The Prime Minister’s Office, following then-premier Benjamin Netanyahu’s lead, snapped into action soon after.
The article misinterpreted Issacharoff’s remarks, a top Prime Minister’s Office official said, and he did not want to leave any room for Israel’s position to be misunderstood. The 2015 Iran deal is “flawed to its foundations.
“The deal gave Iran a highway paved with gold to build the critical infrastructure for an entire arsenal of nuclear bombs. That deal gave Iran the resources to significantly escalate its aggression and terror across the Middle East,” the official said.
Those quotes could have just as easily come from the new government, led by Prime Minister Naftali Bennett.
“Returning to the Iran deal is a mistake that will once again give legitimacy to one of the most violent, darkest regimes in the world. Israel will not allow Iran to get nuclear weapons. Israel is not a party to the deal, and will maintain total freedom of action,” Bennett said on the eve of his swearing-in.
In Sunday’s cabinet meeting, Bennett said that the world is “doing business with... mass murderers” by returning to the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action.
“A regime of executioners cannot have weapons of mass destruction,” he added.
Netanyahu and Bennett, as well as Foreign Minister Yair Lapid, agree on the facts. The 2015 Iran deal legitimizes a nuclear weapon in 2030 for a regime that seeks Israel’s destruction. It does not address the Islamic Republic’s aggression throughout the region and proxy warfare, as well as its ballistic missile program. In fact, by lifting sanctions, it helps fund those malign actions. Former US president Donald Trump left the deal in 2018 – and Netanyahu played a major role in that decision – opting to heavily sanction Iran, and the Biden administration seeks to return to it.
GIVEN THOSE facts, the old government and the new have drawn divergent conclusions about how to respond to the Biden administration’s hope to return to that deeply defective deal.
In late 2020, when Netanyahu was prime minister, those quotes, and the clarification of Issacharoff’s remarks, were meant to convey that Israel does not want to have anything to do with the Iran deal. The Prime Minister’s Office was careful not to criticize Issacharoff himself but just the way the article construed his remarks. However, the message was clear: Even faint praise for the suggestion of a “JCPOA-plus” was too much. If restrictions on Iran were based on the 2015 framework, they would be rotten at the core.
And that is how Netanyahu and the government under his leadership continued to conduct itself after US President Joe Biden’s inauguration the following month and the start of indirect talks between the US and Iran in Vienna soon after. Former foreign minister Gabi Ashkenazi was in touch with Secretary of State Antony Blinken about how the negotiations were progressing, but Israel did not have any part in it. Netanyahu did not allow senior officials to discuss the details of the Iran deal and how to soften its blow to Israel.
The argument on Netanyahu’s side was that engaging would legitimize and possibly even bind Israel to an agreement that, in turn, legitimizes an Iranian nuclear weapon, the worst-case scenario for Israel’s security.
A source familiar with the Biden administration’s thinking on the matter went even further, saying it saw the Trump administration “maximum pressure” sanctions campaign against Iran as a plan concocted by Netanyahu and former national security advisor John Bolton to bring about regime change in Iran. The Biden administration thought Netanyahu’s refusal to discuss the Iran deal reflected a hope that heavy sanctions would have that intended effect. It’s not the same as the Obama-era accusation that Netanyahu’s opposition to the Iran deal was because he wants to start a war, but it’s not that far off.
Bennett and Lapid, however, looked at what Netanyahu did up until now, and seem to have drawn the conclusion that it didn’t work. Obama still joined the Iran deal in 2015, after Netanyahu spoke out against it before both houses of Congress. Netanyahu’s refusal to discuss the matter with the Biden administration has not stopped it from negotiating with Iran. And the Islamists’ regime is still in place in Tehran.
The prime minister is leading the way on Iran policy, and he is working on a broad policy review, which has not been completed yet. Bennett is expected to meet with Lapid before the latter’s quick trip to Rome on Sunday to meet with Blinken, where Iran will be one of the issues on the agenda.
Even if a policy review is under way, Bennett and Lapid have already embarked on a different approach, one that sees reality as it is and tries to mitigate the damage.
Or as Lapid said in his first speech as foreign minister last week: “We have to prepare quickly for the return to the nuclear agreement with Iran. It was a bad deal. I opposed it. I still oppose it. Israel could have, with a different approach, influenced it far more. We will manage this task together with Prime Minister Bennett, but there is one organizing principle: Israel will do whatever it takes to prevent Iran obtaining a nuclear bomb.”
