When the 98th Division moved into southern Lebanon to begin ground maneuvers last week, it marked the beginning of the Third Lebanon War, even if it is a part of what some are calling the greater October 7 War.
Naturally, another war in Lebanon caused concern among the public since the first two – Operation Peace for Galilee in 1982 and Operation Change of Direction in 2006 (commonly known as the First and Second Lebanon Wars) – evoke many painful memories.
The First Lebanon War began well enough, with the IDF quickly pushing the PLO, which had entrenched itself in Lebanon, 40 kilometers north of the border.
However, the IDF did not stop there and carried on to the outskirts of Beirut. Ariel Sharon, the defense minister at the time, had grander ambitions, dreaming of restructuring Lebanon and signing a peace treaty with Lebanon’s Christian president at the time, Bashir Gemayel.
Gemayel was assassinated, Sharon’s plan failed, Israel got bogged down in the Lebanese mud for 18 years, and in the interim, Hezbollah emerged as a dominant force.
The Second Lebanon War had a different trigger.
The Second Lebanon War
It started in 2006 after Hezbollah killed three soldiers along the border and kidnapped two others. That incident took place less than three weeks after Hamas terrorists infiltrated Israel through a tunnel near Kerem Shalom, murdered two soldiers, wounded two others, and took Gilad Schalit captive.
The event on the northern border came so quickly after the attack in the South that it became inevitable that former prime minister Ehud Olmert would respond forcefully to deter any other similar actions and provocations. However, as the Winograd Commission later concluded, the IDF was ill-prepared for a major war in Lebanon.
Lessons from both wars have been learned as Israel embarks on this latest ground campaign in Lebanon.
There is much debate about whether Sharon lied to or manipulated then-prime minister Menachem Begin during the First Lebanon War regarding his war aims, pursuing war objectives far beyond just pushing the PLO back 40 kilometers.
This time, as the troops moved into Lebanon last week, the IDF spokesperson was clear: this operation is localized and limited, aimed at enabling the 60,000 displaced residents of northern communities to return to their homes. Unlike in 1982, there was no talk of creating a new order in Lebanon, and unlike in 2006, there were no promises to totally destroy Hezbollah, indicating this time the goals are more limited.
And, unlike 18 years ago, this time around, the army is well prepared – even super prepared.
In 2006, the IDF had only had five brigades immediately available when the war began, and these brigades had been engaged in anti-terror operations in the West Bank and Gaza for years, not preparing for war in Lebanon. This diminished their readiness.
In addition, as the war in 2006 came as a response to a particular incident, there was no carefully preplanned strategy.
Moreover, after the war began, there were major logistical issues, including problems in mobilizing the reserves – in the end, three reserve divisions were deployed. However, many of the units thrown into action had not trained for years and were woefully unprepared for the type of battle that awaited them.
In addition, budget cuts had significantly impacted the IDF’s preparedness: key equipment, such as bulletproof vests and ammunition, was in short supply, the supply of food and water to the troops was faulty, and there was little coordination between the air force and the troops on the ground.
And, as military historian Martin van Creveld wrote, when the ground operations in southern Lebanon got underway, they “proved clumsy, heavy-handed, and slow. Very large forces – as many as 500-600 tanks with all their accompanying firepower – were deployed. Partly for that very reason, there was no attempt at surprise, no attempt at attacking the enemy from unexpected directions... and little or no cooperation among the various participating formations."
That was then.
In comparison
Today the situation is dramatically different.
First of all, the IDF currently has four divisions, or approximately 15,000 soldiers, inside Lebanon, and they are coming off a year of fighting in Gaza; they are very well-prepared and battle-ready.
The types of logistical problems that plagued the military the last time around are much less of an issue today: the units are well equipped, well trained, and are by this time very well used to fighting together. Perhaps most importantly, the coordination between the air force and the ground troops is in a different league than was the case in 2006.
Second, Hezbollah now is just a shadow of what it was when it first began firing rockets at Israel a year ago on October 8. In the ensuing months, even as the terrorist organization succeeded in driving 60,000 Israelis from their homes and leaving a large swath of the North uninhabitable, Israel has been destroying the infrastructure the terrorist organization built up along the border and has been chipping away at its mammoth arsenal of some 150,000 missiles and rockets.
While there was no overall plan for the war that started unexpectedly in 2006, Israel has been planning – and gathering intelligence – ever since then for its next war with Hezbollah.
The fruits of those efforts have been apparent for the world to see over the last two weeks, beginning with the exploding beepers and continuing with the killing of the commanders of the elite Radwan force, who were trained for an October 7-style attack in the North.
This includes the elimination of Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah and the man who was to replace him, Hashem Safieddine, as well as a significant degradation of Hezbollah’s missile and rocket capabilities.
This time, unlike in 2006, the IDF had prepared abundant surprises.
Hezbollah is an organization without a head, said Defense Minister Yoav Gallant on Tuesday. “Nasrallah was eliminated; his replacement was probably also eliminated,” he said. “There’s no one to make decisions, no one to act.”
Gallant said the military’s actions are being seen across the region. “When the smoke in Lebanon clears, they will realize in Iran that they have lost their most valuable asset, which is Hezbollah,” he said, likening the organization’s once fierce firepower to what Hamas began the war with last year, if not less.
Will the ground incursion in Lebanon be a cakewalk? Most definitely not. But is Israel’s starting position fundamentally better than it was in 2006? Without a doubt.