As the political and social crises in Israel intensify, so the ideas put forward to resolve them appear to become more extreme and/or less feasible.
There is no question in my mind that compromise is the only reasonable and feasible solution to the crisis. I also believe that if Israel had a comprehensive constitution acceptable to most of its citizens, it would be much simpler to resolve all the various conundrums, or “wicked problems” it confronts.
Unfortunately, for historical reasons we have no constitution, just Basic Laws with an unclear status, and no Basic Law: Legislation, which would at least lay down some practical norms and principles on how constitutional issues ought to be contended with.
Why Israel still doesn't have a constitution
The last time an attempt was made to put a complete constitution together was during the term of the 16th Knesset (2006-2009) when, as chairman of the Constitution, Law and Justice Committee, MK Michael Eitan (Likud) tried to work out a constitution by agreement, together with the Israel Democracy Institute.
The fruit of this effort, which was never completed, can be found on the Knesset website, but since then the chances of reaching agreement on this issue have further diminished, as both the society and the political establishment have become increasingly polarized.
As to the chances for compromise, here, too, we are in a seemingly hopeless situation – not only as between the coalition and the opposition, but also within the coalition and within the opposition. Though a majority profess to want compromise, there is no agreement about what sort of compromise one should aim at.
With regards to the most urgent issue on which compromise is required – reform of the judicial system – the basic approaches of the two sides make it almost impossible to make serious progress. This is because grosso modo the coalition seeks a minor, cosmetic compromise on a set of pretty rigid bills it put forward soon after the government was formed, while the opposition seeks to begin by agreeing in principle on what reforms are required, and then proceeding to work out a new set of bills acceptable to both sides.
The leaders of the reform – especially Justice Minister Yariv Levin – reject any real compromise on principle, and large sections of the protest movement also reject compromise, because its members do not believe that what the government is seeking is a straightforward legal reform, but, rather, an overall constitutional upheaval that seeks to undermine Israel’s liberal democracy,
While I do not believe that there is any chance of anyone being able to work out an acceptable constitution at this point, the issue of compromise is a conundrum we might still be able to crack, especially if Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu will invest less efforts and energy in spreading false promises to the American media, and concentrate on convincing the opposition that he is sincere in his desire to reach a workable agreement with it.
IN THE meantime, in the absence of a constitution and compromise, all sorts of alternative solutions are being bandied around.
One of these solutions speaks of dividing the State of Israel into two states: the State of Israel, centered around Tel Aviv, made up primarily of secular liberals who consider the term “Jewish state” to mean a homeland for all Jews, and based on liberal democratic principles, and the other the State of Judea, centered around Jerusalem, made up primarily of religious Jews and conservatives, who desire a Jewish state in the religious sense.
This idea has more appeal among liberal secular circles, who feel that they are the main victims of the current situation, are suffering from growing religionization, accompanied by a deliberate attempt to turn the undivided Israel from a liberal to an illiberal democracy.
In addition, they feel that they are expected to provide most of the financial backing, know-how and expertise to uphold a state that is becoming increasingly hostile to them and their aspirations. Nevertheless, let us be clear: For the time being, the number of active supporters of this idea is probably no larger than several tens of thousands.
There are several reasons why the idea is unlikely to gain widespread support. The first is that the chances of the two mini states to survive is small. Though the survival chances of the secular liberal State of Israel will be better than those of the conservative religious State of Judea, the first will be a much weakened state compared to the current undivided Israel, while the second will rapidly turn into an impoverished pariah state.
Unless the two states will somehow manage to maintain a joint military force, it is difficult to see how they will be able to survive militarily. What is happening today, in the current crisis, with regards to the IDF’s cohesion and preparedness should serve as a warning to what is liable to happen in the case of the state dividing in two.
Another problem is that Israeli society is divided in many different ways, and it is not clear how exactly the borders of the two states will be delineated. The divide is not only between religious and secular. It is also between Ashkenazim and Mizrahim, between various groups of conservative and radical right-wingers and groups of centrist liberals and more or less radical left-wingers.
The religious community is also divided between ultra-Orthodox (haredim) and National Religious, while the ultra-Orthodox and National Religious are each divided into numerous denominations. And let us not forget the Arab population, which might well take advantage of the breakup of the current state to demand a state of its own. And what about the Palestinians of the West Bank and Gaza Strip, who have lived under some form of full or partial Israeli occupation since 1967?
PERSONALLY, I am totally opposed to the partition of Israel into two Jewish states, and if it were in any way possible, I would even support Israel turning into a binational Jewish-Palestinian state. Though I am a secular, Ashkenazi, social democratic Israeli, I cherish the pluralism of the current undivided State Israel, even though this pluralism is not always easy to bear, and frequently requires one to compromise on his/her principles.
As a Jerusalemite since 1969, almost all the abovementioned divides in Israeli society are part of my daily reality, and I have no desire to replace this chaotic pluralism, with all its advantages and disadvantages, for a largely monolithic secular, liberal, middle-class Ashkenazi Tel Avivian reality. I enjoy driving down occasionally to Tel Aviv to visit friends or attend a play or concert, but the almost total absence of skull caps in the audience feels a little strange to me.
While I would be delighted to live in a state where there is public transportation on the Sabbath (well, I can always move back to Haifa, where I was born), where there is no gender separation in public locations, where there are no disgusting anti-LGBT declarations made by certain ultra-Orthodox and extreme National Religious rabbis, and where soccer fans do not shout “Death to the Arabs” in soccer stadiums, as long as I have a choice I shall nevertheless always opt for pluralism, and in the current social and political crisis will fullheartedly support compromise over any sort of escapist purism.
The writer worked in the Knesset for many years as a researcher, and has published extensively both journalistic and academic articles on current affairs and Israeli politics. Her most recent book, Israel’s Knesset Members – A Comparative Study of an Undefined Job, was published by Routledge last year.