I do not know anyone who on this day does not wish that the year 2024 will be a better one than the Gregorian year that just ended. However, we do not agree about everything that was bad about 2023, and about what we shall view as positive in the new year.
What we all appear to agree about is that the events of October 7 were the epitome of evil performed against us, and the greatest catastrophe that befell us as Jews since the Holocaust. Most of us also agree that the only correct reaction to what happened on that day is the use of force to eradicate Hamas, which has been in power in the Gaza Strip since it overthrew the Palestinian Authority there in 2007, and that maximal unity among us is required in order to achieve this goal.
However, when it comes to our hopes for what will unfold in the new year, we are as divided as we ever were.
If we take a look at our second declared goal in this war – the release of all our hostages held by Hamas and others in the Strip, whether alive or dead – here the differences start to emerge.
There are those, first and foremost among the families of the hostages, who demand that the immediate release of all the hostages should be Israel’s first priority, because time is running out on their chances to survive. In fact, it is believed that of the 129 remaining hostages, as many as 30 are no longer alive – whether killed already on October 7, and taken to the Strip as bodies, or killed under various circumstances, some even by our own forces, after being taken alive across the border.
It is no secret that there is no consensus on the day after
We do not usually hear anyone speaking openly against placing the release of the hostages immediately as the first priority, since this involves a tacit admission that endangering the lives of the remaining living hostages is a risk that must be taken, and a price that we must be willing to pay. But it cannot be denied that there are Israelis who feel this way.
Next there is the question of “the morning after.” Our greatest ally and supporter – the US administration – keeps insisting that Israel must decide on its plan for the day after Hamas is eradicated.
Last Thursday the narrow war cabinet was scheduled to hold a first discussion on “the day after.” However, after Finance Minister Bezalel Smotrich and National Security Minister Itamar Ben-Gvir raised all hell, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu made a U-turn, and canceled the discussion, rescheduling it for the broad security cabinet, of which the two are members.
It is no secret that there is no consensus – neither in the government nor within Israeli society in general – as to what should become of the Strip on the day after. The most extreme right-wing opinion, which seems to enjoy the support of certain sections in society, in Otzma Yehudit, the Religious Zionist Party and quite a few MKs and even ministers from the Likud, is that after the war is over, Jewish settlement should return to the Strip, in one form or another.
At least formally Netanyahu does not support this position, and speaks of an administration for the Strip that is “neither Hamastan nor Fatahstan.” As to what should be, he is vague, saying only that the Strip should be demilitarized, and that Israel should maintain the ability to enter it militarily whenever it considers this necessary.
What Israel’s Center proposes is also not clear, though supposedly it maintains that the Palestinians – but certainly not Hamas or the other terrorist organizations – should be involved. One response given by leader of the opposition Yair Lapid to a question on the future of the Strip was that the PA should be part of the solution, but only if it can gain very broad international support, including that of the moderate Arab states.
The Left is inclined to support the two-state solution on principle, though no one really believes that under the current circumstances such a solution is feasible – it is more of a vague forecast for some undefined time in the future.
And what about the judicial reform we've all forgotten about?
THE NEXT point of contention is what is to become of the judicial reform proposed by Justice Minister Yariv Levin on January 5, 2023. Though it is unlikely that the government will actively return to the judicial reform in the foreseeable future, the issue is not dead, and the Supreme Court is expected to deliver its verdict about the cancellation of the argument of reasonableness in court decisions, which went into effect on July 23. It is said that the amendment will be canceled by a decision of eight justices in favor and seven against. However, that might turn out to be the last time that the liberal forces within the court will command a majority, and even now the majority is very slim.
Netanyahu keeps scolding the parties that are not members of his all-right coalition that they are playing politics despite the ongoing war, even though he himself is deep in the political game as a result of the consistent outcomes of public opinion polls regarding the political situation. All the polls predict that the Likud under Netanyahu might lose up to half its Knesset representation if elections were held today, and that his all-right coalition will fall from a majority of 64 Knesset seats to less than 50, and this despite the fact that there has been a clear shift to the Right in the Jewish Israeli public since October 7.
However, the way the electoral system works, what counts is the number of MKs the government actually commands, and not the predictions of opinion polls. Unless some of the current coalition members (not counting Benny Gantz’s party) will decide to vote in favor of bringing down the government and calling for new elections, the current government has good chances of surviving until the end of 2026.
This does not mean that irrespective of the continuation of the war against Hamas, and its possibly spreading to a full-scale war against Hezbollah in Lebanon, the political battle within Israel will not intensify. Already there are voices from the direction of the all-right coalition that are spreading conspiracy theories to the effect that supporters of the opposition within Israel’s military command cooperated with Hamas over the latter’s attack on October 7 in order to bring about Netanyahu’s demise, or warnings that a government headed by Gantz will bring about the establishment of a Palestinian state in the West Bank and Gaza.
On the opposite side, Netanyahu’s opponents argue that he has a vested interest in the war against Hamas lasting as long as possible, for the sake of his own political survival.
Of course, we do not really know how things will evolve regarding all these issues in the next 12 months, though as things look at the moment the year 2024 is unlikely to be less bumpy than 2023 was.
The writer worked in the Knesset for many years as a researcher, and has published extensively both journalistic and academic articles on current affairs and Israeli politics. Her most recent book is Israel’s Knesset Members – A Comparative Study of an Undefined Job.