Defense Minister Israel Katz was on a roll.
That is, until he ran headfirst into the new IDF Chief of Staff, Lt.-Gen. Eyal Zamir on Monday, when Katz tried to intervene in an ongoing investigation and start a take down of the IDF’s legal division. Zamir responded by slamming Katz – publicly.
Although it remains to be seen what the long-term consequences of this clash between these two will be, in the short-term, it looks like an error occurred in which Katz had to rapidly retreat from a fight with likely the most popular figure in Israel at the moment.
But let’s backpedal to what had Katz on a roll.
Only two months after becoming the defense minister, Katz successfully pressured now-former IDF chief Lt.-Gen. Herzi Halevi to quit.
As part of that process, he also got Halevi to publish the IDF probes on October 7, which helped Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu try to shift more blame from himself for failing to prevent the disaster onto the military and the Shin Bet (Israel Security Agency) instead.
Katz was the defense minister when Bashar al-Assad and his regime fell in Syria, even if Katz did not have a direct role in this. He also succeeded in getting government funding to build an upgraded fence along the Jordanian border.
Other than a minor error – he got into an unnecessary fight with IDF intelligence chief Maj.-Gen. Shlomi Binder – Katz had not lost any battles.
As for Halevi, Katz had a much weaker opponent.
Halevi's career after October 7
Fair or not, Halevi’s reputation was permanently stained by his failure as IDF chief to prevent Hamas’s October 7 invasion.
Halevi himself had vowed to resign before his three-year term expired; some demanded he resign after Hamas was mostly beaten in Rafah in the summer of 2024, and by this January, he had reached two years of service. In other words, Halevi was on borrowed time.
Likewise, Halevi had delayed the October 7 probes for a long time. Sometimes, this was for understandable reasons – the war reignited and distracted his commanders’ attention. But at other times, this was for more questionable reasons, with many observers believing that the IDF reports in October should have come out by the summer of 2024.
Zamir is a different situation entirely.
Unlike Halevi, who was picked by the previous government, Netanyahu himself handpicked Zamir, and he and Katz have fallen over themselves to repeatedly praise him as more aggressive than his predecessor. In fact, Netanyahu would have picked Zamir over Halevi had he been in office at the time.
Also, if Halevi had a brave past as a deadly special forces fighter, as IDF chief, he struck a more philosophical and cerebral tone versus Zamir, who fits the image of the classic macho, gruff Israeli soldier worshiped by much of the population on both sides of the spectrum.
Regarding Netanyahu, he is trying to shift the October 7 blame onto Halevi and the Shin Bet, but he knows that he is still politically vulnerable to blame for the disaster, whereas all parties made it clear leading into his appointment that Zamir was blameless.
In fact, Zamir may currently be the most popular public figure in Israel.
Apparently, Katz must have thought that Zamir would desert IDF Military Advocate General (MAG) Maj.-Gen. Yifat Tomer-Yerushalmi when the defense minister signaled that she was the next target in the government’s plan to tear down the legal establishment’s leading officials.
Zamir would have done this out of loyalty to Katz and Netanyahu for being given the IDF chief job.
Maybe Katz assumed this because he succeeded, directly or indirectly, in getting Zamir to quickly show the door to outgoing IDF chief spokesperson R.-Adm. Daniel Hagari, though the new IDF chief might have simply transferred Hagari to another role if there had been no pressure.
IN ADDITION, Zamir appointed Maj.-Gen. Tamir Yadai as his deputy chief and Maj.-Gen. Yaniv Asur, who was a favorite of the political Right, as the new Southern Command chief, even though Halevi had passed over them for promotion and they were both headed toward retirement.
But these were easy moves that Zamir might have made on his own, with the exception that he would have replaced Hagari with a close associate but likely allowed him a different post.
Katz and the IDF
In contrast, Katz was now going after the IDF MAG.
Until now, the IDF MAG has been highly respected within the military. She has bent over backward to facilitate the most aggressive Israeli war in 50 years, if not ever.
When top IDF commanders wanted Tomer-Yerushalmi’s war probes of IDF soldiers to be delayed or to go under the radar, she tried to comply while still seeking to remain within the spectrum of international standards.
As for Zamir, he strived to ensure that no military commanders, right-wing or left-wing, leaked information.
If Brig.-Gen. (res.) Oren Solomon, the high-level officer and suspect under investigation, did, in fact, leak or try to leak classified information that was part of the October 7 probe into the Gaza Division or some other matter, as is alleged, Zamir would have absolutely no patience for him regardless of who he wanted to leak the information to.
Most importantly, the IDF MAG is a much harder target for Netanyahu and Katz because Zamir has authority over her.
Unlike Attorney-General Gali Baharav-Miara and Shin Bet director Ronen Bar, who the government can fire at its discretion if there is no special legal bar (such as waiting until the Qatargate probe is finished), no one but Zamir can fire the IDF MAG.
This means they cannot get rid of her without having a direct battle with Zamir, something they do not want.
Finally, even as Netanyahu has accused the attorney-general of failing to block the International Criminal Court from going after him, he knows very well that there is still a far worse scenario in which the ICC could go after a wide array of IDF personnel.
If Katz tries to fire the IDF MAG, he would far more directly undermine Israeli efforts to protect the IDF before the ICC.
In time, Zamir or the IDF MAG may falter and become more vulnerable, but for now, Katz might think twice before going after her again, especially before trying to intervene in an ongoing investigation.