Israel, Hamas, and the US are all giving out vibes that talks are stalled over disarmament, withdrawals, and fulfilling the later stages of the October 2025 ceasefire in a way that could finally bring the Israel-Hamas War to a close.
If the talks really do get completely stuck, it is possible that Israel could reinvade Gaza at some point. Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and a majority of top IDF officials say they are ready to face such an eventuality if the parties do not reach a satisfactory conclusion in negotiations in the near-to-medium term.
But other forces within the defense establishment are becoming louder in opposing such a rushed move and in some ways for the first time since October 7, are questioning the basic foundations of Israel’s current strategy vis-a-vis Hamas.
Two sides to the failure of Israel's strategic framework
According to these sources, there were two sides to the failed “conceptzia,” Israel’s strategic framework in vigor on October 7, 2023.
The first piece of the failed strategic framework is well-known: the false claim that Hamas, as it was constituted at the time, could be deterred and prevented from any major military achievement, based on the very limited forces the IDF had deployed on the border at the time.
But there was also a second false claim, which defense sources say much of the government and country have still not fully come to terms with: that Israel can “manage” the conflict or simply “defeat” Hamas without paying a diplomatic price.
These sources say that even after around two years of war in the Gaza Strip, in which around 90 percent of Hamas’s structures were destroyed and 25,000 or more terrorists were killed, and after the seven-month standoff since the October 2025 ceasefire, the same terror group still rules in Gaza.
Hamas is weaker. It governs less territory. But fundamentally significant aspects of the strategic balance between Hamas and Israel are unchanged, in that Israel has not succeeded in getting all that close to a tipping point at which Hamas would be removed from power in the Strip.
Few Israelis are currently interested in returning to the mid-1990s vision of a two-state solution, but now that all-out war has been tried extensively, some defense sources are calling on investing more in diplomacy and abandoning the idea that only force, with no concessions, will solve the Hamas-Gaza dilemma.
What price should be paid and how much risk should Israel take on to establish a new security regime against Hamas are issues these sources say can be debated, but they view as erroneous the idea that a fifth, sixth, or seventh invasion of northern Gaza (depending on how one counts) will somehow end the threat of Hamas any more than have the numerous earlier invasions.
They say the problem is not just “hostages”, since some argue that now without hostages around, Israel could really remove the gloves and go all out.
Given the destruction of 90% of Gaza and the tens of thousands of civilians killed there (the IDF acknowledges some of the numbers being bandied, even if it blames Hamas for using human shields), they ask how much worse Israel can really make the situation for Hamas while remaining true to its values of targeting terrorists and not civilians, given the fact that Hamas has shown its willingness to hide among civilians.
They question how much Israel would be “giving up” by testing the water with a longer diplomatic process.
Despite repeated promises by Netanyahu to return to war any day, in many ways, the war is long over.
There have been no big invasions by Israel into Gaza and no meaningful attacks by Hamas on Israeli territory, rockets or otherwise, in about seven months.
Around five weeks ago, the United States proposed an eight-month-long plan during which Hamas would encounter different stages of disarmament.
Hamas rejected that offer and made a counteroffer. What this reveals is that US President Donald Trump is ready to extend the end of the war in Gaza for another eight months as long as Hamas at least starts some kind of process of disarmament.
Trump is also the authority who imposed the end of the war on Netanyahu and Israel in the first place.
If he is not going to easily let Israel get back into a large-scale invasion of Gaza anytime soon, then it makes sense for Israel to try to get something out of this peacetime-ceasefire period
To date, at most, Israel has grabbed tiny, statistically insignificant pieces of new territory and begun to, very occasionally, kill Hamas officials even when they are found beyond the yellow line of the conflict zone, which splits Israeli-controlled, empty Gaza from Hamas-controlled, populated Gaza.
Until now, the sticking point has been that Hamas will only agree to partial disarmament and only in exchange for at least partial Israeli withdrawals.
Israel and the IDF would obviously prefer not to withdraw from the 53% Gaza within the yellow line until Hamas fully disarms.
But the Trump plan always contemplated stages.
There was always a point at which Israel was going to be forced to withdraw to a security strip made up of only 15% of Gaza. And the truth is that many Israeli defense officials acknowledge that such a strip would be adequate and transformational in providing Israel with better security as compared to pre-October 7.
The 53% line is mainly being held as a bargaining chip.
So, what if Hamas were to give up its heavy arms – rockets, drones, anti-tank missiles – and Israel were to withdraw to somewhere in between the 53% line and the 15% line? Wouldn’t Israel have more security at that point if Hamas had abandoned its heavy weapons?
This might also allow for the International Stabilization Force (ISF) led by Indonesia to finally come into Gaza and the Palestinian Authority-linked technocratic committee to start managing aspects of Gaza’s affairs; possibly even to start moving toward a PA-affiliated police force that could begin taking some enforcement powers away from Hamas.
Critics will correctly note that this might play into a trap in which Hamas becomes like Hezbollah in Lebanon, the puppeteer, or the power behind the throne.
But defense sources would shoot back that this ignores the basic fact that, right now, Hamas is not just a puppeteer controlling something; it is openly controlling everything.
Every day that goes by without advancing an alternative to Hamas in Gaza allows the terror group to deepen its control and long-term survivability as the Strip’s ruler.
And every week that goes by brings the US CMCC nearer to closing up shop, with no ISF to replace it. Members of the technocratic committee have started to resign, leaving Israel more, not less, stuck in managing Palestinians’ lives.
None of this even gets into the merits of what might be if Israel committed to some kind of distant, highly adjusted two-state vision (Trump’s plan in 2020 cut a future Palestinian state’s territory from around 95% of the West Bank to around 70%), something which could lead to normalization with the Saudis and much of the rest of the Middle East.
The critical defense sources say that even after October 7, Israelis must realize they cannot just “be rid” of the Palestinian issue.
Can Israel indefinitely hold onto a 15% security zone in Gaza?
Can it use diplomacy to make some initial progress toward the partial disarmament of Hamas, partially weakening Hamas politically after having already heavily reduced the terror group’s threat potential by blunt force?
And could giving positive vibes for regional diplomacy, without even necessarily having to make permanent concessions in the West Bank, lead to radically strengthening Israel’s regional alliance with the Sunni countries against Iran, Hamas, and the Shiite axis?
Theses are questions that defense sources hope will be discussed and debated, such that no one will fall back into believing Hamas can simply be deterred and held back with no security zone and light border security.
In any case, no one can remain stuck in thinking that endless rounds of fighting in Gaza will guarantee Israel’s security any more than will reengaging in a mix of diplomacy and, when necessary, muscle flexing.