"Ten Days in September” may be a scriptwriter’s dream when looking to name a television series based on the incredible events between the explosion of thousands of pagers held by Hezbollah operatives and the shocking assassination of Hezbollah secretary-general Hassan Nasrallah.
These 10 dramatic days between September 17 and 27 could signal a profound strategic change in the geopolitics of the Middle East and beyond. Their reverberations continue to send shock waves reaching far from the epicenter of the events, and we probably still do not understand their full implications. Nonetheless, it can already be said that September 27 marked one of the biggest miscalculations in the history of the Arab-Israeli conflict.
Israel’s military achievements in Lebanon since mid-September are dramatic but lack an organized strategy and clear goals. The recently articulated government goal of enabling the return of tens of thousands of Israelis forced out of their homes along the Israel-Lebanon border a year ago is worthy in itself. But it is vague and will not be feasible on its own without additional significant goals, chief among them a broad political settlement within Lebanon’s political-social arena that weakens Hezbollah.
Since its establishment, and even more so since Nasrallah was appointed secretary-general in 1992, Hezbollah has derived its power from three main sources.
The first is the military source – with Iranian support and funding, Nasrallah built a powerful terrorist organization, immeasurably stronger than any other element in Lebanon, including the Lebanese army. The second source is the political one. Through a gradual, sophisticated process, relying on his military power, Nasrallah has subordinated Lebanon’s political-constitutional system to his needs, enabling him to steer policy and veto decisions incompatible with his interests. Hezbollah’s third power source lies in Lebanon’s social arena, where it has embedded itself as a provider of welfare, education, and health services, mainly for members of the Shi’ite community.
Hezbollah's power lies beyond its arsenal
In other words, Hezbollah’s power lies not only in the 150,000 missiles and rockets in its arsenals, but also in subsidized daycare centers, free medical clinics, and a discount supermarket chain. In essence, Nasrallah built a movement on which his followers depend and which his opponents fear.
However, Nasrallah’s miscalculation, which cost him his life, may also lead to a dramatic weakening of his organization’s three sources of power. Hezbollah will not disappear after the war, but Israel and its allies have a historic opportunity to take advantage of the damage inflicted on the organization’s military power and public standing to weaken its hold on the Lebanese state. This would clearly serve Israeli interests and strike a severe blow against the radical regional axis led by Iran.
Many Lebanese view Hezbollah as an Iranian agent acting in the service of foreign interests and deepening the country’s paralyzing economic and political crises. To top it off, Hezbollah has dragged Lebanon into a destructive war, viewed by many in Lebanon to be without any justification or logic.
At this point, Israel must undermine Hezbollah’s sources of power in the domestic Lebanese arena. A military move, brilliant though it may be, cannot achieve this alone. It will result in temporary calm but will fail to deal with the fundamental problems underlying the shaky order in Lebanon.
Instead, a broad-based political settlement is required that both addresses Israel’s security needs and reshapes a new internal order in Lebanon, with an emphasis on comprehensive constitutional reform and economic rehabilitation. The United States, France, and moderate Arab states are the only ones capable of spearheading this process of reconstruction and rehabilitation of the Lebanese state, while systematically weakening the hold of Hezbollah and Iran.
Revamping the Lebanese state could address Israel’s security needs and lay the groundwork for an arrangement between Israel and Lebanon. To that end, Israel must maintain the distinction between Hezbollah and the Lebanese state. The political echelon has done well in addressing the people of Lebanon and making clear that they are not the target of Israel’s attacks. The military, too, has done well in exposing Hezbollah’s cynical use of the Lebanese people through a creative, consciousness-raising campaign.
Establishing such a new order will undoubtedly be a complex task, but the dramatic weakening of Hezbollah and Lebanon’s prolonged crisis presents a historic opportunity that simply should not be missed.
The writer is head of the Middle East and North Africa Program at the Mitvim Institute for Regional Foreign Policy.