Despite having killed Hezbollah and Hamas chiefs Hassan Nasrallah and Ismail Haniyeh and despite having successfully invaded both Gaza and southern Lebanon, Israel may still have failed, to date, to convince the Iranian Shiite axis that its existence is beyond being challenged, says former IDF intelligence analysis chief Brig. Gen. (res.) Itai Brun.
Speaking at the recent Reichman University International Institute for Counter-Terrorism conference on world terrorism and afterward with The Jerusalem Post, Brun explained Hamas, Hezbollah, and Iran’s outlook regarding October 7, 2023, as well as major events since then.
Despite all of the IDF’s successes since October 7, the damage to Israeli deterrence that occurred before that time, along with some of Israel’s failures even after that time, have left the Jewish state’s enemies with the impression that it is more vulnerable than in previous decades.
This is surprising because of how hard Israel has pummeled Hezbollah and Hamas in recent months.
Brun, who served as the IDF intelligence analysis chief from 2011 to 2015, including during the large 2014 Gaza conflict, has returned to take over the post for a number of months starting in early April of this year, after then-head Amit Saar resigned due to the combination of a medical crisis and responsibility for October 7. Therefore, Brun is completely updated on current thinking within IDF intelligence.
At the conference, Brun gave a thorough review of the evolving strength of Israeli deterrence in the decades leading up to October 7 and how things have since changed.
Historically, it is known that many Arab countries viewed Israel as defeatable until and even after the 1973 Yom Kippur War. However, Brun said that essentially, from 1991 to 2006, Israel was in one of its strongest positions ever in terms of deterring its enemies with its relative military superiority over any threats.
However, “there was a new period, starting in 2006, of more balance. Each side could only win points [smaller battles, but not a decisive war]. Then, there was more weapons development and the Shiite axis grew stronger together than the separate individual groups. There was American weakness,” and its presence in the region was being reduced.
“They changed their view about how much they think they can hurt Israel,” he said. “Our fundamental deterrence regarding our existence here had been set. But it fell apart starting in 2021. They started to think about ‘winning.’
“There was also a connection” to the judicial overhaul debate destabilizing the IDF, “but this goes back longer to 2021.”
Next, Brun referred to Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei’s tweets against Israel, in which he implied that the events of October 7 had set Israel back 70 years. In other words, despite all of Israel’s military use of force since October 7, Iran and many of its proxies still believe this to be true.
“You are back to a place where your existence isn’t a given,” warned Brun.
Why are Iran and its proxies so confident?
The Post spoke to Brun afterward to clarify how Iran and its proxies could still have so much confidence after the IDF assassinated Nasrallah and Haniyeh and broke apart Hamas and Hezbollah militarily.
He responded, “I am not sure we succeeded in restoring basic deterrence. I ask the question: How does one define the feeling of being able [strong enough to win]? We strongly harmed Hamas and Hezbollah. This raises the question: Is this a historic change? We need to be very careful about whether it has really gone back to the way it was [some years ago].”
Furthermore, he stated, “I claim it [deterrence] was reduced even before October 7. Maybe recent weeks” helped restore some deterrence, but the events of the year were not entirely positive, such as when the IDF was seen as winning too slowly in Gaza and struggling to truly end Hamas or return the Israeli hostages.
“Mostly the last weeks in Lebanon with Hezbollah have been a major tool” to reduce Iran and its proxies’ belief that they can fully overwhelm Israel, and “maybe we shook their confidence in the idea that they can overwhelm us decisively and that they can beat us. This would be a big change,” he said.
Introspectively, he cautioned, “But this has not stopped their overall thinking that they can wear us down [use attrition against Israel] and prevent us from winning.”
Brun identified four factors that provided them with the confidence to overwhelm Israel after 2021 and leading into October 7: 1) They have had new capabilities; 2) a phenomenon of an axis and “ring of fire” that made them cumulatively stronger than they would be individually; 3) US weakness; and 4) Israeli weakness.
“Many of these things remain; mainly, they have only lost capabilities and only for now [since they can be rebuilt],” he contended. “The Houthis and the Iraqis are still firing. The Israeli question is, what do they understand from our military actions?”
Next, Brun was asked why Iran finally decided to attack the Jewish state a second time on October 1 (after an unsuccessful first attack in April) after Israel pummeled Hezbollah.
According to Brun, there are “two main reasons. The recent months didn’t change their views on the capability [to overwhelm Israel]. They saw losses in Lebanon and Gaza, but this was not a huge change.”
Additionally, “their attack on October 1 was based on new Israeli actions in Lebanon. They realized the price they are paying for attrition is larger than they expected. Hezbollah attacked us over the last year. The Houthis attacked us, and we were stuck, failing to make progress with Hamas. We couldn’t win,” he said. “So now, they wanted to signal: you will pay a price, so back down.”
To those Israelis who want to use this moment to remake the region, he said, Iran’s October 1 message was, “Back down; we [Iran] are strong. They took this and decided they were ready to take a [significant] hit from us.”