Since the war began, the Israeli-Lebanese border has transformed into a dynamic conflict zone. Despite the primary focus being on combat against Hamas in Gaza, it’s undeniable that the northern border has become a secondary but active front in this conflict. In the past two weeks, tensions in this area have significantly heightened.
The pressing query revolves around whether Hezbollah Secretary-general Hassan Nasrallah’s actions along the northern border merely fulfill obligatory gestures or if they’re a deliberate strategy to pacify Israel temporarily, setting the stage for a more appropriate moment to escalate the conflict into a full-blown war. Pinpointing Nasrallah’s true intentions is a challenge, primarily because even he appears uncertain of them. In fact, all indications suggest that the Hamas attack caught him and his Iranian supporters off guard.
Since its establishment in 1982, and notably under Nasrallah’s leadership starting in 1992, Hezbollah has undergone a gradual transformation into a pragmatic movement. Departing somewhat from the strict Islamic revolutionary principles of the Khomeini doctrine, the organization has embraced a Lebanese national identity, actively integrating itself into Lebanon’s political system.
Hezbollah now wields substantial political influence, possessing the authority to veto governmental decisions. As part of this process of “Lebanonization,” Hezbollah highlights its role as Lebanon’s “shield” against various threats, particularly those perceived to emanate from Israel.
Nevertheless, this process of “Lebanonization” consistently garners significant suspicion. While some perceive it as a genuine evolution, many regard it as a cynical maneuver crafted to conceal the organization’s genuine motives. Additionally, within the internal Lebanese landscape, Hezbollah grapples with an overwhelmingly negative public perception, largely blamed for the state’s economic downturn and political gridlock.
Hezbollah's predicament
Hezbollah finds itself in a challenging predicament – caught between its identity as an Iranian proxy and its allegiance as a patriotic Lebanese entity, as well as balancing its stance within the resistance axis aiming to spread Islamic revolution and liberate Palestine, while also positioning itself as Lebanon’s protective bastion.
Nasrallah confronts a formidable dilemma: On one side, the ongoing conflict with Israel validates the organization’s purpose. However, engaging against the country’s interests would fundamentally undermine its claim as Lebanon’s “shield,” intensify internal opposition, and potentially cause irreversible damage – irrespective of the substantial harm likely inflicted by Israel and possibly the United States, in addition to inflicting substantial damage to the organization’s capabilities.
This dilemma is leading Nasrallah to maintain a stance of not involving himself in a full-blown war, at least for the time being, given that internal Lebanese concerns currently outweigh other factors.
Apart from Hezbollah losing the element of surprise, the internal Lebanese landscape steadfastly opposes drawing the country into war. In the past four years, Lebanon has grappled with its most severe economic crisis in history, compounded by the absence of a serving president and governance by a non-functional transitional government. Lebanese citizens are acutely aware that entering the war could exacerbate an already severe humanitarian and economic crisis, potentially surpassing that of the 2006 war.
The extensive devastation in Gaza serves as a poignant warning of the fate awaiting Lebanon should Hezbollah opt for war. Concurrently, tens of thousands of Lebanese in the southern regions are evacuating their villages, actively preparing for potential conflict. It’s crucial to note that Hezbollah’s internal Lebanese considerations align with Iran’s interest in avoiding involvement in the war.
Nasrallah wants Israel to play the aggressor
INTERNAL LEBANESE considerations surfaced in two recent speeches by Nasrallah, attempting to portray Hezbollah as aligned with the Palestinians. However, reading between the lines reveals his hesitation to escalate the conflict, particularly emphasizing Iran’s alleged lack of prior knowledge about the attack. These speeches drew vehement criticism from across the Arab world, accusing Nasrallah of being someone who glorifies resistance and confrontation with Israel but ultimately forsakes the Palestinians in their time of need.
In alignment with the Iranians, Nasrallah is navigating a middle-ground strategy aimed at avoiding an all-out war, while positioning himself as a champion of the resistance cause. He seeks acknowledgment for sustained attrition tactics against Israel, leveraging significant IDF forces on the northern border and prompting the evacuation of tens of thousands of northern residents. Simultaneously, he adheres to his interpretation of the “rules of the game,” preventing the escalation to full-scale war.
Hezbollah’s attrition along Israel’s northern border fits into a broader context where other Iranian proxies in Syria, Iraq, and Yemen exert pressure on the Americans and their allies in the Middle East, collectively aiming to coerce Israel into accepting a ceasefire.
As the conflict rages on in Gaza, the attritional maneuvers orchestrated by the Iranian axis in the Middle East, spearheaded by Hezbollah along the Lebanese border, are expected to persist. This policy of walking on the threshold may backfire: Any misstep could easily tip the scales, thrusting the northern theater into a war zone that few, except the Palestinians, genuinely desire.
But if Nasrallah would opt to escalate the conflict to an all-out war, it’s plausible that he would strive to goad Israel into initiating the first strike. Perceiving himself as a leader who exercises prudent and calculated decision-making, it would be challenging for him to justify instigating a highly destructive war to the Lebanese public.
His likely narrative would pivot on portraying Israel as the aggressor, positioning himself as Lebanon’s “shield,” compelled to defend and retaliate in response to Israel’s actions.
Israel has chosen to focus its efforts on the southern theater, refraining from broadening the conflict in the North. Nonetheless, the ongoing war in Gaza, particularly its aftermath, could present Israel with an opening to alter the power dynamics concerning Hezbollah, whether through military or diplomatic measures.
Meanwhile, Hezbollah has chosen to join the ceasefire by Israel and Hamas, but the Israeli-Hezbollah confrontation is far from over.
Prof. Elie Podeh instructs at the Department of Islamic and Middle Eastern Studies at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem and serves as a board member at Mitvim – The Israeli Institute for Regional Foreign Policies. Eitan Ishai is a doctoral candidate within the Department of Islamic and Middle Eastern Studies at the Hebrew University, focusing on Lebanon.