In the years leading up to the Hamas attack on October 7, it seemed inconceivable that this terrorist group could cause such an earth-shattering shift in the region and globally. However, Black Shabbat is seen in stark terms in Israel.
Today the defense minister speaks of a war for our “home,” meaning that if Israel doesn’t defeat Hamas, then Israel’s future is at risk. Indeed, he has said it is “us or them.” The prime minister speaks of a second war of independence.
If you’d asked experts the day before the Hamas attack what the major challenges in the region were, they might have discussed normalization with Saudi Arabia. However, in general, they would have believed that everything was going well. The Abraham Accords had created a new regional architecture. The US was investing in this regional “integration,” trying to work with Israel, Bahrain, the UAE, Jordan, Egypt, Morocco, and other states. The big controversy before October 7 was that the Foreign Ministry might have slipped up in mentioning a meeting with a Libyan diplomat. However, the region was supposed to be trending in Israel’s direction.
Now that is all in doubt.
Turkey has thrown out “reconciliation” with Israel and is threatening Jerusalem. Most of the countries in the region call for a ceasefire and will not define Hamas as terrorists or even condemn the massacre of 1,000 Israeli civilians. This is how low things have sunk overnight.
For many years Hamas was hosted in Qatar and was normalized.
This is despite the fact it had carried out terrorist attacks, killing hundreds since its founding in the 1980s. But there was an agenda to make it seem reasonable. It could be dealt with, and it was contained. In addition, the sources for Hamas appeared to be drying up. Hamas emerged in the 1980s and thrived in the 1990s and early 2000s when many young people flocked to extremist parties linked to the Muslim Brotherhood in the region. But by 2023, it seemed the Brotherhood was on the way out. It had lost out in Egypt and the Gulf, and in Syria. Yes, the ruling party of Turkey was rooted in the Brotherhood, but Ankara appeared to be changing course from the threats that it had made between 2010 and 2020.
HOWEVER, BEHIND the scenes much was not as it appeared. Ankara’s regime was empowered by elections in the spring of 2023, and it was cemented in power for another five years. China had brokered Iran-Saudi reconciliation, and many Gulf countries were hedging between the West and China. Russia, having invaded Ukraine, was now acquiring drones from Iran, and it was working to unseat the United States as a world leader.
Indeed, the meetings of BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa) and the SCO (Shanghai Cooperation Organisation) illustrated that China and Russia wanted to expand the forums they are involved with to include many countries in the Middle East, such as Iran and the Gulf. Meanwhile, Israel was excluded from BRICS, the SCO, and other meetings. The Russia-China-Iran-Turkey attempt to unseat the world order was emerging.
As it emerged, very few commentators noted that this constellation of countries could empower extremists.
For instance, while Iran was seen by Israel as a major threat, Israel was focused on confronting Iranian entrenchment in Syria and also on denying Hezbollah access to Iranian weapons.
This was called the Campaign Between the Wars. With Hamas isolated, the goal was to defeat the Iranian “octopus” and its tentacles. Iran, meanwhile, had other plans. It wanted to “unify” various fronts against Israel. Toward that end, it hosted meetings of Hamas, Hezbollah, and Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ). It also encouraged the Iran-backed Houthis in Yemen to begin threatening Israel.
In 2021, Iran first did a dry run with this emerging set of variables. It got Hamas to launch a conflict with Israel in the wake of Ramadan. Then, it got militias in Iraq to launch a drone at Israel and militias in Syria and Lebanon to increase threats.
Israel didn’t interpret 2021 as a practice drill for October 7.
It saw this as another small conflict, like numerous ones since 2014. It had operational names for these things, such as Black Belt, Guardian of the Walls, and Shield and Arrow. Show battles to manage Gaza and shrink the conflict. But Iran had other plans. Iran, Turkey, and Russia were working together in Syria against the US. Iran got Syria back into the Arab League. This was at the same time as a Saudi-Iran reconciliation was brokered by China. Iran also did outreach to Egypt. Iran also wanted to get PIJ to inflame the West Bank. It accomplished this in early 2023, getting Israel to launch an operation in Jenin.
It also improved Hezbollah’s position by getting Hezbollah to threaten Israel into a maritime deal with Lebanon. However, the experts thought that the maritime deal, like Qatar hosting Hamas and providing funding to Gaza, would reduce tensions. The theory was that if the terrorist groups get rich, then they will be nice.
However, Qatar had shown its long-term goals with the Taliban already. It hosted the Taliban and got them international legitimacy in Iran, Russia, and elsewhere until they could return to power. Hamas was also being hosted in Qatar and Turkey with the hopes that it could return to power in the West Bank.
Israel believed Hamas was isolated, contained in Gaza
ISRAEL BELIEVED that Hamas was isolated in Gaza and contained – and that the Palestinians were divided. But the backers of Hamas believed that if they waited long enough, it could come to power in the West Bank as the Taliban did in Kabul, by kicking down the house of cards that was the US-backed Palestinian Authority (PA).
All they had to do was wait.
Hamas, meanwhile, planned the massive attack of October 7. It trained men on motorcycles and trucks to strike at the fence. It even drove up to the fence and showed off. It knew that since 2018 – when it began to stage riots at the fence – it could approach and that not much would happen.
Meanwhile, Turkey, Iran, Russia, China, and other countries were slowly primed to be ready for anti-Israel statements.
Russia and China were now viewed by the US as near-peer rivals and, as such, they saw Israel as a US ally and proxy. For them, Israel was no friend.
Turkey also had a historic antipathy to Israel under the current Turkish ruling party. It had reconciled only for energy deals and to sabotage Israel-Greece-Cyprus ties, as well as to get favors in Washington.
Doha was also playing a double game as it had done by hosting the Taliban. It knew that by hosting extremists, it became an essential interlocutor, like a kind of law firm for these extremists, the one you go to in order to broker agreements. Law firms benefit from this, no matter how bad the client is.
Now in the wake of the October 7 attacks, Israel faces an uphill struggle to return to be a center of power and stability in the region. Gulf states did outreach to Israel because it was stable, while the rest of the region was in chaos between 2014 and 2019. Now Israel is the center of chaos, fighting in the West Bank, Gaza, and Lebanon. Israel has also shown that a small dedicated terror group like Hamas can mobilize masses in the region and the West. This threatens the PA in the West Bank and means Hamas could improve its power.
Countries in the region want to back the strong horse. Israel has to show that it still knows how to ride.