An IDF intelligence officer, with the mid-level rank of major from the Palestinian analysis branch, has resigned, becoming the first Israeli intelligence officer to resign over the failure to anticipate and warn of Hamas’s October 7 invasion of southern Israel.
The development, reported first by KAN news, and confirmed by The Jerusalem Post, is a major event in and of itself, but also could set the stage for additional much larger resignations.
To date, IDF Chief of Staff Lt.-Gen. Herzi Halevi, Shin Bet Director Ronen Bar, and IDF Intelligence Chief Maj. Gen. Aharon Haliva has also taken responsibility for the failure in terms which strongly hinted at their readiness to resign.
However, all of these officials to date have said that delving deep into the October 7 failures needed to wait until the current war has settled down.
Although originally, Defense Minister Yoav Gallant had predicted that the Gaza war would settle down by the end of January, recent signs indicate that top defense officials may believe they need to stay on until Hamas’s leadership is eliminated or at least the Israeli hostages are returned, and the conflict with Hezbollah in the North is resolved.
Reisgnation contrasts with Netanyahu's rhetoric since the attack
Given that these are complex strategic issues that could take several months or more to resolve, some have started to predict that none of the top officials would be resigning earlier than late 2024.
In addition, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has aggressively tried to blame others for the October 7 failure and to prevent any probes into the failure which might study his role and strategic decisions in handling Hamas since he was reelected prime minister in 2009.Gallant very belatedly took more responsibility than Netanyahu, but questions linger on his future in office.
The resignation of the IDF major is the first sign that the above officials may not be able to delay resigning or addressing the consequences of October 7 as long as they might like.
While the major had responsibility for downplaying the threat of a Hamas invasion, that was part of a much larger trend and strategic framing of Hamas as a non-threat.
Some have even accused Netanyahu of using Hamas as an indirect “asset” with which to weaken the Palestinian Authority, while not fully preparing for the potential risks of such a path.
Also, the major is far from the only IDF officer who dismissed the Hamas invasion threat.
Piecing together the different insider accounts along with leaked information, the Post has reported that Non-Commissioned Unit 8200 Officer “V” is the female hero who foresaw the full scope of Hamas’s plans and warned about it multiple times leading into October 7.
There also seems to be little question that her superior officer, Lt.-Col. “A” in IDF intelligence, will be depicted as one of the prime culprits who failed, and dismissed her warnings as “imaginary.”
That said, the Post understands that this same lieutenant colonel remains in IDF intelligence, that there had been no plans to dismiss him, and that there might even have been plans to continue his movement up the ladder of IDF intelligence roles.
When some of this news broke in November, keeping the heat off Lt.- Col. A could have been because dismissing him mid-war could lead to calls for higher resignations and could lead them to turn on their even higher-up superiors mid-war.
But with the IDF achieving operational control in northern, southern, and central Gaza – besides in Rafah and Deir al-Balah and with four months having passed since October 7, the resignation of the major may force the hand of others in the IDF and at the political level who have avoided taking responsibility to date.