The battle over the Evyatar outpost in the West Bank was a loss for Prime Minister Naftali Bennett from the moment he took office.
It was a loss the moment Defense Minister Benny Gantz and former prime minister Benjamin Netanyahu failed to halt hundreds of right-wing activists and settlers from setting up tents and modular homes on the small hilltop overlooking Route 505, which links the Samaria region with the Jordan Valley.
It has been fairly standard in the last 16 years for Israeli security forces to quickly demolish such illegal encampments before they can transform into large outposts with a heavy concentration of people that would turn any evacuation later on into a spectacle.
During Netanyahu’s 12-years in office, the IDF routinely razed such temporary construction, built with little investment because its demolition was so expected.
Such razing rarely made headlines and had little impact on Netanyahu politically, as he held onto his right-wing leadership credentials and pledged repeatedly not to uproot settlers.
The flimsy nature of these encampments and the small number of people in them made it easy for decision makers to destroy them with little consequence.
A high-publicity evacuation usually involves outposts that have stood for a decade or more, that often have had a more expensive modular construction or even permanent homes.
This included outposts such as Amona, Migron, the Ulpana and Netiv Havot.
Attention-grabbing evictions also involve a large number of people at the site, which increases the chance for violent clashes between activists and security forces. Their removal is also far more costly because of the large number of troops needed.
Evyatar’s size alone, therefore, gives policy weight to any decision regarding its fate.
Its inception is rare, because it is unusual for settlers to galvanize so many people and resources with such speed. Evyatar’s creation is a significant victory for both the Samaria Regional Council and the Nahala Movement, which spearheaded the initiative For them, the victory stands even if the outpost is razed.
The opposite is true for Bennett.
On a personal level, this is his first policy test with regard to the West Bank and it will signify to the Israeli public and his right-wing voters what his policy may be regarding the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.
As the former director-general of the Yesha Council and as a politician who has placed himself to the right of Netanyahu, Bennett’s heart in the past has been with the activists on the hilltops.
In the past, he has made solidarity visits to outposts and called for their legalization. Bennett was one of the first ministers to call for the application of Israeli sovereignty over Area C.
If he now orders Evyatar’s demolition, Bennett will suffer a political blow by further alienating himself from his right-wing base, and it will make it more difficult for him to seek reelection if his government falls.
Images of a forced eviction that would likely turn violent would underscore that point.
Bennett would bear unique responsibility here because the High Court of Justice has not adjudicated the matter and Evyatar’s fate will rest with the policy makers. At this stage, the court has not forced Bennett or the IDF to take action, the government has chosen to do so.
Most memorable outpost demolitions were done at the demand of the court and not through a prime ministerial or military edict, so the decision-makers were less open to criticism.
On the military front, it is presumed that an Evyatar evacuation could inflame extremist anger on the Right and lead to attacks against Palestinians. This could ignite the West Bank and lead to a cycle of violence that would destabilize security when the coalition is still in its infancy.
But if Bennett fails to remove the outpost, he also faces a series of challenges.
On the domestic front, a decision to allow Evyatar to stay put would create turmoil within the coalition, where many members believe that it must be removed. Those partners will continue to call on Bennett to take action and such continued criticism would indicate vulnerability in the coalition and present a perception that its future is in jeopardy.
On the international front, failure to evacuate Evyatar and any decision to advance its legalization would create tensions between the Bennett government and the US just as Bennett is preparing to head to Washington to meet with US President Joe Biden. The US has been clear that it is opposed to any form of settlement activity.
On the military front, Evyatar would remain an issue, because the outpost’s creation has led to violent Palestinian protests and additional forces would be needed to secure the fledgling community.
Lastly, if Evyatar stands, it is likely to inspire similar initiatives that would present repeated challenges for Bennett.
The Evyatar story did not play out this way in 2013, when the Samaria Regional Council, then headed by Gershon Mesika, attempted to set up an outpost on the site on May 1 in the immediate aftermath of the stabbing to death a day earlier of Evyatar Borovsky by a Palestinian terrorist at Tapuah Junction.
The IDF wasted no time, and less than two days after the site was set up, security forces demolished it.
Eight years later, in an eerie kind of Groundhog Day scenario, a Palestinian terrorist shot Yehuda Guetta, 19, on May 2, at the same location.
Even before his death on May 5, settlers and right-wing activists led once more by the Samaria Regional Council, with the help of the Nahala movement, again set up camp on the small hilltop.
This time, they struck at the most opportune moment. Netanyahu’s mandate to form a government expired on May 3, there was unrest in Jerusalem and pending Sheikh Jarrah evictions. The Gaza war broke out on May 10 followed by Jewish-Arab riots across the country.
The attempt by a small band of right-wing activists to help ensure that Israel maintains its hold on Judea and Samaria by laying claim to one small additional hilltop, drew scant attention and almost no headlines.
In the first days a few modular structures and tents were set up on a sandy lot but by the time Bennett took office some 50 families moved into dozens of structures and scores of young adults set up camp on the site, with more joining in every day.
By now, there are small paved roads, with street names, portable toilets and dozens of temporary structures.
It is for this reason that the Bennett government has sought so hard to find a compromise to at least neutralize the situation.
Among options for a compromise resolution is the placement of a yeshiva and a military base at the site with the promise of legalization in the future if activists first agree to leave voluntarily.
And even that compromise would create internal coalition turmoil. It would also be hailed as a victory for the settlement movement that has grown stronger and bolder precisely on the pillars of such initiatives.
Evyatar will be seen as a marking point for this new coalition. How Bennett handles this outpost crisis will likely set the formula for future ones.
The outposts, like any issues with regard to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict will always underscore what divides the coalition rather than what unites it. In this arena, the only true victory for Bennett is living to fight another day.