After the limitation of reasonableness doctrine in the Basic Law, many citizens experienced a sense of loss and (justified) frustration at the coalition’s forceful and anti-democratic legislation. However, taking a broader and more distant view, it seems at the moment that the coalition’s chances of success of regime change are slim and the constitutional damages are reversible.
The use of the “coalition discipline” political mechanism to force coalition members to vote contrary to their positions, is an effective tool, when used in a measured manner. It cannot be used time and again without jeopardizing the coalition.
The legislation on the limitation of reasonableness doctrine was intended to please Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, to preserve the coalition, and to show that this coalition has brought some kind of achievement. It should not be assumed that additional legislation will be possible by using the “coalition discipline” tool and by pressures and threats by Netanyahu, if he is at all interested in continuing the legislation.
For example, immediately after one of the votes, Knesset member Eli Dalal (Likud) published the following message: “And from now on, negotiations and reaching broad agreements!” MK Dalal also withdrew his bill to split the position of the attorney-general.
At the same time, it was said that Defense Minister Yoav Gallant is working to create a unity government, without Itamar Ben-Gvir and Bezalel Smotrich. Other Likud members gave similar public statements. Their words should be taken cautiously, but neither are they necessarily another spin by Netanyahu. In the future, these elected officials may show more courage and responsibility and make it more difficult to pass additional legislation without broad consensus.
Further legislation without agreement to change the constitutional-legal structure of Israel, whether by the “salami method” or in one package, will ultimately disintegrate the coalition in view of what is happening in society, the economy, and security. However, the lack of progress with the judicial overhaul also endangers the integrity of the coalition on the part of its extremist elements, so the chance that the coalition will last in the coming years is not high.
THE CIVIL protest and the political moves in the Knesset showed that the legislation lacks professional logic and lacks public, political, and international legitimacy. The result was the halting of the main legislative moves at the end of March and a transition to the gradual salami method.
The choice regarding the reasonableness doctrine seemed to be the easiest way forward, which Levin and Smotrich claimed was agreed upon in the negotiations at the President’s Residence.
In practice, the opposition to reducing the reasonableness doctrine was no less impressive than the opposition in March and the coalition passed the legislation with difficulty in vain attempts to find legitimacy in the opposition’s consent until the time of the vote. The amendment of the law was passed, but at the same time a strong message was conveyed that the public does not buy this “salami slice” as a softening or an acceptable compromise.
In this context, it is clear to the coalition that public opinion has turned against it and against the judicial overhaul. Public opinion polls show that a large majority of the public opposes the coalition’s unilateral change of the Basic Laws, including about a third of Likud voters.
These positions are also reflected in election polls that show a shift of hundreds of thousands of votes from the Likud to Gantz’s party. If the situation continues or escalates, the political map will be turned upside down in the next elections, assuming they are still fair. Public opinion is a preventive measure and a powerful means of pressure against coalition members who read polls closely.
Even if the coalition succeeds in passing some of the changes that Justice Minister Yariv Levin and Constitution, Law, and Justice Committee Chairman Simcha Rothman want to introduce in the Basic Laws, it is not certain to what extent the coalition will be able to abuse this partial legal infrastructure in order to pass concrete legislation that infringes on rights, and that such laws will not be overturned by the court based on the existing law.
What will happen when Israel goes to elections?
IN ADDITION, every day and every month of recess that passes brings Netanyahu closer to the witness stand and signing a plea deal. Netanyahu was close to signing a plea deal at the end of Mandelblit’s term. Netanyahu’s attorneys are pursuing another arrangement that will not send him to prison, especially Boaz Ben Tzur, who leaked to the press that he threatened Netanyahu to resign if the March legislation is passed. Signing a plea agreement will require the resignation of Netanyahu and hence a new coalition or new elections.
The big question is whether the next elections will be fair, or whether the coalition will be able to use its power to disqualify the Arab parties, or to gain some other electoral advantage. A bill to change the composition of the Central Elections Committee and the final authority of its decisions has already been presented in the Knesset, but the chance of changing this law is very small.
As long as the next elections do remain fair, and the coalition does not disqualify opposition parties, the composition of the Knesset will change dramatically. The new Knesset will be able to repeal the anti-democratic legislation and pass the “Basic Law: The Legislation.” This would establish clear rules for the status of the Basic Laws, their amendment, their delayed applicability in the next Knesset, and the deepening of judicial review. It would also establish clear rules for clearer power delimitations between the authorities based on checks and balances.
Of course, it is impossible to predict with certainty these political scenarios, and one must proceed from the assumption that the dangers are clear and immediate to democracy. The protests have proved to be a formidable social and political force that is the strongest opposition to the coalition. If we persevere, we will win.
After the elections, the structural weaknesses that have been discovered in society and the democratic regime in Israel will have to be addressed, alongside establishing more effective mechanisms of defensive democracy.
The writer is a protest movements scholar and head of the Department of Politics and Communication at Hadassah Academic College Jerusalem.