The IDF Manpower Directorate chief, Maj.-Gen. Dado Bar Kalifa released Lt.-Col. "A" from military service, the military confirmed on Thursday.
A served as the intelligence officer for the Gaza Division during the October 7 massacre.
On November 23, 2025, IDF Chief of Staff Eyal Zamir ruled that a number of military officers bore command responsibility for the failures of the October 7 massacre, and that command-level measures should be taken regarding them.
Due to A's role as the division's senior intelligence officer, it was decided following Zamir's ruling to initiate the process to review whether he should be released from military service.
He has the right to appeal the decision, the military noted.
On March 23, he petitioned against convening a committee to release him from service. The following day, the court ruled that the committee should not convene until further notice, and placed a gag order on all details of the proceedings.
The court ruled on June 30 that the service termination process, initiated after the IDF's deputy chief of staff issued his opinion on the matter that A had been guilty of professional errors, operational failures, and command responsibility, had been conducted fully within the appropriate legal protocol and with full authority.
The court rejected A's arguments and ruled that the IDF has the authority to initiate the release of a soldier who committed professional and command-related failures.
The court also emphasized that A's right to be heard had not been infringed upon.
What failures were Lt.-Col. A directly linked to?
Army Radio listed several failures directly attributed to Lt.-Col. A's behavior in the lead-up to the October 7 massacre.
Firstly, he was the officer who brushed off a warning that Hamas was training for a major war scenario, dismissing the concerns of a female non-commissioned officer under his command, and writing that it was merely an "imaginary scenario" and that it was nothing more than "posturing and a show of force."
Secondly, he refused to discuss Hamas's Nukhba Force's unusual training activities. When a discussion was finally called for, he did not invite the aforementioned NCO because he was "not interested in hearing her opinion," Army Radio reported.
Third, he concealed the unusual training patterns observed from his commanders. A meeting was scheduled to take place after the High Holy Days period with the Gaza Division commander, but this meeting never took place because it was scheduled for after the massacre occured.
Further, he refused to accept responsibility or resign following the massacre, insisting on staying in his role.
Additionally, after finishing his role, he attempted to progress within the hierarchy of the Military Intelligence Directorate, serving as a project manager in Unit 9900, and at the Military Directorate chief's headquarters.
Army Radio reported that A's father frequently appears in the media as a security expert, while not properly disclosing his son's position. In one interview, the father stated his opposition to the establishment of an October 7 commission of inquiry.
A is currently attempting to wage a legal battle to prevent the publication of his name and identity, even after a court ruled that it could be published.
This is a developing story.