Could street protests prevent Netanyahu from firing Gallant? - analysis

Replacing Defense Minister Gallant with MK Sa'ar strengthens Netanyahu's position and benefits the haredi parties, but faces protest challenges.

Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu. (photo credit: MARC ISRAEL SELLEM)
Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu.
(photo credit: MARC ISRAEL SELLEM)

The move to replace Defense Minister Yoav Gallant with MK Gideon Sa’ar is a clear win for Netanyahu, Sa’ar, and the haredi (ultra-Orthodox) parties, and a clear loss for Ben-Gvir and the opposition. Meanwhile, the X factor, as it has been since the current government took office in late 2022, will be the protest movements’ ability to galvanize Israelis to oppose the move.

The haredi parties, and especially United Torah Judaism led by Housing and Construction Minister Yitzhak Goldknopf, reportedly threatened the prime minister during the past week that his party would not support the 2025 budget without progress on the issue of haredi IDF service.

The main impediment to this progress was Gallant, who demanded that any progress receive “broad approval,” namely, approval by former minister MK Benny Gantz. Gantz and fellow former minister MK Gadi Eisenkot have advocated for a comprehensive agreement that will lead most haredim to join the IDF within a few years, with a set number given an exemption for Torah study. This is unacceptable to the haredi parties, who are willing to accept at most a slow increase in annual haredi draft numbers, chiefly made up of groups on the fringes of haredi society.

Sa’ar has noticeably distanced himself from Gantz and Eisenkot’s position. In debates in the Foreign Affairs and Defense Committee, he has focused on meeting the IDF’s manpower requirements and not on issues of inequality. Sa’ar, for example, supported the Defense Ministry’s initiative to lengthen mandatory service from 32 to 36 months for combat soldiers irrespective of the haredi draft issue; Gantz and Eisenkot, however, insisted that the burden could not be increased on those who serve without first bringing in those who do not.

Sa’ar is therefore a more comfortable partner for the haredi parties on the draft issue, and his entry into the Defense Ministry is a win for the haredim.

For Sa’ar, the move grants him two years as defense minister during a war, which will give him ample time to position himself as the next leader of the Likud. In addition, the agreement reportedly permits Sa’ar to skip the usual three-year waiting period in order to contend in the next Likud primary and perhaps challenge Netanyahu for the party lead. The move would also reportedly grant spots in the next Likud list for members of his party and enable some of his party operators to rejoin the Likud’s central committee. This will grant Sa’ar a sufficient toehold within his old party in order to rebuild his base of support within Likud.

Strengthens coalition and challenges opposition

For Netanyahu, the move is a win for a number of reasons. First, it paves the way to a solution to the haredi draft issue and from there to the 2025 budget; second, it removes Gallant, who has operated independently and has publicly accused him of putting political considerations before national security ones; third, Sa’ar does not come from the security establishment and therefore could prove to be more in tune with Netanyahu, who notoriously has had bad relations with all defense ministers who came from the security establishment and served under him; and fourth, it neutralizes National Security Minister MK Itamar Ben-Gvir’s ability to threaten to topple the government – Sa’ar’s addition would increase the size of the coalition to 68. Even without Gallant’s vote, Ben-Gvir will no longer be able to threaten the 61-MK majority with his six seats.

This is therefore a loss for Ben-Gvir, who is the only coalition party leader currently performing well in polls and therefore the only party leader with an interest in going to an election.

The move is an obvious blow to the opposition as well. Sa’ar was seen as a potential member of a new right-wing coalition that would challenge the Likud’s hegemony, and his rejoining the Likud turned him from an ally into a rival of the right-wing opposition members. It is also a blow in that it reduces the opposition’s size from 56 to 52 mandates, which will make it much harder to pose a real challenge to the government’s existence.

Having said all of the above, the only element that is unpredictable and not within the power of either the prime minister or the opposition parties is the protest movement. Hundreds of thousands of protesters hit the streets in March 2023 in order to oppose Netanyahu’s decision to fire Gallant at the time and succeeded. Whether or not the move will ultimately succeed will depend to a large degree on how much the protest movements will be able to galvanize support.


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On one hand, protests against the government and in favor of a hostage deal have not reached the dimensions of last year’s judicial reform protests. On the other hand, the hostage family’s forum is becoming increasingly desperate and views Gallant’s removal as a death blow to a possible hostage deal. This could lead the forum to ramp up its calls to hit the streets and create momentum that has been missing so far.