The Beirut strike and Hezbollah’s ‘equation’ - analysis

Iran’s proxies are all expanding their attacks. The Houthis targeted Tel Aviv and killed a person on July 19.

 People gather near a damaged site after what security sources said was a strike on Beirut's southern suburbs, Lebanon July 30, 2024.  (photo credit: REUTERS/MOHAMED AZAKIR)
People gather near a damaged site after what security sources said was a strike on Beirut's southern suburbs, Lebanon July 30, 2024.
(photo credit: REUTERS/MOHAMED AZAKIR)

The Israel Defense Forces carried out a precision strike on a Hezbollah target in Beirut on July 30. This was three days after Hezbollah had carried out a rocket attack that killed twelve children and teenagers in the northern Golan town of Majdal Shams. It’s unclear if this “round” of escalation with Hezbollah is now over. However, what is clear is that Hezbollah will enter this into its “equation” of how it views the conflict with Israel.

Hezbollah chose to attack Israel on October 8, in the wake of the Hamas attack on Israel. Hezbollah has decided to create a new rule for its war with Israel. It used to fight Israel in the past for a variety of reasons, some of them contrived to enable Hezbollah to keep stockpiling weapons after Israel left Lebanon in 2000. Hezbollah claims to be “resistance” against Israel. it is part of the Iranian “axis of resistance.” It is an Iranian proxy but also carries out its own policies. Towards that end, Hezbollah sought to pressure Israel in the region of Mount Dov in northern Israel, which Hezbollah claims is part of Lebanon. In 2023, before October 7, Hezbollah created new tensions there.

Hezbollah also pressured Israel into a maritime deal in 2022. The US backed the deal, and Israeli politicians claimed it would reduce tensions. Instead, Hezbollah learned that pressure and provocation work. It increased the provocations in 2023. October 7 was a game-changer. Hezbollah decided to link its attacks with Hamas, enabling Hamas to basically dictate when Hezbollah would go to war. Hezbollah began with small attacks using mortars and rockets and then using anti-tank missiles and drones. It has increased the use and capabilities of drones and rockets, using the heavy Burkan and Iranian Falaq-1 rockets, for instance. The Falaq-1 killed twelve children in Majdal Shams.

Hezbollah has used around 6,000 projectiles in its attacks since October 8. These include a large number of precision kamikaze drones. Sometimes, Hezbollah increases the attacks beyond a 10-mile range inside Israel. This is beyond the area that Israel evacuated along the border. Basically, Hezbollah has been doing a deadly dance with Israel in which it decides when and where to strike. It often doesn’t target areas where it thinks civilians are present. It prefers to target military sites such as Mount Meron or various bases of units. Therefore, despite 6,000 attacks, a relatively small number of people have been killed in northern Israel, but the numbers are growing weekly. Twelve were killed in Majdal Shams, and one was killed today in Kibbutz HaGoshrim.

Hezbollah believes it has a “right” to these attacks, and it has set aside northern Israel as basically part of Lebanon or part of where it is allowed to attack. This is now a kind of “fighting area” that Hezbollah claims it can attack whenever it wants. Anything beyond that, such as Tiberias or Haifa, would be an escalation. Hezbollah re-wrote the rules. Israel obliged, so far. Israel’s leaders are cautious and want to avoid war. They prefer evacuations to war, and they prefer using precision munitions and proportionate response. Iran, using Hezbollah, now fights inside Israel’s borders. This is the first time this has happened since the 1948 war.

 A view shows damage after what security sources said was a strike on Beirut's southern suburbs, Lebanon July 30, 2024.  (credit: REUTERS/Ahmed Al-Kerdi)
A view shows damage after what security sources said was a strike on Beirut's southern suburbs, Lebanon July 30, 2024. (credit: REUTERS/Ahmed Al-Kerdi)

Usually, it was Israel carrying the fight against the enemy, such as in 1967. Even in 1973, Israel immediately went on the attack after the first days of setbacks from the Egyptian and Syrian attacks. Today, things are different, and a war of attrition, which benefits Hezbollah, is taking place. Israel’s officials point to Hezbollah losing 300 members as evidence that Israel has inflicted pain on the group. But Israel has more to lose by letting Hezbollah basically control northern Israel. Hezbollah doesn’t lose much by letting Israel strike “launch sites” in Lebanon and “observation posts.”

 After the Majdal Shams massacre, Israel has said that Hezbollah has crossed a red line. Israel’s Defense Minister and other officials have vowed a strong response. It is unclear if the strike in Beirut on July 30 is the end of the response.

Hezbollah's expectations 

Nevertheless, Hezbollah expects this response to be largely choreographed and messaged beforehand and almost stage-managed like a script, wrapped up with a bow at the end to then say, “This round is over.” Hezbollah has already gone back to daily attacks after Majdal Shams. It is signalling to Israel a message that goes something like this: “You have surrendered northern Israel and now we have a right to attack anywhere we want within ten miles of the border, if you escalate your attacks, we have a right to strike Haifa or other sites.”

This is the Hezbollah equation. Iran’s proxies are all expanding their attacks. The Houthis targeted Tel Aviv and killed a person on July 19.

Israel responded with strikes on Hodeidah. The Iraqi militias have announced they will return to attacking US forces. They expect no real response. Iran is eating away parts of the region and eating into Israel’s historic security doctrine. It’s plausible that Hezbollah's appetite will grow, and soon, it will demand a “right” to strike deeper into Israel. Hamas began with attacks on Sderot between 2000-2009 and then expanded to Ashkelon, Ashdod, Tel Aviv, and Jerusalem.


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At each step, Hamas was appeased, basically. Then came October 7, and then came Hezbollah’s attacks on October 8, and the doctrine of letting the attacks happen in the north migrated from the Gaza front of “managing” the conflict to the north. Now come July 30 and the Beirut strike. Will the equation hold or not?