Qatar’s bait and switch game as mediator and host - analysis

Qatar is arguing that it won’t act as a mediator any longer, threatening the fate of the hostages because a deal would be harder without Doha in the middle.

 DOHA, QATAR - AUGUST 2: A man holds a Palestinian flag as people attend funeral ceremony, held for Hamas political chief Ismail Haniyeh, who was assassinated in Tehran, at Imam Abdul Wahhab Mosque in Doha, Qatar on August 2, 2024.  (photo credit: Ali Altunkaya/Anadolu via Getty Images)
DOHA, QATAR - AUGUST 2: A man holds a Palestinian flag as people attend funeral ceremony, held for Hamas political chief Ismail Haniyeh, who was assassinated in Tehran, at Imam Abdul Wahhab Mosque in Doha, Qatar on August 2, 2024.
(photo credit: Ali Altunkaya/Anadolu via Getty Images)

After hosting Hamas leaders in comfort for more than a decade, reports have emerged that Qatar has asked the group to leave. 

Hamas was a much weaker group when it moved to Qatar in 2012. It grew exponentially more powerful in Gaza, increasing its rocket arsenal and its threats to Israel while being hosted by Doha. 

Qatar is also a US major non-NATO ally, meaning that a US ally hosts the group that massacred more than 1,000 people on October 7, 2023.

On November 9, the stories about Qatar expelling Hamas shifted focus to Doha, saying it might end its role as hostage deal mediator. 

Hostages have been held by Hamas in Gaza for 400 days, and Doha has portrayed itself as helping a deal take place. 

 Ismail Haniyeh, top leader of the Palestinian Islamist group Hamas, meets people offering condolences after the killing of three of his sons in an Israeli strike in Gaza City, in Doha, Qatar April 11, 2024.  (credit: IBRAHEEM ABU MUSTAFA/REUTERS)
Ismail Haniyeh, top leader of the Palestinian Islamist group Hamas, meets people offering condolences after the killing of three of his sons in an Israeli strike in Gaza City, in Doha, Qatar April 11, 2024. (credit: IBRAHEEM ABU MUSTAFA/REUTERS)

However, after the first deal in November, no such deals have occurred. Elderly hostages and children, such as the Bibas children, were not released. 

The US and other countries have not been able to get their citizens released.

This poses questions about whether Doha has been helping the talks or making sure Hamas gets the deal that Hamas wants. 

Now that there appears to be pressure on Doha to expel Hamas, Qatar is arguing that it won’t act as a mediator any longer, essentially threatening the fate of the hostages because a deal would ostensibly be harder without Doha in the middle.

To understand how we got here, it’s worth looking back at history. 


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Doha has managed to position itself as indispensable by hosting the group that carried out October 7 and then making it seem that having Hamas in Qatar would somehow help with a ceasefire or hostage deal.

One might wonder, if Hamas had never been in Qatar, would it have grown powerful enough to execute October 7? One might also wonder how none of the intelligence services in the region had any hint that this unprecedented attack was set to unfold.

If having Hamas in Doha was beneficial, then why didn’t that prevent the worst massacre of Jews since the Holocaust? If it was a benefit to have Hamas in Qatar, then why didn’t Hamas moderate itself via Doha’s pressure?Why didn’t Qatar condemn October 7? 

Why didn’t Doha even appear surprised by the Hamas onslaught? One would think that most countries hosting a group would be surprised if that group massacred over 1,000 people.

Doha’s hosting of Hamas has been in the spotlight for years. Each time there was a push to get Hamas out of Doha, there was pushback. 

The argument was that it was better to have a Western partner and ally hosting Hamas because this would facilitate dialogue with the group.

In addition, funding flowed from Doha to Gaza. This funding included money for reconstruction after the 2014 war, and it also included money that paid Hamas’s salaries. 

The theory was that the money would placate Hamas. If the money stopped, Hamas would go to war.

The problem with the theory of having a Western ally host an extremist terrorist group is that there is no evidence that having Hamas in Doha has decreased the chances for war.

In fact, the current war in Gaza is the worst in Gaza’s history. If Qatar had been truly helpful, then the war would have been prevented or limited. 

If Hamas had been hosted only by Iran, would the war in Gaza be worse? Would October 7 be worse? It’s hard to imagine how.

Hamas's wider strategy

DOHA’S HOSTING of Hamas was part of a wider global strategy. Qatar also positioned itself as a host of the Taliban so that it could be a key conduit between the US and the Taliban. 

It also positioned itself as a mediator with Iran because of Qatar’s good ties with the Islamic Republic. As such, Doha became the broker of many deals in the region and globally.

Doha’s relationships have been destructive in the past. For instance, their hosting of the Taliban paved the way for their return in 2021, and the Taliban has now crushed women’s rights in Afghanistan. 

It’s likely that having successfully brought the Taliban back to power, Qatar believed it could also bring Hamas to power in the West Bank.

Qatar does not seem to be a neutral mediator. It appears to often prefer more hardline groups, such as Hamas, the Taliban, or groups linked to the Muslim Brotherhood.

However, Doha also knows how to be flexible. During the Gulf crisis, when Saudi Arabia and the other Arab states broke relations with Qatar, it weathered the storm until it could reconcile with Riyadh. It has also reconciled with Cairo.

Qatar is a keen ally of Turkey, and the two countries generally share interests. Both of them are officially allies of the West, but both are happy to work with the enemies of the West. 

Both believe this independent policy benefits them more than merely being on the side of the West. Balancing the West and other countries, such as Iran, can make the “mediator” indispensable to both sides.

Now, reports indicate that rather than expelling Hamas, Doha may be threatening to end its role as a mediator. 

This ostensibly presents Israel and the US with the worst of both worlds. Hamas could remain in Qatar, and Doha wouldn’t mediate.

The real story is likely more complex. Qatar has often hinted in the past that any pressure it receives from Washington or even criticism of its role in Congress could harm the hostage talks.

In essence, Doha positioned itself as a mediator by hosting Hamas and then tried to pressure countries into using it as a mediator. 

This is not a neutral place to be when mediation is the business. It is not altruistic; it is purposely hosting Hamas so that it can become the mediator and so that countries have to go through Doha to get things done.

Reports that Hamas was asked to leave could be a trial balloon, and Doha’s decision to then claim it is ending its role as a mediator may be designed to send a message to Israel and the US that if there is any pressure on Doha, then Qatar will walk away, and the hostage talks and ceasefire talks will end. 

This would then be used to pressure Israel by claiming no other countries would step in as mediators.

The US election on November 5 could also play a role here. Reports say that US President-elect Donald Trump wants the Gaza war to end. 

Doha could be signaling to the incoming administration that it will not be threatened with pressuring Hamas to end the war and that any attempt to get Hamas out of Doha will result in a longer war.

Of course, the US and others could call this bluff. The overall goal of Qatar, though, is to keep the ball in its court and make sure that it is the go-to in the region whenever there is conflict.