Israel entered the multi-front war it finds itself in now nearly three years ago with weakened domestic weapons-production capabilities, gaps in certain weapons stockpiles, and no full, budgeted policy for preserving domestic arms production lines, State Comptroller Matanyahu Englman found in a report published Tuesday.
The report examined Israel’s ability to preserve domestic production of weapons, raw materials, components, and infrastructure used by the defense establishment and the IDF.
According to the comptroller, over the past two decades, certain domestic production capabilities for raw materials used in weapons manufacturing were damaged or lost, while some weapons production lines were weakened because of insufficient orders and a preference for cheaper procurement from abroad.
The issue became more urgent after the outbreak of the war, the report said. As the IDF’s demand for weapons and components rose, several countries – including some described as friendly to Israel – imposed embargoes or restrictions on the supply of weapons, raw materials, spare parts, and components.
At the same time, global demand for such materials had already increased following the Russia-Ukraine war, further complicating procurement.
Procurement target was lower than the operational need
The comptroller found that on the eve of the war, the IDF’s stock of certain weapons was below the procurement target set for the end of 2024. In another case, the target itself was lower than the operational need identified for that period.
The report also found that from December 2016 until the outbreak of the war, the Defense Ministry had not ordered certain weapons, except for one type ordered in June 2023 for delivery by the end of 2024. Most orders for a certain type of weapon were placed only after the war began, according to the comptroller.
Englman’s report said the political echelon had not set a comprehensive, budgeted policy before the war for maintaining domestic weapons-production independence. Former defense ministers discussed parts of the issue, but the report found that they did not address the full range of capabilities required, set priorities, approve a fully budgeted plan, or bring the matter before the National Security Council or the prime minister.
The security cabinet also did not hold a dedicated pre-war discussion on domestic weapons-production independence or on preparations to accelerate domestic production in an emergency by purchasing raw materials and components during routine times, the report found.
The NSC did not recommend that the issue be brought before the cabinet ahead of the war.
The comptroller also criticized the Defense Ministry’s internal work. Domestic production-capability mappings approved in 2021 and 2022 were carried out without the IDF’s participation, the report said. They also did not include a full review of the components, raw materials, and manufacturing technologies used to produce weapons in Israel.
As a result, the comptroller found, the defense establishment lacked a full picture of whether certain weapons could be manufactured entirely in Israel, what it would cost to do so, and which capabilities should be prioritized.
The report further found that before the war, the Defense Ministry had not prepared a structured plan to reduce risks created by reliance on foreign procurement. Such a plan could have included mapping alternative suppliers, signing state-to-state supply agreements, or purchasing stocks of critical raw materials.
ON THE operational implications, the comptroller and the IDF presented sharply different assessments.
The comptroller found that the lack of sufficient domestic production capacity and missing stocks of certain weapons and raw materials had operational significance during the war, including harm to the pace of certain IDF operations and risk to soldiers in specific circumstances.
The IDF, however, said that its combat capabilities were not harmed and that soldiers’ lives were not endangered because of ammunition or weapons stocks. The military said it had been fighting continuously on multiple fronts for more than two years, while achieving “unprecedented” accomplishments, and that it had carried out numerous processes to address gaps and prepare for possible shortages.
The IDF also said it maps and prioritizes operational weapons needs, but that responsibility for procurement composition and weapons production rests with the Defense Ministry.
Domestic munitions production is at the core of the Defense Ministry's strategy
The Defense Ministry said in response that domestic munitions production is the core of its strategy and at the top of its priorities.
The ministry said that since the outbreak of the war, and particularly over the past year, it has worked to close years of gaps and is advancing a broad, multi-billion-shekel plan to achieve domestic weapons-production independence.
According to the ministry, it has established new production infrastructure and expanded production lines in around 20 critical fields together with the defense industries. The ministry said emergency measures over the past year led to a production acceleration of hundreds of percentage points, including through management of critical raw materials, resolving bottlenecks, and training dedicated personnel in the defense industries.
The ministry also said it is advancing a plan to accelerate Israeli procurement and maximize domestic munitions production in critical components as part of the “Shield of Israel” force-building plan, approved by the prime minister and defense minister, at a scope of NIS 350 billion over a decade.
The report comes amid a broader post-October 7 reassessment of Israel’s defense posture. Recent defense planning has included a NIS 350 billion force-building framework, including plans to expand Israel’s F-35 and F-15 fleets. Separate expected talks with the US are set to address a long-term shift from traditional military aid toward joint defense and technology partnerships.
Englman recommended that the security cabinet examine the recommendations of the Nagel Committee on the defense budget and force-building, including those dealing with increasing domestic weapons-production independence, expanding production infrastructure, and strengthening technological superiority.
He also recommended that the Defense Ministry draw lessons from repeated findings on the erosion and loss of weapons production lines, monitor essential production lines together with defense industries, and include raw-material production lines in that oversight.
The report further recommended that the Defense Ministry, IDF chief of staff, and deputy chief of staff set a budget, funding sources, and an action plan for purchasing stocks of raw materials, long-lead items, and discontinued or soon-to-be-discontinued components during routine times, so that Israeli defense industries can accelerate weapons production during emergencies and wars.
Englman also called on the Defense Ministry, the IDF, and the NSC to regularly update the mapping of domestic production capabilities, set priorities, budget them, and bring the issue before the security cabinet as part of multi-year defense planning.
Yonah Jeremy Bob contributed to this report.