The fascination with the haredi problem, and where it leads - analysis

Israelis love drama. Better, they are addicted to drama.

Will those additional 42 or 57 days – or, conversely, a term shortened by a month and a half – really make that much of a difference?

Granted, the government will try to use those extra weeks to push through controversial legislation, first and foremost, splitting the attorney-general’s position. But will what has not been accomplished in four years suddenly be completed in those final, frenetic days?

The answer is almost certainly no. So, why the excitement? Why, after four years of failing to pass a haredi conscription law, and after repeatedly threatening to leave the coalition over the issue, only to repeatedly back down, are the haredi parties suddenly going to bring down the government now?

Why did the head of Lithuanian Jewry, Rabbi Dov Lando, instruct United Torah Judaism to pull the plug on the Netanyahu government and say last week, “We have no confidence in the prime minister; we do not feel like his partners. Elections are needed as soon as possible”?

The haredi parties want to be able to go to their constituents and say: “Look, we brought down the government over an issue important to you: preserving exemptions for yeshiva students.” They could also say – though they won’t, because it sounds far less noble – “preserving draft exemptions for those not studying in yeshivot as well.”

Such a message is not just slogan‑making; it is a way of demonstrating that the parties are still fighting for their base, not quietly acquiescing to the status quo.

Some might assume that such a declaration is unnecessary, and that the haredi parties can count on the haredi public to vote for them regardless. But the numbers suggest otherwise.

Since 1999, there have been 11 Knesset elections. During that period, the haredi parties – Shas and United Torah Judaism, with Agudat Yisrael and Degel Hatorah sometimes running together and sometimes apart – performed best in 1999, when they won 22 seats together. In 2015, they won only 13. In most of the other elections, they have hovered between 16 and 18 seats combined.

In other words, haredi representation has remained relatively stable for a quarter of a century, even as the haredi population has ballooned from roughly 400,000 to 500,000 in 1999, or about 10% of the population, to some 1.4 million in 2025, roughly 14.3%.

That the parliamentary strength of the haredi parties has not grown in tandem with the community’s demographic growth indicates that demographics do not automatically translate into political power.

Bringing down the government even a month before the end of its term enables it to say: “We have principles, and we fought for them.” It lets them cast the rupture as a moral stand over the conscription issue.

The flip side of this manufactured drama is the question of why Netanyahu is now so concerned about the haredim leaving the government that he is once again trying to push through a bill wildly unpopular with much of the non-haredi public.

He has said he will advance the long-stalled legislation on Wednesday, the same day a preliminary vote on dissolving the Knesset is expected.

To understand his rationale, however, one has to look beyond the opposition’s claim that this is merely about squeezing another 42 to 57 days out of the current term. It also goes beyond the belief that a great deal can happen geopolitically in that window - such as regime change in Iran - that could dramatically affect Netanyahu’s political fortunes. Those are secondary considerations.

To understand what else is driving Netanyahu, it is necessary to look at another part of Rabbi Lando’s statement ordering UTJ to move toward dissolving the government.

“We no longer have any trust in Netanyahu,” Lando said. “From this point forward, we will do only what is best for haredi Judaism and the yeshiva world. We must act to dissolve the Knesset as soon as possible. The concept of a bloc no longer exists as far as we are concerned.”

The “bloc” he referred to is the long‑standing alignment between the haredi parties and Likud that has characterized Israeli politics – aside from a few BRIEF exceptions, such as the Rabin era in the early 1990s – since Menachem Begin’s 1977 victory.

For decades, the Likud has counted on the haredi parties as coalition partners, and the haredi parties have counted on the Likud as a reliable, if not always ideal, anchor.

Even with that arrangement intact, the arithmetic of the next Knesset will be difficult for Netanyahu. Without it, it becomes almost impossible.

That is why Netanyahu needs to demonstrate that he fought for the haredim, even if the outcome is uncertain. By advancing the draft bill yet again, he can tell the haredi parties that whatever happens, he did try to deliver on their core demand. He can also tell his own base that he has not abandoned a critical part of the right‑wing constituency.

The irony is that the drama currently consuming Israeli politics may ultimately be less about whether elections are held in September or October than about whether the old political compact between the Likud and the haredi parties can survive after the October 7 massacre.

The extra 42 to 57 days are not, in and of themselves, game-changers.