the IDF mostly defeated Hamas in Khan Yunis and central Gaza, leaving only four Rafah battalions (out of an original 24) intact.
From February, until early May when the IDF invaded Rafah, there was very little significant fighting going on.
Finally, in March, the IDF did start its own probes, advertising that the results would be issued in May-June. The deadline was later changed to July-August.
Then, after the issuing of the report – the one on the battle of Be’eri – the probes were indefinitely delayed and completely fell off the radar screen. At the time, no explanation was offered as to the delay, but after the ceasefire with Hezbollah was reached in November, the military began to talk about finishing the probes sometime around February, with no clear publication date.
Then came Defense Minister Israel Katz’s statement on December 19, that he has frozen all military appointments until the probes are issued, and that this must happen by the end of January.
At first, IDF Chief of Staff Lt.-Gen. Herzi Halevi signaled that he would work hard to comply.
But, as Katz has gone out of his way to publicly attack Halevi and frustrate the remainder of his term in office, Halevi has left some ambiguity about his compliance. The standard expectation is that Halevi will resign when he issues the probes in a show of partial responsibility for October 7.
So, here we are, in mid-January, with no clear answers about when the probe results will be issued, with not even a start date for a state commission of inquiry into the government’s handling of October 7, and a lack of clarity about Halevi’s future.
THE MISSING piece in all of this is the hostage deal.
There was a temporary ceasefire in November 2023, but when that fell apart and the majority of the government and the IDF favored continuing the war against Hamas by invading Khan Yunis, any idea of pursuing an IDF probe of October 7 fell by the wayside.
Likewise, the first time that the military started the probe process in March was not too long after the war cooled off, with some greater expectations that Hamas might agree to a hostage deal to avoid a Rafah invasion.
The probes were delayed again from May-June to July-August when the IDF got deep into Rafah after hostage negotiations failed.
At this point in July, the dynamic changed.
'Government should end the war'
Halevi, then-defense minister Yoav Gallant, Shin Bet head Ronen Bar, and Mossad chief David Barnea all said publicly that they thought the government should end the war – especially given that Hamas’s last organized battalions in Rafah were now beat – in exchange for the hostages.
Top defense officials publicly accused Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu of sabotaging the hostage negotiations to keep his coalition partners happy who wanted to continue the war for a more indefinite period. Most defense officials believed Netanyahu would eventually let a deal happen, and that Halevi was preparing to resign in September.
After the IDF issued the Be’eri report, middle management and some top officers rebelled against Halevi for issuing the report with criticism against some of the field commanders in a vacuum, that did not equally criticize the high echelons of the IDF, including the chief himself.
Halevi reached the decision that the military could not roll the probes out one piece at a time, but would need to put them all out at once, which delayed the results.
Committed to getting the hostages released
More important is Halevi’s commitment to getting the hostages back before he steps down, something he has viewed as his personal responsibility since October 7, 2023.
Put differently, if there had been a hostage deal in July-August – as most of the defense establishment believes there could have been – Halevi might have issued the probe results then or shortly after, and resigned.
With no hostage deal, and believing that Netanyahu’s next IDF chief might not be as committed to releasing the hostages – even at the cost of ending the war – Halevi put off the probes again, along with his resignation date.
Then, in the middle of all this, Netanyahu finally decided to go after Hezbollah. Once that started in mid-September, Halevi froze the probes and any resignation talk until after that conflict ended.
Present as well during this time was a direct exchange of attacks between Israel and Iran, which Halevi believed required his personal management.
After the ceasefire with Hezbollah was signed on November 27, Halevi hoped that a hostage deal between Hamas and Israel – most importantly Netanyahu – would be possible. Accordingly, he started moving forward on the October 7 probes again.
But, as hostage negotiations have continued to drag out, Halevi foresaw that Netanyahu and Katz might just want to axe him so that they can try to further blame the October 7 failure solely on him, without taking governmental responsibility, even with the looming deadline threats issued by US President-elect Donald Trump. There has also been increasing talks of a potential Israeli attack on Iran’s nuclear sites.
All of this means that while the IDF probes still may be issued in January-February, and Halevi may resign, the military chief may further delay the probes, or issue them but stay on longer – to ensure a hostage deal, and possibly be involved in future moves regarding Iran.
Had a hostage deal been made earlier, Halevi probably would have issued the probe results, and resigned, much earlier.