IDF needs to focus on rockets, not tunnels, in the next round with Hamas

In a mainly air campaign, some 1,500 targets belonging to Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad were struck by the Israeli military over the past two weeks with thousands of munitions.

Palestinian students supporting Hamas stand next to mock Hamas rockets during a rally celebrating their winning of the student council election at Birzeit University in the West Bank city of Ramallah April 23, 2015. (photo credit: REUTERS/MOHAMAD TOROKMAN)
Palestinian students supporting Hamas stand next to mock Hamas rockets during a rally celebrating their winning of the student council election at Birzeit University in the West Bank city of Ramallah April 23, 2015.
(photo credit: REUTERS/MOHAMAD TOROKMAN)
Operation Guardian of the Walls secured many of its goals. But the Israeli military would have liked to have destroyed more of Hamas’ long-range missiles.
Some 1,500 targets belonging to Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad were struck by the Israeli military over the past two weeks with thousands of munitions in what was mainly an air campaign.
The IDF says that using plans it devised over the last few years, it was able to take out strategic assets like Hamas’ underground tunnel network, and quickly kill senior operatives.  
Claiming the operation was defensive, the Israeli response was aggressive from the start, hitting two tunnels with an estimated 20 Hamas militants who were planning a raid against Israel.
Over the 11 days of fighting, the IDF destroyed more than 100 km. of the terror group’s tunnel network during multiple strikes in Gaza City and Khan Yunis. Hitting their tunnel network, all built under residential areas, had an effect on the group’s communications, command and control, as well as its ability to fire rockets toward Israel.
The military also assassinated 25 senior officials and some 200 operatives belonging to Hamas or Palestinian Islamic Jihad, a move that the IDF would have usually saved for a bigger operation. But, both the military and the Shin Bet internal security agency – which played a big role in the operation – thought the time was right.
According to their plans, specific individuals were set up for targeted assassination, such as Qassam Brigades commander Mohammed Deif, who was targeted twice but survived.
“We did everything possible during the campaign to make sure that people who should not be alive will not stay alive,” IDF Spokesperson Brig.-Gen. Hidai Zilberman told reporters on Friday.
Though Zilberman said the military also severely damaged Hamas’s ability to develop and produce weapons-destroying workshops and research centers, some of which were designed to upgrade their weaponry, the IDF would have preferred more success in destroying their arsenal.
Due to the blockade on Gaza by both Israel and Egypt, the majority, if not all, the rockets and mortars are locally produced.

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In the last days of the operation, the IDF focused on the groups’ rocket-launching abilities, some 570 airstrikes targeting rockets and their launchers. Of these, 340 strikes targeted rocket-launching infrastructure, such as launch pits, 230 ground-to-ground rockets and 70 multi-barrel rocket launchers. Another 35 strikes targeted mortars.
The two groups combined had an estimated 14,000 rockets – both long-range and short.  Over the course of the 11 days, more than 4,360 rockets and mortars were fired toward Israel, 680 landing inside the Gaza Strip and another 280 falling in the sea – leaving about 10,000 rockets in their arsenals.
The IDF knows that in any future conflict with the terror groups in the Strip, the rockets will continue to be a major threat to the Israeli home front. Because, as they demonstrated, by firing mass barrages of missiles at Israel, the Iron Dome air defense system, while highly effective, can’t intercept them all.
The missile strikes against Ashkelon and the center of the country speak for themselves.