That new approach begins with Israel sending experts to Washington. So far, Israel is emphasizing enforcement and sanctions; if there is a return to the JCPOA’s restrictions on Iran’s uranium enrichment, it should be enforced much better than in 2015, and if the Biden administration is removing sanctions in order to rejoin the Iran deal, then Israel wants to make its voice heard on which should be left in place.
Lapid also wants to hear what Blinken has to say on Sunday, and is expected to ask him what he means when he has said the US is seeking a “longer and stronger” deal with Iran, something the Israelis feel has never been adequately explained. Lapid’s predecessor as foreign minister had doubts as to whether the US would really pursue that path, instead of just returning to a mostly unchanged JCPOA.
Meanwhile, in Washington, the Biden administration is still trying to figure out how Bennett makes decisions and who are the influential people surrounding him. They view the new government as an opportunity to cooperate.
A better relationship with Jerusalem will make things easier for Biden in Washington, whether in Congress or in the media, even if Israel is still unhappy about a return to the Iran deal. In order to keep Israel cooperative, the US may have to concede in some way when Israel makes demands – the government has yet to ask for any kind of “compensation package,” but it’s likely.
From what the Biden administration is hearing from Jerusalem so far, it no longer has the suspicion it had about Netanyahu, that he is seeking regime change. Rather, it sees Bennett and Lapid as wanting to deal with the situation at hand, try to improve it as much as possible, and maintain a credible Israeli military threat to deter Iran.
Sources with knowledge of the US side of Iran negotiations said that, due to the new Israeli government’s position, which the Biden administration views as more cooperative, Washington is so willing to hear Israel out, as it sends experts and voices its concerns, that it would be willing to delay talks with Tehran if need be. It would draw out the nuclear negotiations in order to talk to Israel more, even at the cost of Iran hardening its stances, one source said.
NETANYAHU DECLINED to respond to The Jerusalem Post report of how far the Biden administration is willing to go to work with Bennett and Lapid. But he has been warning that the new government is falling into a trap, that the Biden administration’s calls for cooperation are a bear hug, an embrace so tight that it’ll break Israel’s ribs.
It’s possible that the Biden administration is willing to listen to Israeli concerns, even at length, but not to actually act on them in any way.
Last week, the readouts of a phone call between Lapid and Blinken said they agreed to “no surprises” between them. Days later, a source close to Bennett said he is seeking “no daylight” with the Biden administration.
On Monday, Netanyahu disclosed that Biden and US Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin had made that request of him, and he rejected it.
Lapid agreeing not to surprise Blinken “is an incredible Israeli commitment that harms the heart of our national security. If Begin would have agreed to a policy of ‘no surprises,’ we would not have destroyed the nuclear reactor in Iraq,” Netanyahu said, on the week of the 40th anniversary of the bombing.
“I never, ever, agreed to tell [the Americans] about all our operations, because it would invite pressure not to carry them out or leaks to the press that would prevent the operation and take away our freedom to act against Iran on existential matters.
“I cannot think of a weaker and more emasculated message to our enemies in Iran,” Netanyahu added. “From now on... the regime knows that it can sleep silently, with no surprises.”
The truth is that Israel has historically favored a “no daylight” position with the US, and officials working under Netanyahu’s leadership have said as much.
Ashkenazi said at a briefing in March that he and Blinken had agreed that they would not surprise one another on matters relating to negotiations to return to the Iran deal.
Former ambassador to the US Michael Oren described in his book Ally how crestfallen Israel was when Obama said he sought greater daylight with Israel, because, “historically, that principle [of no daylight] applied to the alliance as a whole.... By illuminating gaps in their political positions, the administration cast shadows over Israel’s deterrence power.”
However, Oren also gave credence to Netanyahu’s remarks this week, telling KAN Reshet Bet that the Obama administration leaked Israeli attack plans to the media.
Netanyahu is right that it will be a challenge for a new prime minister and foreign minister, with far less experience on the world stage than Netanyahu, to assert itself before Washington, Israel’s greatest strategic ally.
But Bennett and Lapid are determined to show that they are up to the task, and that there is more than one way to make Israel’s voice heard.
As Bennett made clear in his remarks last week, he does not view talking to the Biden administration to get as good an outcome as possible as binding Israel to the Iran deal. After all, he said: “Israel is not a party to the deal, and will maintain total freedom of action.”